SPINOZA ON KNOWING, BEING AND FREEDOM

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SPINOZA ON KNOWING, BEING AND FREEDOM

SPINOZA ON KNOWING, BEING AND FREEDOM

PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SPINOZA SYMPOSIUM AT THE
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
IN THE NETHERLANDS
(LEUSDEN, SEPTEMBER 1973)

EDITED BY J. G. VAN DER BEND

1974

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PREFACE

From September 10th till 13th, 1973 a Spinoza symposium was organized in the International School of Philosophy in the Netherlands. The main subject of discussion was the epistemology of Spinoza. The fifteen papers which were discussed are published in this volume.

Since what Arne Naess said in the first lecture is generally true: 'I know of no philosopher after Spinoza from whom people can learn as much of significance for our life and community' (see p. 6) this symposium in the School is justified. For the International School of Philosophy ('Internationale School voor Wijsbegeerte') is a centre for the realisation and promotion of human freedom and solidarity, by critical reflection and by an attempt to extend the image of man-kind and of the world that every one has formed for himself. That is why the School welcomes all those who occupy themselves with fundamental questions of life and community.

I hope that the symposium and its proceedings will play in some way a part towards the encouragement of the study of Spinoza's philosophical thought.

v.d.B.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Eth	= Ethica
IIP40Sch2	
(standard form)	= Ethica Part II, Propositio 40, Scholium 2
AffDf	= Affectuum Definitio
AppCap	= Appendix Caput
Ax	= Axioma
Cor	= Corollarium
Dem	= Demonstratio
Df	= Definitio
Expl	= Explicatio
Lm	= Lemma
Praef	= Praefatio

CM	= Cogitata Metaphysica
Ep	= Epistola
KV	= Korte Verhandeling (Short Treatise)
PPC	= Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae
TIE	= Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione
TP	= Tractatus Politicus
TTP	= Tractatus Theologico-politicus

V&L	= Van Vloten & Land edition (1914)
G	= Gebhardt edition (1925)
GIIp.8,10	= Gebhardt ed. Volume II, page 8, line 10.

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INTRODUCTION

Some idealistic tendencies in Spinoza

It seems to me a good thing to declare why I wished to give a central importance in this symposium to Spinoza's epistemology.

Several years I was engaged with the oeuvre of the Dutch philosopher Dr. J. D. Bierens de Haan, who called himself now an idealist, now a Spinozist.[1] Concerning Spinoza one might call him an idealist interpreter of Spinoza, one for whom Spinoza's first kind of knowledge was connected with things in their appearances while the third kind of knowledge, the *scientia intuitiva*, brings men to realize the unity that exists between the mind and the whole of Nature.

In 1966 C. de Deugd published his dissertation on Spinoza's first kind of knowledge.[2] He interpreted Spinoza's epistemology just the other way round: the *scientia intuitiva* was, in his view, of relatively minor importance in his philosophical system. On the other hand he held that the first kind of knowledge is not limited to the world of appearance but is connected with the reality of things and consequently contains the possibility of true knowledge. De Deugd then blames idealist interpreters of Spinoza, among others, for the fact that every criterion of truth is generally denied to the first kind of knowledge. On reading this, one wonders whether the idealist interpreters have been such dolts as not to have seen this or whether they have distorted Spinoza's thought, in other words deliberately read idealistic tendencies into it. De Deugd's ideas lead in the latter direction.

In my book on Spinozism in Dr. J. D. Bierens de Haan I aimed to show that Spinoza himself gives grounds for idealistic interpretation.[3] I must content myself with giving a few important points in which this is the case.

Of course this is not the appropriate place to work out this train of thought in detail. Nevertheless I feel I must say a little more on the topic by way of justifying the subject of the congress. I am convinced that the discussion I opened, as to the possibility of the empirical-realistic and the idealistic interpretation of Spinoza will probably be raised again and again.

According to Bierens de Haan, Spinoza's place is in the idealist

tradition, which has had its representatives through the ages. The sixteenth-century idealist thought on which Spinoza built consists in the proposition that true reality resides not in appearances and definition but in the General. The General is the Unity, the whole. It is reason which in its autonomy postulates its own unity as the basis of reality and comprehends the particular from the General, the Totality.

19th and 20th century idealism have given their own slant to this concept. In consequence we now have a clearer appreciation of the real tendency of Spinoza's thought, according to Bierens de Haan. I have no wish to say more at the moment about Bierens de Haan. I have strong objections to his interpretation of Spinoza and I believe I have arguments to counter it. On the other hand I find it a deficiency in De Deugd's view that he glosses over or overlooks the idealist tendencies in Spinoza's thought.

I should like merely to propose a few arguments to counter his representation of Spinoza as empirical realist. I should like to do this in four propositions.

The first concerns the parallelism in Spinoza between the epistomological and the ontological foundation of the Substance, whilst on the other hand the attributes are only and exclusively founded in an epistemological manner.

'By that which is self-caused', so runs Spinoza's definition, 'I mean that of which the *essence involves existence*, or that of which the nature is only *conceivable* as existent' (IDf1), and 'By substance, I mean that which *is* in itself and *is conceived* through itself...' (IDf3). This parallelism we find also in the definition of 'modus' (IDf5). Next to it we meet only the ontological positiveness in the definition of God, namely: 'By God, I mean a being absolutely infinite' (IDf6). But in the following propositions about God, in which God is identified with the Substance, the parallelism is stated again, for instance: 'Besides God no substance can be *granted* or *conceived*' (more correctly translated in the Gutmann edition: 'Besides God no substance can *be* nor *be conceived*' (IP14), and: 'Whatever is, is in God and without God nothing can *be*, or *be conceived*' (IP15).

When, however, Spinoza defines the attributes, the parallelism has been broken: the ontological aspect falls out and only the epistomological aspect is upheld: 'By attribute I mean that which *the intellect perceives* as constituting the *essence* of substance' (IDf4). In the following propositions the attributes have indeed been put together with the 'reality of the substance' or 'the nature of substance'. But when Spinoza again and again calls the attributes the expressions of the substance, they are its expressions to the human mind or conception. Besides, he seems to use the terms 'exprimere' and 'explicare' quite promiscuously. With that our problem is diverted to the meaning

which we must ascribe to these two words: 'exprimere' and 'explicare'.

In this context it leads too far to set out this research. I will confine myself to remarking that according to Spinoza the attributes are not ontological elements, because as they only methodologically have the function of expressing the substance to the human mind, not to corporal or extensional experience. These means give rise to an idealistic interpretation because the parallelism of 'being' and 'conception' is disturbed in favour of the conception of the human mind.

A second reason for stating that Spinoza himself has given grounds for idealistic interpretation is that he has attached much more importance to the infinite mode of the 'intellectus infinitus' (the infinite intellect) than to the infinite mode of 'motus (et quies)', the infinite motion in extension. In the co-ordination of motion and rest the latter has sometime a positive sense, while confusion, being the absence of true ideas, is always judged negatively. This, however, is of minor importance.

Causality in Spinoza is a logical causality. The regular used term 'sequitur' (it follows *from*) seems to indicate a scientific, a physical determination: all in nature is in motion (or in rest) and all things naturally by necessity follow from the next cause. Next to it, however, this causal determination is placed in a wider context, since it is also a logical causality. This logical causality, which is stated by 'rationari', reasonable argumentation, means the logical definition or determination of the one from the other by the human mind, in so far as ('quatenus') that human mind forms part of the infinite intellect. Spinoza therefore defines an idea as 'a conception of the mind, which the *mind forms* because it is a thinking thing' (IIDf3).

A third basis for idealistic interpretation of Spinoza can be found in the co-ordination that Spinoza makes between the 'conatus' (endeavour), the reason and the infinite intellect.

'Everything, in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persist in its own being' (IIIP6), 'The endeavour wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its own being is nothing else but the actual essence of the thing in question' (IIIP7).

In these propositions of part III of the Ethics, Spinoza for the first time speaks of the endeavour to persist in its own being or essence. Only once in the first and once in the second part of the Ethics is there talk of the endeavour, but there of the perseverance of the existence, not of the essence. It seems that later on both existence and essence fall under the endeavour to preserve.

The endeavour is not only a real establishment or an established reality of the fact that everybody naturally wants to persist in their existence and being, but also the foundation of virtue (IVP18Sch).

In accordance with the laws of one's own nature the mind endeavours to achieve that which is useful. And since it is useful to live 'in accordance with the dictates of reason' Spinoza says: 'To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is in us the same thing as to act, to live, or to preserve one's being in accordance with the dictates of reason' (IVP24). Than Spinoza takes another turn: '... the essence of reason is naught else but our mind, in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands; therefore whatsoever we endeavour in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand ('intelligere')...; this effort at understanding ('intelligendi conatus') is the first and single basis of virtue' (IVP26 Dem). 'The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God' (IVP28).

Man is reduced to mind. His corporality has no more importance. 'The essence of the mind consists in knowledge, which involves the knowledge of God' (IVP37Dem).

That is the reason why the highest degree of the endeavour to preserve one's being is the 'conatus intelligendi', the endeavour to achieve insight or 'the endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of knowledge' (VP28).

In the continuation of this reasoning also lies Spinoza's conception of immortality.

In the fourth place I think there is a reason to state that Spinoza turned against the empiricism of his time, in spite of the fact that a large measure of reality-conception, of realism cannot be denied to him. For, first, the empirical experiences of men acquire importance in so far as they are reflected and conceived. Secondly, reason is able to conceive true ideas, apart from all empirical reality. At this point I will only mention the twenty-ninth proposition of the fifth part of the Ethics: 'Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the essence of the body under the form of eternity'. Even when someone 'possesses a body capable of the greatest number of activities, (he) possesses a mind whereof the greatest part is eternal'; in other words: 'it is the mind that "possesses" the power of arranging and associating the modifications of the body according to the intellectual order, and, consequently, of bringing it about, that all the modifications of the body should be referred to the idea of God' (VP39). Spinoza does not attach any importance to even the corporeal things. With interhuman relations the case is the same. His psychological definitions pursue to state utilitarian (utilistic) morals, but these morals discharge into the highest purpose, namely the 'conatus intelligendi', the endeavour to achieve insight.

By this four remarks I have tried to indicate, that in Spinoza there may be found grounds for idealistic interpretation.

v. d. B.

NOTES

[1] Dr. J. D. Bierens de Haan, 1866-1943.

[2] C. de Deugd, *The Significance of Spinoza's First Kind of Knowledge*, Van Gorcum, Assen 1966.

[3] J. G. van der Bend, *Het Spinozisme van Dr. J. D. Bierens de Haan*, Wolters/Noordhoff, Groningen 1971.

ARNE NAESS

IS FREEDOM CONSISTENT WITH SPINOZA'S DETERMINISM*

INCONSISTENCY?

Spinoza has been charged with inconsistency in proclaiming both determinism and freedom. Some have put forth weighty arguments against the charge, but the matter is still controversial. Many historians of philosophy of this century have upheld the charge.

In one of the most widely read histories of philosophy it is simply said that Spinoza denies human freedom. But he is also said to try to 'have it both ways': to maintain both an extreme determinism and an ethics presupposing freedom (Copleston).[1]

In what follows I shall argue against the thesis on inconsistency and also try to clarify in what sense Spinoza is determinist, in what sense he is not, – and *in what sense he did not take a definite stand*.

The importance of this undertaking is due to the actuality of Spinoza's teaching, properly understood. I know of no philosopher after Spinoza from whom people can learn as much of significance for our life and community. We therefore need clear expositions of the doctrine of freedom, determinism and necessity which do not contain unnecessary philosophical technicalities. In what follows I try to offer one such exposition.

DETERMINATION: MEANINGS AND KINDS

Determination is basically a relation between two relata, the determinans and the determinatum. If A determins B, B may or may not determine A. This holds good whether A and B are different, or in more rare cases, identical. The bounderies of Dutch administrative regions determine each other. We have then to do with a topological determination.

Given the function of whole numbers $y = f_1(x) = 2x$, the choice of x'es determines the y's. But we can also write $x = f_2(y) = \frac{1}{2}y$. The relation is symmetric. The choice of y determines the x'es. Or, less voluntaristically and more in the way of ontology, x'es determine y's and y's determine x'es.

* Formulating this paper I have greatly profited from reading two unpublished manuscripts by Ragnar H. Naess, and from subsequent discussions.

Thus formulated we still use a verb, 'to determine' which suggests a time interval. This we may eliminate in our example saying that to every and any x there correspond one and only one y, and vice versa. Time is eliminated. We obtain a key by which to survey in thought an infinitely rich set of pairs of numbers, namely those satisfying the functions.

Two angles in a plain triangle determine the third. If the two are 30° and 60°, the third is 90°. But the third does not determine the two. They may be 15° and 75°, or both 45°. The relation is assymmetric.

In these topological, algebraic and geometrical examples, time does not enter. We might add a long list of other kinds of examples in which time does not enter.

If 'time enters', that is, if A *antedetermines* B, if there is a difference in time, however small, between A and B, the relation is by definition or by logic of time, non-symmetric. If A determines B, B cannot determine A. If the ring of a bell determines Mr. Brown's immediate raise from bed, this second happening does not determine the first happening. On the other hand, appropriate location of a bell may well determine the ring of the same bell if Mr. Brown jumps out of bed, hitting the bell. This only points to the relevance of a proper description of different contexts.

If A determines B and B determines C in time, one may or may not say that A determines C. Some concepts of determination in time are such that there must be time continuity between determinans and determinatum, others admit the possibility of an interval. The latter is the case when we in daily life say that the bell makes Mr. Brown jump out of bed: He may yawn before doing it without falsifying our contention.

Taking antedetermination to be a subkind of determination in a broad sense, we ask: Does Spinoza, when using the terms *determinare*, *determinatum*, *determinatio*, *predeterminatio*, intend to express an antedetermination or other kinds of determination? What can be learned from the many occurrences of the terms in Spinoza's texts, primarily the *Ethics*?

There is perfect agreement among Spinoza specialists that in *some* occurrences timeless determination is intended. Thus, the complete determination and causation of all things by God is clearly timeless. According to the doctrine of immanence of God in the world, or more accurately in Nature, God could not precede Nature, and create it. Further, when he causes himself, he does not precede himself in time.

Let us, however, raise the question: are *all* occurrences of *determinare* (etc.) in the *Ethics* such that timeless determination is intended?

At first it seems evident that some occurrences are of antedetermination. Thus IP28 has been largely interpreted to refer to chains of events in time.

But there is in IP28 and its complicated demonstration no *direct* reference to time or duration. One thing (*res singularis*) is the cause of an other which in turn is the cause of a third. IP28 would furnish occurrences of *determinari* and *determinatum* in the sense of antedetermination if and only if the *determinatum* according to IP28 or its proof follows immediately after the *determinans* in time, or after an interval of short or long duration. But there is no direct indication of this. But even if there were a reference to time, it need not be the onedimensional *historical* time when each unique limited starts to exist at a certain date and vanish at an other. The equation of physics contain 't', but they do not contain dates.

We can therefore not without arbitrariness infer from the occurrence of the term *causa* in IP28 that there is a case of antedetermination. The causation may be of one of the timeless kinds, for instance that of delimitation or that giving a reason or ground for something. Or, the delimitation of one thing or power in relation to others.

THE INFINITE CHAIN OF TIMELESS CAUSES OR REASONS

In IP28 a singular thing is said to have a cause, which again has a cause – not several or infinitely many causes. We thus are led to picture a simple chain of causes – and why not then a chain of events in historical time? Time is onedimensional. The most important argument in favour of IP28 being interpreted to tell about processes in time stems from this peculiarity. One thing seems to have only one cause, and if so, it is natural to think of something just preceding it. But there are many reasons for hesitation.

The cause of a particular thing – its existence and way of operation – is according to Spinoza identical with that through which the thing is understood. The understanding of the cause *contains* the understanding of the effect. The cause of the cause is, again, something through which the latter can be understood. Thus, we have here a chain of causes corresponding to a chain of questions 'why?' and 'how?'. But it is not a timechain. At least not when we cognize the second or third way.

Time is an *ens imaginationis* and this influences the status of time cognitions.

That through which something is understood has a form of unity through its hermeneutic function. It is therefore not unnatural to refer to it in the singular – as the cause rather than the causes. This may contribute to the explanations of why Spinoza uses 'cause' in the singular in IP28.

If B is understood through A, A may, according to common usage, be something existing before B in time or it may not. This holds even

if A and B are particular things. Giving examples should be easy, but I hesitate because of the complicated use of the term *res* in the *Ethics*. Is a man, a horse, a happening, a singular thing (*res singularis*)? If a concrete happening or event is a thing, time may not enter in its explanation. 'The cause of the increased pressure is the increase in temperature'. Here the increase in temperature does not *preceed* the increase in pressure. There is no antedetermination.

Causes are said in IP28 to determine existence and definite ways of operation. The reference to operations in IP28 therefore does not suggest that *causa* as used in IP28 is someting determining something that will appear later.

Conclusion concerning IP28: There is in IP28 and its proof no decisive argument in favour of complete or incomplete determinism in time. The determinism may be one of timeless determination, for instance, in the sense of lack of arbitrariness or chance.

In *Letter 23* Spinoza says that 'all bodies are surrounded by others, and are mutually determined to exist and to operate in a definite and determined matter'. Mutual determination of A and B occurs when A determines B and B determines A. Here the *determinatum* cannot follow after the *determinans* in time, the effect cannot precede the cause. Clearly, Spinoza sometimes speaks about mutual physical determinations which do not make up onedimensional chains and which therefore do not indicate succession in time.

Spinoza sometimes stresses explicitly that 'the definite way a thing exists and operates' does *not* refer to duration. Thus in the preface to Part 4. The definite *kind of* way of operation is determined by the essence of the thing. But the essence of a thing does not precede its operation in such a way that after the occurrence of the essence, the thing starts to operate. Determination by essence, if we apply the definition of essence in Part 2, precludes temporal or processual determination. 'The reality, that is, the essence of a thing in so far (the thing) exists and operates in a certain way, has no relation to its duration.' If the essence determined the operation as a chain of events in time, it would also determine beginning and end, i.e. duration. From this I also infer that the determination by essence cannot be in time.

In a chain of events, the event A just preceding event B may be said to determine the existence, but scarcely the operation of B. Events do not operate. If a cause A determines both the existence *and* the operation of something B, A must at least have a concrete kind of thing character, not event character. The time-relation is then either irrelevant or only accidental.

– From all this I also tentatively conclude: A complete description of *the way* in which a thing exists and operates does not contain dates. The mutual determinism of all ways of existence and operation is not a determinism in time.

All possible things are, according to Spinoza, expressions or manifestations of Spinoza's God. But perhaps this God is simply not interested in a definite order in time? And Spinoza was perhaps not interested?

ANTEDETERMINATION AND TIMELESS KINDS OF DETERMINATION

It is my first tentatively asserted general thesis that what holds of IP28 holds for the *Ethics* as a whole: There is in the *Ethics* not one single occurrence of *determinare* (etc.) in the sense of *antedeterminare* – determination in time. More accurately, I assert that there are no *decisive arguments* for the conclusion that *determinare* (etc.) anywhere refer to determination in dated time.

Some formulations by Ernst Cassirer, Harald Höffding[2] and other highly professional students of Spinoza seem to imply a conclusion in the same vein, but they may not be intended to do so, and they have not offered a detailed discussion of relevant evidence in the text.

An objection to the general thesis (the thesis generalized from our conclusion concerning IP28) can be based on a text unit in Part Two. Spinoza has there inserted a mechanistic physics. He discusses such events as pushing, one body giving another body a push. The first body antedetermins the movement of the second. The second in turn may determine the movement of a third.

The proof of the third Lemma of this part of the *Ethics* resembles in phrasing and style the proof of IP28. It is, I think, perfectly legitimate and also highly interesting to interpret the more general IP28 in conformity with the more narrow Lemma 3. We then obtain an interpretation of IP28 which binds us to a kind of universal determination of durations which endangers the status of consistency between propositions on determination and propositions on freedom. It is one of my contentions that such a binding or prejudgment or anticipation carried over from Part 1 and 2, to Parts 4 and 5 is, methodological unwarranted and harmfull. Our conclusion: The determination envisaged in Lemma 3 of Part Two includes complete antedetermination, and its physics of bodies may through an interesting generalizing reconstruction be made to cover the whole doctrine of extension in the *Ethics*. It is however a kind of reconstruction or interpretation which is not the only plausible one consistent with the text as a whole.

Among the timeless kinds of determination, there are some of particular importance for our general theme:

(1) Determination in the sense of *delimitation*. Finite things have boundaries, limits, which mark them off from others. Things are defined by such delimitations. 'All determination is negation'. (2)

Determination as emanation. From God as cause and *determinans* the world emanates according to Jewish and other medieval philosophy which influenced Spinoza. The immanence of *Deus sive Natura* precludes emanation in time. (3) Determination of kind. Anger causes something and something causes anger. That is, the *kind of* affect called anger have certain *kinds of* effects. Or, more nominalistically formulated, members of the class of angers have effects of certain limited differences, thus making up a natural class. Particular things in the sense of particular *kinds of* things have particular *kinds of* effects or manifestations. But anger, nominalistically conceived, does not precede its manifestations.

The third concept of determination, classes of things having classes of effects in common, is particularly important for the theory of active emotions in Part 4 and 5 of the *Ethics*. This theory, again, plays an important role in provoking arguments that Spinoza's theory of determination contradicts his doctrine of freedom through conquering passive emotions.

Let us inspect some determinations of class (*genus* determination). (a) 'The free man ... tries to join other men in friendship'. (IVP70Dem). I interpret this in terms of classes: Members of one class of things (*res*), namely free men, cause the establishment of another *class* of things, friendships.

Free men *necessarily* try to establish friendships, they are *determined* to do it, but nothing can be said about a particular free man at a particular date. The essence of free men is such that it determines every member of the class of free men to try to join other men with success or without success. (b) '... hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love'. (IIIP43). Here again determination *as asserted* by Spinoza, is a relation between kinds or, better, between classes of things. Definite ways of operation are asserted, but in the sense of classes of operations forming ways. Details are left out.

Even when Spinoza speaks about *res singulares*, particular things, it is at least sometimes clear that he speaks about particular *kinds or classes* of things. This implies that Spinoza is not talking about a strictly singular temporal sequence of events, the one and only one *history* of nature, including man. In that case he would be speaking of strictly singular things at definite *dates*. But, of course, Spinoza may have had the opinion that a definite unique singular anger elicited a completely definite reaction. This opinion is not expressed, however. (And it is false, I think, because the reaction would for instance also be determined by the level of freedom of the recipient, the customs of his social class and the physical medium between the angry person and the recipient of the anger. In short, all Nature is involved.)

LAPLACIAN UNIVERSES: NOT SPINOZA'S CONCERN

Datedness becomes decisively important as soon as we by determination think of causal determination à la Laplace. The state of the universe at time t_o determines in all details the state of the universe at the next moment t_o+d, where d is the smallest meaningful quantity of time.

We may think of a film played slower and slower. What happens in the next picture is determined by what we see in the foregoing. With ordinary films, we soon see walking as a series of jumps and jerks, because of the relatively long timeinterval between the photos taken. The state of affairs at time t_o clearly does not cause these jumps. But the Laplacian view is that the timeintervals must approach zero to arrive at accurrate predictions. Knowledge of the man walking must include knowledge of his position at different times with a millionth millimeter accurracy, forming part of the knowledge of the so-called *Randbedingungen* at the atomic level. Some kings have stumbled and because it has been taken as a bad omen, the miscalculation of millimeters and seconds have great historical consequences.

The development of the univers is one single process in time, and since no pair of macroscopic objects or pair of cubes in spaces, are likely to be only arithmetically different, determination cannot be expressed by what happens to kinds or to classes of things. Two grains of sand, or two humans being always subjected to different forces according to where they are, will have different histories and influence the rest of the univers in different ways. Spinoza's determinism of classes does not suffice to generate a Laplacian determinism.

The Laplacian model of the universe is strange and abstract, but it has with slight alterations (due to quantum physics) somehow entered the thinking of practically everybody impressed by physics as the source of so-called scientific world views.

Even if class-determination somehow were completed – the laws of *all* kinds of things being stated – there would still be no way of predicting any future event from the present. Spinoza sometimes uses the term 'to predict' especially in his *Theological-Political Treatise*, but not in any way connected with the question of predictability of world development.[3] Spinoza does not discuss to what extent, if any, an event can be predicted from something that is determined – the *determinatum*.

This means that the *Ethics* does not provide or intend to discuss any determinism adapted to physics or natural Newtonian or Bohrian science in general. *To attribute natural science determinism to Spinoza is totally misleading*.

This implies that the discussion concerning the consistency of

natural science determinism with Spinoza's doctrine of freedom is irrelevant. They have never been asserted together.

The determinism of physics is the only form of determination in time (antedetermination) that has been conceptually worked out in detail. The antedeterminism of fate, fatalism, concentrates on a small range of important events such as death, salvation or marriage. Spinoza perhaps subscribes to that fatalism. (Cf.p.14, note 7). But even if he does, this view is very different from general antedetermination. Even if fate orders somebody to die by an airplane crash, he or she can live different ways until death.

It is significant that a contemporary philosopher with exceptional appreciation of Spinoza nevertheless upholds the view that his determinism is of a Laplacian kind. As a consequence, Spinoza's view is critizised as out of date.

> ... metaphysical determinism, of which Spinoza was the most uncompromising proponent, no longer seems such an acute issue to philosophers and moralists ... The simple faith of Laplace in the theoretical possibility of a complete explanation of every state of the universe is now generally represented as logically absurd. Determinism in this extreme form seems plausible only at a time when the possibilities of *complete* scientific explanation are accepted as absolutely unlimited.[4]

But Spinoza was not interested in complete explanations of a state of the universe, and his idea of the vast possibilities of human understanding is untouched by the impossibility of complete explanations of such states.

According to the philosopher quoted above, Stuart Hampshire, Spinoza adheres to 'metaphysical determinism' of a Laplacian kind. He was a child of his age. '... an effort of imagination is now required in order to reconstruct the intellectual conditions in which it seemed generally plausible'.[5] If what we have said in the foregoing is tenable, Spinoza has not given us any ('ruthlessly stated') exposition of antedeterminism or of a determinism of events. *His problem was never even similar to that of Laplace.* We do not need to involke the 'child of his age' excuse.

Unhappily, the belief in Spinozism as a sort of inconsistent 'mechanistic determinism' colours its reception in a great part of human society, the part in which dialectical materialism is taught.

SPINOZA'S CONCERN: ESSENTIAL RELATIONS

In order to get nearer to Spinozistic determinism we shall proceed from the discussion of determination between kinds or classes of things to the discussion of *relations of essence.* What engages Spinoza are the things that follow necessarily from the nature of the human

predicament. As a theoretical starting-point we may take what is said in IIIP7Dem:

'From the given essence of anything there follows necessarily something; but only that is in the power of things which follows necessarily from their definite nature'.

Most of the theorems concerning man I take to express what follows from the nature, that is, the essence of man. Some examples have already been stated (p. 11). Others: 'Our mind is active in relation to some things and passive in relation to others: in so far it has adequate ideas it acts with necessity, ...' (IP1), 'The acts of the mind originates in adequate ideas, the passions /passive states/ depend only upon inadequate ones' (IP3). 'Desire arising from joy is, other conditions being equal, stronger than desire arising from sorrow'. (IVP18). (The theorem does not assert something about one particular desire and one particular joy, but something about every particular desire and every particular joy. Thus, the theorem asserts something about essential relations between members of *particulars* forming classes.) 'An affect cannot be coerced or suspended except through an affect that is contrary and stronger than the affect that is being coerced'. (IVP7). 'He who imagines himself to be hated by another, and believes that he has given him no cause for hatred, will hate that other in return'. (IIIP40).

In the last example, the term *imaginari* is of central importance.[6] The law of human nature expressed by IIIP40 concerns imagination or knowledge of the first kind. Hatred is only an object of knowledge of the first kind. The essential relation expressed by IIIP40 is not characteristic of free men who answer hate with love and generosity. If the limitation of IIIP40 is forgotten it is easy to construct a case of inconsistency between theorems in the third part and some of the later half of the fourth part of the *Ethics*.

Asserted essential relations are asserted relations between *classes of particulars*, not between unique particulars, dated or undated. The particular operation of things *in time* is therefore not determined by essential relations. Durations can according to the 'uncertainty theorems' on the 'common order of nature' only be guessed, cognitions of them are highly uncertain. They are even uncertain *in God*.

Spinoza does *not* pretend to offer a key to knowledge of particulars in time.[7] What, then, does he offer us?

Spinoza's important claim is that the way to freedom and salvation depends largely on knowledge of essential relations. His mission is to impart such knowledge to us.

The total set of essential determinants for the person or group or community at A causes that under the given conditions A's decision or action, 'what A will do', 'how A will react', must lay within a bound-



ary, a limited field of possible actions. Suppose a possibility is actualized which results in a new situation at point B within the field. From this point there again is a variety of possibilities within the limits put by essential determinants – and so on, as illustrated above.

FREEDOM THROUGH INSIGHT INTO THE DETERMINATION OF ESSENTIALS

What we need along our road of increasing freedom is an increasing insight into our nature or essence. In particular, we need to know more about our power and its limits. Thus IVP17Sch:

> '... it is necessary to get to know both the impotence and potency of our nature, so that we can determine what we can and cannot do in controlling our affects.'

In any situation, what we can will be many things, not one. A field with boundaries, not a point. The increase of knowledge concerning our nature or essence is an increase of knowledge about (necessary) relations between our essence or nature and that of other things, and necessary relations within our essence or nature. This does not restrict the field, but clarifies its extent.

The predicate 'necessary' is strictly speaking superfluous because relations within essences or between different essences are not open to external influences. (Modal logic is therefore largely an unnecessary tool). Necessity as predicated of the essential relations is by Spinoza opposed to arbitrariness or chance. Necessity is, as he often stresses, not a kind of coercion: necessary is what follows from the very nature of a thing as part of that thing. The necessary partakes in the very definition of the thing. A thing does not coerce *itself*. The term 'necessary' would never be used if our insight and our language permitted the presentation of the whole of a thing.

Conclusion: Except for criticising Descartes' doctrine of free will, or better, *liber arbitrium*, Spinoza does not enter into the debate about antedetermination of the particular consequences of a particular choice. It suffices for him to assert the complete determination of the frame or condition of choices by *the structures of essential relations*. Certain imaginations of philosophers, and of Descartes in particular, must be fought at all cost in order that we realize our constitutional limitations. (Spinoza the great realist and naturalist!) But the realistic assessment of the limitations must not make man despair on his road towards the greatest heights of freedom and power.

GRADES OF POWER AND FREEDOM

Spinoza has no inhibition against talking of what *we* perform or are able to perform. 'If we remove ... an emotion ...' (VP2), 'We form a clear and distinct idea' (VP3), 'we have the power of arranging' (VP10), 'we are active' (VP18Dem). The expressions are taken from the part dealing with our freedom, but similar expressions are found all through the *Ethics*. We find also a number of exhortations: we must take notice of, understand that... There is no hint in the *Ethics* that this way of speaking sometimes makes Spinoza uneasy. We, persons, or members of *homo sapiens*, are of course able to decide more or less freely to do or not to do so and so. This ability is a necessity of our nature and its recognition part of insight into essential relations. But Spinoza's trust in our justification of speaking the way exemplified by the above quotations is not shared by all readers. And for good reasons. One of them is the not very clear separation of two concepts, a kind of absolute and a kind of relative freedom and power. Freedom is for Spinoza intimately connected with activity and power.

Definition 7 in Part 1 of 'a free thing' is such that it can apply only to God or substance. In the first part, and also later, he states, however, that only God is *absolutely* free. This suggests that something might be free, but not absolutely free. It suggests that Spinoza thinks of freedom as a matter of degree or/and as something we realize in some, but not all situations. I shall for the sake of simplicity mostly use the term 'degree'. In a few places Spinoza explicitly uses a notion of freedom such that freedom as a matter of degree.

'The man who follows reason is more free *(magis liber)* in a state ... than alone.' (IVP73)

This is the only explicit grading of freedom in the *Ethics*. In *Letter 21* there is another occurrence:

'Our liberty is placed not in a certain contingency or in a certain indifference, but in the mode of assertion or denial, so that the less indifferently we affirm or deny something, the more free we are.'

Then there is a famous superlative, *liberrimus*, 'most free', in *Letter 58*, quoted here p. 20, not registered clearly in Boscherini's excellent *Lexicon spinozanum*.

In *Political Treatise* 2, 7, we find a grading:

'The more, therefore, we consider man to be free, the less we can say, that he can neglect to use reason...'

This occurrence is of interest also in connecting freedom and necessity: the free man *cannot* neglect reason, he is not *forced* to use reason, but he necessarily uses it, this belonging to his very nature or essence as a free man.

The adverb *libere* is sometimes graded, but perhaps with less relevance for our argumentation. But the many occurrences of the expression 'absolutely free' (*absolute libera*) and similar expressions with 'absolute' are evidence of a broader concept 'freedom' with absolute freedom as a special kind or case. And such evidence supports our main conclusions.

Among the free men there may be differences in power, and this makes for, or simply (see IVDf8) is equivalent to, differences in degrees of freedom. According to IVP46 free men strive *as much as they can* to compensate hate with love and generosity.[8] It is reasonable to suppose that their amounts of power are not identical – but that some have more and others less. Through the equivalence of gain in power and gain in freedom, this implies differences in degrees of freedom within the class of people Spinoza would consider to be free men in a broad sense.

The combination of a graded use of 'free' and the use of expressions like 'absolute free' as applied to God, permits us to establish the existence of a broad and a narrow concept of freedom. But as a designation of the narrow concept Spinoza sometimes uses simply *liber* without any absolutistic qualification. It is this usage which gives rise to *charges of inconsistency*. Man cannot be both free and not-free, at least not under a definite set of conditions. But man *can* be moderately free and therefore moderately unfree. *He is both* – not absolutely free and not absolutely unfree. This is part of his predicament.

With the establishment of the two different notions, the absolute and the graded, the road is open to eliminate alleged inconsistencies between sentences predicating freedom and sentences predicating lack of freedom.

A series of propositions of Part 4, IVP69-IVP73, describe the free man. The way they are talked about strongly suggests that *Spinoza thinks there are free men*. There is nothing hypothetical about them. Spinoza writes in the indicative mood about people 'who are ruled by reason' (*Ratione gubernantur*, IVP18Sch) and who 'look for what is useful for

them guided by reason' (IVP18Sch). On the basis of the above distinctions we take free men to be predominately free – free to a rather high degree, free in fairly many important situations or respects. Some assertions on freedom are thus robbed of absolutism. But others clearly are intended to express absoluteness. 'That thing is called free, which exists out of its nature's necessity only, and is determined through itself only to act'. The expression *res libera* in IDf7 is taken to be short-hand for *res libera absoluta*. *Causa libera* in the first part is synonymous to *causa libera absoluta* a.s.f.

When men are said in IP17Sch to believe they are free, absolutely free is meant. This belief is an illusion. But there is also cases of illusions of non-absolute freedom, as we shall see later.

WHAT FREEDOM CONSISTS OF, ACCORDING TO SPINOZA

Spinoza says freedom presupposes necessary relations and therefore the absence of contingency. When a free agent choses act A in preference to B, the difference in preference must follow with necessity from the nature and striving of the agent, and the insight into the situation. But otherwise what *is* freedom? There are more or less complete extensional, if not intensional, equivalences between the term 'free' and certain other expressions.

In a number of contexts Spinoza says that to be free *is* to follow or be led by reason, which *is*, again, the same as to act out of virtue. To be unfree *is* to submit to passive emotions (affects), to be the slave of (passive) passions. By implication, the free acts from active emotions.

Other extensional equivalences, based upon IVDf8, IVP24, IVP25Dem, IVP26Dem, IVP52Dem and IIIP55Dem2: to act freely is

to act in accordance with one's essence
to act in accordance with one's nature
to act from the laws of one's own nature
to do what follows with necessity from one's nature
to act, and not from contingency or indifference
to effect what can be understood from the laws of one's nature
to act from power
to live according to the dictate of reason
to conserve one's being according to reason
to base one's actions on the fundament of seeking what is really useful

In order to find out exactly what *kind* of relation of equivalence does hold at the particular places in the text, one would have to go deeply into the doctrine of definition, essence and method as suggested, but

not elaborated, by Spinoza in *On the Improvement of the Intellect* and in other writings. Here it suffices to remind oneself of the inner relations between the term free and other terms in his system. It does not work to try to isolate a problem of freedom from the problems of essence, nature, power, reason, active emotion and adequate ideas. The study of Spinoza is an exercise in systems thinking on the fundamental level.

There is in the *Ethics* nothing hypothetical about free men. The equivalences broadens the relevant places. When Spinoza in IVP66 says that *we* strive when led by reason to prefer a greater future good to a lesser present when, *we* are to that extent free. In the demonstration he uses an analogous expression – 'to the extent that we take notice of reason itself'. When Spinoza in the note to the 'pessimistic' IVP17 stresses that he *does* reckon with the difference between those who have and those who have not insight, he by implication points to the moderate or relative difference in level of freedom. The equivalences give the 'road to freedom' a richer and more earthbound sense. It is a path we all struggle along, with minor or major lapses. The occurrences of explicit grading of 'free' are rare, but the occurrences of gradings of the equivalent expressions are many. They support our conclusion that the freedom envisaged by Spinoza and applied to humans is one that is proportional to the extent to which we act from necessity of our own nature. Like in common sense, he does not find the question relevant whether our nature 'ultimately' is causally fully determined by something else. He does not, because the relevance of 'ultimateness' only gives sense when we are thinking about time: our nature did not exist before we were born or conceived. If, therefore, we conceive of complete determination as one in time, our nature is not ours but a nature prefabricated by something else. Such reflections are not made by Spinoza because the determination he talks about is a mutual one, an interdependence. It is only the timedimension that is onedimensional and gives raise to the thought: 'I am completely prefabricated'.

THE FICTIVE HUMAN FREEDOM

Equating 'from necessity' with 'not from contingency or indifference', the necessity postulated by Spinoza does not say more than that there is an inner relation between the nature or essence and the acts performed. The acts are manifestations of the nature or essence, and without the acts the essence would be a mere word or fiction. This reveals the dynamic character of the notion of essence (closely related to *conatus*).

Men act from a mixture of causes or determinants, *only some* of which are internal, that is, follow necessarily from their nature. They *tend to* be unaware of the non-internal determinants, the 'external

causes'. They all tend to believe that they act so and so for *no other reason* that they want to act so and so. With this in mind let us inspect a famous passage in Letter 58:

> ... a stone receives from an external cause, which impels it a certain quantity of motion, with which it will afterwards necessarily continue to move... Surely this stone, inasmuch as it is conscious only of its own effort *(conatus)*, and is far from indifferent, will believe that it is maximally (completely) free *(liberrimus)*, and that it continues in motion for no other reason than because it wants to *(vult)*. And such is the human freedom which all men boast that they possess ...

Absolutely all men? Or all men who boast? Or what? – In this letter Spinoza seems in his rhetorical mood to forget for a moment his free men alluded to in Part four. They have been said to understand their own actions, and at least some of them have presumably read and accepted what Spinoza says in his *Ethics*! They, at least, clearly did not boast of their so-called *liber arbitrium*!

What humans *boast of* is, in accordance with the above quotation, complete freedom defined not by necessary action from internal determinants, but by uncaused volitions – falsely defined by certain philosophers as free will (*liber arbitrium*).

If, however, we are spontaneously conscious only of our own effort in the sense of our own *conatus*, this explains that we all are *liable to* take internal determinants to be the only determinants of an action. The mistake is, however, one of analysis, and it does not disqualify the spontaneous consciousness of freedom. This consciousness is not a registration of free *will* or of *all* determinants. If we decide to put up the umbrella, there is a spontaneous feeling of free decision which governs the act, and we have good grounds for taking this freedom at its face value. That the rain caused us externally is irrelevant.

If we have the inclination and interest of analysis, we may take our time and try to list determinants, *including* the external ones. We shall then avoid neglecting the rain, our clothing, our bad health, our cultural determinants, perhaps our conscious vanity, our distaste for polluted sulfuric acid, a slight joy using our new umbrella, and what else. None of these determinants need furnish any arguments against (non-absolute) freedom of our action. If we, however, later find that the use of the umbrella was due to hypnosis or passive affects, we shall arrive at a low estimate of freedom, perhaps a high degree of slavery under passions or of a kind of automatism in that particular situation.

The *illusion of freedom* from false analysis is not universal and constant. Otherwise Spinoza's examples would not single out people with weaknesses or those not yet ripe for making a correct causal analysis:

So the infant believes that it freely wants revenge; the timid that he wants to escape. Then too the drunkard believes that, by free decision of his mind, he says those things which afterwards when sober he would prefer to have left unsaid.

If sober we may freely decide not to say certain things. But this freedom does not reveal *liber arbitrium,* it reflects in action our nature or essence as an integrated personality.

So the delirious, the garrulous and many others of the same sort, believe that they are acting according to the free decision of their mind, and not that they are carried away by impulse.

'Others of *the same sort*', that is, subgroup of people at a low level of freedom. 'Carried away' – another way of describing slavery under passive emotions.

The *illusion* of freedom is, in other words, characteristic of uncritical people, in uncritical moments, it is not characteristic of humans as such. Some people have *insight into* their own freedom, an adequate idea of own freedom. The illusion of freedom is not a necessary consequence of human nature or essence, but neither is its absence.

How much people differ from each other, says Spinoza (in IVP66Sch), is clear when comparing IVP18 with IVP66, both of which may be true without inconsistency, the former concentrating on people who are led by passions or opinions, the latter about people who are led by reason. It is absurd to take what is said about 'the delirious, the garrulous and many others of the same sort' to hold about the people led by reason. We could then, for instance, derive from IVP66 the following theorem:

'Those who prefer a future greater good to a smaller present good believe falsely that they are acting according to the free decision of their mind, and do not understand that they actually are carried away by impulse'.

We can as our conclusion subscribe to that of the master himself in his letter to Schuller: '... if you will attentively examine my view, you will see that it is entirely consistent...' We subscribe, but add a qualification: we cannot *see* this consistency, but we can work out a consistent reconstruction on the basis of a set of plausible interpretations. At least this is what I have tried to do.

SUMMARY CONCERNING FREEDOM OF DECISION

1. The immediate and spontaneous feeling of free choice and decision is a consciousness of own *conatus*, our basic dynamics and expressive of our own particular essence or nature. There is nothing illusory about this feeling.
2. The feeling of free choice is sometimes taken to be an indicator of

the complete set of determinants of an action. From this stems the illusion of complete or absolute freedom, in the sense of absolute self-causedness or total absence of causes.
3. The feeling of free choice is a genuine indicator of internal, not external determinants.
4. The extent to which we are determined ('internally') by our nature or essence, is a matter of degree, never total, never zero.
5. The way towards increased level of freedom, that is internal determination, is through clarification of our affects, by which means they are converted passive to active emotions.

GENERAL SUMMARY

6. The thesis that Spinoza does not predicate freedom of human beings, and the thesis that if he did, it would result in an inconsistency with his determinism, are both false.
7. 'Freedom' and 'determinism' are loose words with a variety of meanings some of which are such that 'x is free and x is determined' expresses or implies a contradiction, whereas others do not. Among the latter we find those best adapted to the text of the *Ethics*. These meanings have deep roots both in every day thinking and in that of philosophers before and after Spinoza.
8. Spinoza judges men to be more or less free and therefore also more or less unfree. There is no definite upper limit to human freedom, but it cannot ever be absolute as in God.
9. The freedom which Spinoza proclaims to be realizable is one that is widely held in every day life to be realizable: to be determined in one's decisions from *own* nature, from the depth of one's soul, from the integrated action of one's personality, and not from pressures, external circumstances or passions which overrun oneself. And of course not to act unintelligibly, unmotivated, chaotic, unaccountably, blindly, randomly, designless. When we judge ourselves free in this sense or these senses we have not yet asserted anything about how we (since birth?) have developed into what we are: We are not speaking about remote causes *in time*. Neither does Spinoza in his judgment. But he stresses that external determinants always are in operation at any definite time, therefore also at the time of our birth – and before that.
10. The determinism of Spinoza is one of essence, *complete determination of essential relations between things*. It is not a determination of particulars, dated or undated, it is not a doctrine of antedetermination. Spinoza does not defend any such doctrine nor does he criticize any. He was not seriously engaged by the problem. What I have tried is therefore only to help a fly to get out of a bottle.

NOTES

[1] F. Copleston, *A History of Philosphy*, Vol. 4, N.Y. 1963, p. 257.

[2] Cassirer in his great *Das Erkenntnisproblem*, and Höffding in his valuable *History of Philosophy*.

[3] Cp. what he says, in Chapter 3 and 6, on prediction of calamities, miracles, victories. My point is only that Spinoza has a concept of prediction and could have discussed its relation to various kinds of determination – if the problem did engage him. But it did not.

[4] Stuart Hampshire, *Spinoza*, Pelican ed., 1951, p. 156 and 154.

[5] Op.cit., p.154.

[6] It is notable now consistent and repetitious Spinoza uses *imaginari*. In the theorem IIIP40, and the short proof and note, he uses forms of imaginari seven times, and he uses near synonyms or substitutes.

[7] His view on so-called fatalism and desire are complicated. The subject is not treated in the *Ethics* and we shall not take it up here.

[8] Similarily, free men who live among ignorant, try to avoid receiving favours as much as they can. (IVP70). In the concluding note to Part 4 (IVP73Sch) the expression *vir fortis*, the man of strength *(fortitudo)*, as synonym for *homo liber*, the free man. This also suggests degrees of freedom. That there are degrees of strength even among the strong, is scarcely up to discussion.

G. H. R. PARKINSON

BEING AND KNOWLEDGE IN SPINOZA

I

To speak of being and knowledge in Spinoza is to speak of a topic which is very wide, covering as it does Spinoza's views about what there is, and how we know it. Such a topic cannot be discussed in detail within the scope of a single paper, and it is therefore necessary to limit it in various ways. First, then, this paper will be concerned only with Spinoza's mature philosophy, as expounded in the *Ethics*; earlier works will be cited only occasionally, and in order to throw light on the *Ethics*.* Second, by 'being and knowledge' in the philosophy of the mature Spinoza two things will be understood. His doctrine of 'being' will be taken to be his theory of substance, attributes and modes – for in Spinoza's view, what there is, is substance, and substance has attributes and modes.[1] By his doctrine of knowledge will be understood his account of the three kinds of knowledge. These, then, will be the main themes of this paper; but before they are discussed, it will be useful to make a few general remarks about the interpretation of Spinoza.

It is notorious that there have been many different interpretations of Spinoza's *Ethics*, and this may seem strange in view of the fact that Spinoza takes great care in defining his technical terms. The obvious answer is that many terms are left undefined by Spinoza – namely, the very words that he uses in defining his terms. Certainly, the *Ethics* contains many such terms, of which no formal definition is given; yet we do not have to rely on guesswork or mere fancy to understand their meanings. Rather, we look at the way such terms are used by Spinoza; we examine the sentences in which they occur, both in the theorems and scholia of the *Ethics* and in his other works, and we try to grasp the rules of their use from their linguistic context. We can also supplement our knowledge of Spinoza's use of certain terms by a study of the use of similar terms in other authors whom Spinoza had read, or may be assumed to have read.[2] This last method, however, must be used with caution. The fact that Spinoza uses (say) a term to be found in the Scholastics does not of itself prove that he

* Translations from Spinoza in this paper are my own (G.H.R.P.).

uses it as they did. It is hardly necessary to stress the point that the meaning of a word is its use in a language; consequently, the final authority in determining Spinoza's meaning must be Spinoza's language.

Yet, after the closest study of the text, one may still not be satisfied that one has grasped Spinoza's meaning. What, then, is felt to be missing? It is a commonplace that, if one is to understand a philosopher, one must know what his problems were, what questions he asked. Many philosophers, of course, pose their problems explicitly in their writings. It so happens, however, that the geometrical form of the *Ethics* conceals Spinoza's problems; the work contains, so to speak, the answers without the questions. However, there is evidence which enables one to make a reasonable conjecture about Spinoza's problems; this is the evidence which is provided by his letters, and by the list of the books which were sold after his death.[3] None of these states his problems quite explicitly, yet they show (even if they do not expressly say) that he had a great interest in the science of his time. By 'the science of his time' is meant in particular deductive science, the mathematical physics of such men as Descartes and Galileo, the Galileo who said that the book of nature is written in the language of mathematics.[4] One may take it as a working hypothesis, then, that this science suggested certain philosophical problems to Spinoza, and it is the view of the present writer (as it is the view of other scholars) that if this hypothesis is followed up, a flood of light is thrown on the *Ethics*.[5] One sees it in the light of questions such as these: What, in view of the doctrines of seventeenth century physics, is a particular thing? What is the nature of explanation, in the sciences of matter and of mind? How are matter and mind related? What is the nature of causality? What is the status of the fundamental concepts of physics? – for example, is motion introduced into the universe by God, or is it in some way ultimate? It is in the light of questions such as these that this paper will discuss Spinoza's views about being and knowledge.

II

We begin with Spinoza's doctrine of substance, attributes and modes. The definitions of these terms that Spinoza offers in the first book of the *Ethics* are far from indicating the problems that he had in mind; indeed, they seem to generate questions rather than answer them. Take, for example, Spinoza's definition of substance. In Definition 3 he states: 'By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; that is, that whose concept does not need the concept of another thing, from which concept it must be formed'.[6] This raises a number of questions. First, what is meant by the term

'in itself'? Second, the definition of substance shows that Spinoza has a name for that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; does he also have a name for something which is neither in itself nor conceived through itself? Or for something which is in itself and not conceived through itself? Or, conversely, for something which is conceived through itself but is not in itself?

The second group of questions, which concern the names given by Spinoza to the various combinations of the terms 'in itself', 'not in itself', 'conceived through itself' and 'not conceived through itself', may seem particularly abstract and remote from live philosophical issues. Nevertheless, they can be related to important problems of philosophy. To see how this is so, it will be necessary first to pursue the matter further at an abstract level. Now, it is clear that Spinoza has a name for something that is not in itself and is not conceived through itself. This is what he calls a 'mode', and which he defines in Df.5 as follows: 'By mode I understand the affections of substance, or, that which is in another, through which it is also conceived'. Axiom 1 makes it clear that what is 'in another' is not 'in itself', so it can be seen that whereas substance is defined as that which has the two predicates of being in itself and being conceived through itself, a mode is that which has the negations of these two predicates. It is not so clear, however, whether Spinoza has a name for what is in itself, but not conceived through itself; or again, for what is conceived through itself but is not in itself. Certainly, the *Ethics* does not contain any formal definitions in which technical terms are assigned meanings of this sort. It will be argued later, however, that that which is conceived through itself but is not in itself is what Spinoza calls an 'attribute', but that he has no name for what is in itself but is not conceived through itself.

But it is already time to try to make more concrete some of the abstract notions that have already been introduced, beginning with the notion of a mode.[7] There is no difficulty in answering the question, 'To what does the term "mode" refer?' Spinoza explains (IP25Cor) that particular things are what he calls 'modes'; for example, a body (*corpus*) is a mode (IIDf1). It must be emphasised that in saying this, Spinoza is not just giving particular things a new name. Rather, he is putting forward a theory, and is saying that what are commonly called particular things are really modes. His point may be illustrated as follows. Consider some particular thing – say, a tree. Common sense (following Aristotle)[8] regards the tree as the subject of predicates, but as not predicable in turn of anything else. One can say that the tree grew, is green, will be brown, will lose its leaves, will die, but one cannot say such things as 'This is tree'. Spinoza, however, would ask one to consider the tree scientifically. Viewed in this way, the tree is only a transient form of matter; although the tree came into existence

and will perish, matter itself does not come into being and does not perish. The tree, then, is to be regarded as a form in which matter exists for a certain time; it is, as Spinoza would say, a 'mode' of matter.

Let us now try to relate this to Spinoza's definition of a mode. As a mode, the tree must be in something else and must be conceived through that something else; that is, it must be 'in' matter and 'conceived through' matter. What, then, is it for a tree to be 'in' something else? It is not meant that it is in something else spatially, as a tree may be in a park; for an idea is also a mode (IIP9), and spatial predicates cannot be ascribed to ideas (*De Intellectus Emendatione*, Gebhardt ed., II, p.14). Nor is it in something else in the sense that it is a member of a class. One cannot say that a particular tree is a form that the class of trees takes, or that the class of trees remains the same when the tree perishes. Rather, to say of a mode that it is in X seems to mean that it is predicated of X; thus, to speak of a tree is to say of matter that it has a certain form at a certain time and place. Such a sense of 'being in' is not peculiar to Spinoza; the Scholastic translators of Aristotle, in rendering his term for predication, used the verb 'inesse' ('to be in').[9]

We turn now to the second part of Spinoza's definition: a mode is 'conceived through' the something else in which it is. Spinoza does not say expressly what he means by the phrase 'conceived through another', but from IDf3 and Ax2[10] it can be inferred that his meaning is that a mode is such that its concept requires the concept of some other thing, from which concept it must be formed. It is clear how the two parts of the definition of a mode differ – the first refers to the mode as such, the second to its concept – but it is not at first clear why Spinoza finds it necessary to add the second part of the definition, i.e. why he is not content to say simply that a mode is in something else. It will be argued later that he needs the second part of the definition to distinguish a mode from an attribute; but we are at present trying to make the notion of a mode more concrete, and this can hardly be done by relating it to a term which has not so far been explained. However, the question can be looked at in another way. If, as was argued just now, to be in X is to be predicated of X, then it follows that Spinoza must say that, for example, the colour green is 'in' a leaf. It does not seem likely, however, that he would say that green is a mode of the leaf, for a leaf is certainly a mode, and Spinoza does not speak of modes of modes. The reason for not regarding green as a mode of a leaf seems to be that green is not *conceived through* a leaf; that is, in forming the concept of green we do not require the concept of a leaf. On the other hand, a leaf is a mode of matter in that it is not only in matter, in the sense explained earlier, but also the concept of a leaf is one into which the concept of matter enters – in thinking of a leaf, we have to think of it as matter.

In discussing modes, we have spoken of matter; and indeed, Spinoza himself uses this term.[11] He does not, however, say expressly that corporeal things are modes of matter. He might not have objected to this in an informal exposition of his philosophy; in his technical philosophy, however, he says that corporeal things are modes of the attribute of extension. We have not yet stated or discussed Spinoza's definition of an attribute, but before this can be done it is necessary to consider further the definition of substance which was stated earlier.

Substance, as was seen from Df3 of Book I of the *Ethics*, is that which is in itself and is conceived through itself; from Axioms 1 and 2 of the same book it can be inferred that substance is not in something else and cannot be conceived through something else. It was suggested just now that to be in something else is to be predicable of that something else; when Spinoza says, then, that substance is in itself, does he simply mean that, although a subject of predicates, it is not predicable of anything else? Certainly, this can be said truly of substance, but it is not likely that this is all that Spinoza means by the term 'in itself'. If it were, then he would be offering a definition of 'in itself' which is negative in nature, and he does not approve of definitions of this type (see, e.g., TIE p.35: every definition must be affirmative). Some other account of Spinoza's meaning, then, seems called for. In the Aristotelian tradition, universals are regarded, not as existing in their own right, but as existing *in rebus*, in things. The universal green, for example, exists in leaves and in blades of grass, which Aristotle would call primary substances. A universal, then, may be called logically dependent on something else for its existence, whereas a substance is not logically dependent in this way. (It may of course be causally dependent, but that is another matter). Spinoza would not give the name of 'substance' to Aristotle's primary substances – rather, he would call them 'modes' – yet there is this degree of similarity: that for Spinoza, too, substance is that which is not logically dependent on anything else. Further, since Spinoza regards logical and causal dependence as the same,[12] substance is not causally dependent on anything else. This, however, is still negative; to translate it into positive terms it must be recollected that for Spinoza, substance is not merely not dependent on anything else, it is self-dependent, its existence is self-explanatory, it is *causa sui* (On this, cf. IDf1). In sum: the view that substance is 'in itself' is closely linked with Spinoza's idea that there is, and must be, a *causa sui*, which is the infinite substance or God.

We come now to the proposition that substance is 'conceived through itself'. Spinoza explains (IDf3) that this means that the concept of substance does not require the concept of another thing, from which concept it must be formed.[13] After what has been said about the way in which a mode is conceived through something else, this needs no

further explanation; there is, however, a problem which concerns the way in which this aspect of substance is related to the fact that substance is 'in itself'. Could something be 'in itself' but not be conceived through itself? Spinoza does not seem to give an explicit answer, but in view of his thesis that substance is both infinite and unique (IP8,14 Cor1) he may be taken to mean that there is nothing other than substance through which it could be conceived. This, then, answers one of the questions raised early in Section II of this paper. Spinoza has no name for that which is in itself but not conceived through itself, and he has no name for it because there is nothing of this kind. Whether he has a name for that which is conceived throug hitself but is not in itself will be considered later, when the notion of an attribute has been discussed. To this we now turn.

The term 'attribute' is defined in IDf4. 'By attribute', Spinoza says, 'I understand that which the intellect perceives of substance as constituting its essence'. There are several problems here. First, what is the 'intellect' that is referred to? Is it a finite intellect, such as our own, or one that is infinite? Second, what is the force of the word 'as', here used to render 'tanquam'? Do the attributes really constitute the essence of substance, or has 'tanquam' the force of 'as if'? Briefly, the answers to these questions seem to be that the intellect in question is an infinite one, or rather the infinite one, and that the attributes really constitute the essence of substance. Here, there is space only to touch on the arguments in favour of these answers.[14] That the intellect to which Spinoza refers must be infinite is inferred from Spinoza's view (IP11) that there is an infinity of attributes, whereas the finite human intellect grasps only two (Ep 64). With regard to the thesis that the attributes really constitute the essence of substance, the decisive passage is IIP44, which states that 'it is the nature of reason to perceive things truly, namely as they are in themselves'. (That 'reason' is equivalent to 'intellect' is stated in IV App par 4).

It now has to be asked what Spinoza means when he says that an attribute constitutes the essence of substance, or, as he says elsewhere, that it 'expresses' its essence (IP19). It emerges later (IIDf2) that there belongs to the essence of a thing that which, being given, the thing is necessarily given, and which, being removed, the thing is necessarily removed; or, that which cannot exist or be conceived without the thing, and conversely. This means, then, that given some attribute, X, substance also is necessarily given, and given substance, the attribute X is necessarily given. A mode, on the other hand, does not constitute the essence of substance. For example (IIP10Cor) to talk of man is to talk of certain modes; but this or that man may or may not exist (II Ax1), so it cannot be said that given substance, man must exist.

The two attributes known to us are thought and extension. This

means, therefore, that if we think of substance, we must think of it as extension, or as an extended thing (IIP2), and if we think of extension, we must think of it as substance. We may, of course, *attend to* an attribute other than extension when we are thinking about substance; but what we are thinking about is also extended, and cannot meaningfully be supposed to be non-extended. Similarly, if we think of substance, we must think of thought, or a thinking thing (IIP1), and if we think of thought, we must think of it as substance. But Spinoza insists that it is one and the same substance whose essence is constituted both by thought and by extension (IP10Sch; IP14); it would be wrong to think, as Descartes did, of extended substance and thinking substance,[15] understanding these to be two substances of different kinds.

Spinoza has more to say about the nature of the attributes. Each attribute, it is stated in IP10, must be conceived through itself. Spinoza says nothing about its being in itself, and the fact that in the Scholium to the same proposition he speaks of 'ascribing' (*tribuere*) an attribute to substance suggests that he thought that an attribute is predicable of substance, and so is 'in' substance. This suggests a way of differentiating substance from attribute – namely, that substance is that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, whereas an attribute is conceived through itself but is in something else, i.e. substance.[16] Correspondingly, both an attribute and a mode are in something else, but an attribute, unlike a mode, is conceived through itself. It must be stressed that the proposition that an attribute is not 'in itself' is only an inference from Spinoza's words, and some scholars[17] have argued that the evidence points to an attribute being both in itself and conceived through itself. Here there is space only to say that the arguments in favour of this view are not convincing, and that it seems more probable that Spinoza held that an attribute, although conceived through itself, is not in itself.[18]

'But', it may be replied, 'granted all this, what does it *mean*?' The answer is that this account of the nature of attributes has to be seen as the setting of a problem about mind-matter relations, and an attempted solution. Descartes had argued that the human mind is absolutely distinct from the human body;[19] finding this impossible to reconcile with what seemed to be the obvious fact that they do interact, he modified the doctrine so as to state that mind and matter interact in man only, and only in the region of the pineal gland.[20] Spinoza rejected Descartes' views about the pineal gland as unintelligible (VPraef p.279), but he thought that the view that mind and body are distinct and do not act on one another, which Descartes stated but was too timid to accept, was correct. As Spinoza put it, the body cannot determine the mind to thought, nor can the mind determine the body to motion (IIIP2). As long as things are considered as modes

of thought, the connexion of causes must be explained through the attribute of thought alone; similarly, the modes of extension must be explained through the attribute of extension alone (IIP7Sch). This is held to follow from the very nature of attributes – namely, that every attribute of substance must be conceived through itself (IP10, quoted in IIP6); that is (IP10Sch) without the help of another.

This aspect of the notion of an attribute poses a problem about mind matter relations. Although Spinoza insists that each of the attributes of thought and extension must be conceived through itself, he does not believe that there is a merely contingent relation between the modes of the two – that, for example, it just happens that when a man's brain is in such and such a state, the man has such and such an idea. Rather, the relation is a necessary one; given the one state, the other must be given. It is this fact (Spinoza might perhaps say) which lies behind the confused notion that mind and body act on one another. The problem is, then, how this necessary relation is to be explained, and Spinoza's solution is provided by the other aspect of the notion of an attribute – namely, that it is in something else. For although the attributes are different, they are in one and the same substance. A mode of extension and the corresponding mode of thought are one and the same thing, expressed in two ways; in other words, they are one and the same thing which is explained through, conceived under different attributes (IIP7Sch). As this is so, the order which is to be found among the modes of one attribute is not simply paralleled by a corresponding order in the modes of another; the order and connexion of ideas is *the same as* the order and connexion of things (IIP7).[21]

But although this may have thrown some light on Spinoza's theory of attributes, much remains obscure. An attribute, it has been suggested, is conceived through itself but is in something else, namely substance. But just how are the attributes related to substance? We have already rejected the idea that the attributes are merely a mental construct; that the mind imposes a plurality of attributes on the one substance. Whatever it may be, the relation between substance and attribute must be an objective one. One solution which may be suggested is that substance is a substratum, underlying the various attributes. By this is meant that substance is *that which* is extended, thinking and so on. Thinking and being extended, etc., are the attributes, whilst substance is the 'that which'. This would make of substance something like Aristotle's 'prime matter', and the objection to such a concept is that it is impossible to identify substance of this kind; substance becomes, in Locke's phrase,[22] a 'something, we know not what'. Nor does Spinoza seem to have held such a view. He insists that, in knowing the attributes, we know substance. This is brought out by the fact that he regards the terms 'substance' and 'attributes'

as equivalent, using phrases which can be rendered as 'substance or (*sive*) attributes',[23] where the 'or' has the force of 'or, in other words'.

This mode of speech may suggest that 'substance' is a collective term, standing for the class of all attributes. But if the word 'substance' meant no more than the class of all attributes, Spinoza would have to explain how it is that the same order is found in the various attributes; how it is, as he puts it, that the order and connexion of ideas is the same as the order and connexion of things (IIP7). In fact, he explains this by saying that thought and extension are attributes of substance, which indicates that for him the relation of substance to attribute is not just that of a class to its members. It may be added that if the attributes were simply members of a class, it would be strange that they are called attributes, and not components or parts.

It is sometimes suggested that the attributes are various aspects of the one substance.[24] There are some points in favour of this. To talk of an aspect is to talk of a view which something present *to somebody*;[25] in the case of the attributes, the part of the somebody is played by the intellect, which is mentioned in the definition of an attribute (IDf4). Again, in ordinary usage there is no suggestion that one aspect of (say) a town is more real than any other, just as Spinoza implies that thought is no more real than extension, and conversely. But there are also weaknesses in this view of the attributes. First, it is not clear in what sense the word 'aspect' is used here. The term often has a spatial sense: it is the view that something presents when seen from a certain angle. Clearly, this cannot be said literally of substance. Another sense of 'aspect' recognised by the dictionary is the appearance that something presents to the mind. But to call an attribute an aspect in this sense may suggest that it is merely subjective, which has already been rejected; alternatively, if an attribute is regarded as an appearance which really belongs to substance, it has to be explained how this can be so. The sense of the word 'aspect', then, is not clear; but there is a further difficulty. When one speaks of aspects, it makes sense to ask what it is which presents the aspects.[26] But what is it to say that *substance* presents various aspects? In ordinary usage, that which presents the aspects – a town, say – is regarded as different from its aspects, whereas it has been seen that for Spinoza, substance *is* its attributes. If it is pointed out that, for the phenomenalist, a thing is the class of its appearances, this will not help either, for it was argued earlier that substance is not just a class of attributes.

Is there, then, some other way of explaining the relation between substance and attributes? I have no radically new suggestion to offer, but I think that it is possible to develop usefully one which has been made by other scholars. Several interpreters of Spinoza[27] have stressed the point that substance and the attributes must be regarded, not as static, but as dynamic. They point, for example, to the great

importance of 'endeavour', *conatus*, in Spinoza's philosophy in general and in his moral philosophy in particular; they point also to Spinoza's view that Descartes' physics is faulty in so far as extension is defined there as inert mass (*moles*).[28] Following this line of thought, H. H. Joachim[29] refers to substance as force, and to the attributes as lines of force. Of itself, this is no more than a metaphor, but the idea that substance may be compared to force is a fertile one. Joachim was one of the British Hegelians, and some remarks made by Hegel on the subject of force, though not expressly referring to Spinoza, are relevant here. People often say, Hegel observes, that we do not know force itself; we know only the manifestations of a force. This, he argues, is false. 'It is the very essence of force to manifest itself, and thus in the totality of manifestation, conceived as law, we at the same time discover the force itself'.[30] In other words, the force is not something *behind* its manifestations; rather, the force *is* its manifestations. In much the same way, it may be said that Spinoza's substance is not something behind or underneath the attributes; substance *is* its attributes. The analogy can be pressed further. One and the same force can be manifested in various ways; similarly, one and the same substance is manifested or expressed through various attributes. This is, of course, only an analogy, but it perhaps along these lines that Spinoza's views about the relation between substance and attributes can best be approached.

Such, then, in rough outline, is Spinoza's doctrine of substance, attribute and mode. Before leaving the topic, it will be worth while to emphasise one point. Hegel objected to Spinoza's philosophy (*Encyclopaedia*, par.50) on the grounds that it was an 'acosmism', by which he meant that Spinoza regarded the world, in the sense of an aggregate of finite things, as lacking in genuine reality. But this does not seem to be just. When Spinoza's definition of an attribute was discussed earlier (p.29 above), it was noted that it is the nature of reason or intellect to perceive things truly. Now, Spinoza says (IP30) that the intellect grasps attributes and modes, and nothing else, from which it follows that not only the attributes but also the modes are real. The reality of the modes can be established by another argument. We shall be discussing Spinoza's three kinds of knowledge shortly; for the moment, it must be enough to say briefly that Spinoza would certainly assert that the third kind of knowledge, intuitive knowledge, 'perceives things truly'. This knowledge, however, is knowledge of individual things (VP36Sch; cf.IIP40Sch2). We deceive ourselves (Spinoza would say) if we treat a mode, not as a mode but as an independent thing; again, we deceive ourselves if we treat the two attributes known to us as two substances of different kinds. But this does not mean that attributes and modes are mere illusions. The unity of substance is not a blank, featureless unity; it is a unity which manifests itself in order.

III

It is now time to ask how Spinoza thinks that all this is known. The question may be approached by way of Descartes. Spinoza often uses the phrase 'clear and distinct ideas', but does not trouble to define it; it may therefore be assumed that he did not believe that he was using it in any fundamentally new sense. As the phrase is typical of Descartes, it is reasonable to suppose that Spinoza meant his readers to understand the phrase as Descartes did. In Descartes, clear and distinct ideas are related to knowledge, in that Descartes holds that something is known to be true[31] if the idea of it is clear and distinct. To call something clear, in this context, is to say that it is apparent to an attentive mind, in much the same way that we see objects clearly, and to say that it is distinct is to say that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear (Descartes, *Principia Philosophiae*, I 45). These are vague criteria, as Leibniz pointed out;[32] for what signs are there that an idea is clear and distinct? But if one disregards what Descartes says about the criteria of knowledge, and considers the criteria that he actually uses, one finds something very different. The 'methodical doubt' that is applied in the *Meditations* presupposes a criterion of knowledge: namely, that for something to be known it must be such that no rational being can doubt it. This, for example, is how we know, according to Descartes, that there is a God. His argument is that given that we grasp the concepts of existence and of a most perfect being, then we cannot doubt, i.e. we know, that a most perfect being exists. Spinoza would say the same about the metaphysical theses stated in the *Ethics*. There seems no good reason to doubt that the geometrical form of the work is meant as a method of proof,[33] and that Spinoza is in effect saying that given that we understand his use of terms and accept his axioms, we must accept his conclusions. Non-acceptance of them involves either a refusal to accept the axioms (and Spinoza seems to think that no rational man can do other than accept them) or it involves a failure to grasp the meaning of the terms used – just as a failure to accept the truth of the proposition that the radii of a circle are equal is a failure to understand the words used in stating the proposition as mathematicians understand them (IIP47Sch). As Spinoza puts it, when discussing the topic of the divine nature, those who disagree with him do not understand what they themselves say (IP15Sch, p.57).

But although there is some measure of agreement between the theories of knowledge advanced by Descartes and Spinoza, there are also important differences. Here, there is space only to touch briefly on one of these: namely, the fact that Spinoza recognises three kinds of knowledge, not all of which seem to be found in Descartes.

Spinoza begins his account of the three kinds of knowledge in

IIP40Sch2[34] by saying that we perceive many things and form universal notions:
(1) from particular things, represented to us by the senses in a mutilated and confused way, and without rational order (*sine ordine ad intellectum*), and
(2) from signs, e.g. from the fact that when we have read or heard certain words we remember things.

Each of these two 'ways of contemplating things' Spinoza calls knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination. Here only the first of its two sub-forms[35] will be discussed – that which Spinoza calls *cognitio ab experientia vaga*. This phrase is often rendered as 'knowledge from vague experience',[36] but 'vague' does not seem to be quite the right word. Vagueness is normally ascribed to the objects of experience rather than to experience itself; one speaks, for example, of seeing a vague outline, but not of vague seeing. How 'vaga' is to be rendered here can best be decided once more has been seen of this kind of knowledge. We may begin by considering the phrase 'mutilated and confused', which Spinoza uses in explaining it. In speaking of confused knowledge (IIP29Cor and Sch) or confused ideas (IIP28,35) Spinoza is following the usage of Descartes, for whom the opposite of a clear and distinct idea is something which is thought with obscurity and confusion.[37] However, Spinoza makes clearer the nature of the shortcomings of this kind of knowledge by referring to it as mutilated as well as confused (IIP29Cor and Sch; IIP35). An idea of this type, he explains, is in some way truncated, cut off – like a consequence without premisses (IIP28).

It is important to be clear about Spinoza's point here. He does not seem to mean that such knowledge is always false. He says, not that knowledge of the first kind is false, but only that it is the *cause* of falsity (IIP41), and it may be (though he does not say this expressly) that what is the cause of falsity under certain conditions is not the cause of falsity under other conditions. It is surely relevant here that in IIP17Sch, p.105, he says that we may not doubt of experience, once it has been shown that the human body exists as we sense it. What he seems to mean is something of the following sort. Suppose that we look at an object, and on the basis of this say, 'That object is 200 feet away'. We may be right; but on the other hand we may be wrong, and indeed wildly wrong, since according to Spinoza the sun looks only 200 feet away (IIP35Sch). Sense-experience alone cannot decide whether or not we are right, for even when we know the sun's true distance, it still looks 200 feet away (ibid.). But if we add to the testimony of the senses a body of scientific and metaphysical theory,[38] then we can know that such and such an object is as near as it looks, whereas another is not. But such theories, Spinoza argues, cannot be produced by someone whose knowledge is only of the first kind. It

seems to emerge from all this that the defect of the first kind of knowledge is that on the basis of experience alone we cannot construct a consistent world-picture. Perhaps, then, 'experientia vaga' could best be translated by some phrase such as 'wavering' or 'inconstant' experience.

2. We pass now to the other kinds of knowledge distinguished by Spinoza. The second kind of knowledge, called 'reason', involves what are termed 'common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things' (IIP40Sch2). The term 'common notions', *notiones communes*, is a literal rendering of the words *koinai ennoai*, by which Euclid referred to his axioms, and was commonly used to refer to axioms of any kind.[39] Spinoza doubtless has this sense of the word in mind here; but it should also be remembered that his three kinds of knowledge also relate to the formation of 'universal notions' (beginning of IIP40Sch2),[40] and Spinoza's 'common notions' may therefore include basic concepts as well as axioms. The axioms and concepts in question are those which are true of, or apply to, absolutely everything (IIP38); they would include, therefore, the concepts of the attributes, and also the axioms and basic concepts of physics. The 'adequate ideas of the properties of things' (cf. IIP39) are more obscure. Traditionally, to say that P is a property of S is to say that only an S can be an instance of P, though not every S is an instance of P. For example,[41] reason is a property of living things since, though not every living thing is rational, *only* living things are rational. It seems, then, that Spinoza is referring here to sciences which have as their field, not the whole of nature, but only a part of it – human psychology, for example. In each case, however – whether we think in terms of common notions, or of adequate ideas of the properties of things – we are *thinking*, and not just relying on our senses. The mind, as Spinoza puts it (IIP29 Sch),[42] is not 'determined externally, by the chance impact of things, to the contemplation of this or that'; rather, it is determined internally to an *understanding* of things.

The second kind of knowledge, Spinoza says, has as its basis concepts which do not explain the essence of any individual thing (IIP44Cor2). What he means is that the laws of physics, for example, are not concerned with any one body in particular, but apply to all bodies and to any body. Even if one considers a scientific law which refers, not to all bodies, but to bodies of a certain type – copper, for example – the laws still refer to any copper object and not to one in particular.

But, Spinoza says, there is a third kind of knowledge, intuitive knowledge, which does provide an 'adequate knowledge of the essence of things' (IIP40Sch2). This kind of knowledge is of great importance for Spinoza's moral philosophy (see his comments on its 'excellence and utility' in the above Scholium), but its nature is notoriously obscure. Here there is space for only a few brief comments.

There is a strong temptation to interpret the third kind of knowledge in Hegelian terms, and to regard the relations between the three kinds as dialectical. The interpretation would run as follows. The first kind of knowledge provides knowledge of particulars, but it is knowledge of a low grade – there is in it no element of genuine universality.[43] The second kind of knowledge does provide knowledge that is universal (cf.VP36Sch), but it is also abstract, and loses sight of the particular. Only the third kind of knowledge unites the concreteness of the first kind with the universality of the second. Certainly, there does seem to be an element of the Hegelian concrete universal in intuitive knowledge, but there is also much in the Hegelian dialectic that is foreign to Spinoza. Hegelians would say that the true is the whole, and that *only* the whole is true. Spinoza, however, would deny this; in his view, truth does not belong to the third kind of knowledge alone; rather, both second and third kinds are true (IIP41).[44]

There may also be a temptation to regard the third kind of knowledge as some kind of mystic vision. The subject is complex and obscure, but one may perhaps venture the following observations. First, the paradoxical language by which mystics have tried to communicate their vision is quite foreign to Spinoza. Second, it seems fair to say that mystical insight is usually regarded as giving a kind of knowledge which is above mere reason; it may contradict the findings of reason, or it may merely supplement them, but it is superior *as knowledge*. It has been argued above, however, that there is no suggestion of this in Spinoza. The third kind of knowledge is *more powerful* than the second (VP36Sch), but both are equally true. Finally, mystical insight is usually regarded as obtainable by some kind of contemplative technique. Spinoza's account of how the third kind of knowledge may be obtained is very different. After saying at the beginning of IIP47Sch that the infinite essence and eternity of God (i.e. substance) are known to all, he goes on to say that we can deduce from this knowledge many things which we know adequately, *and so form* that third kind of knowledge which will be discussed in the fifth part of the *Ethics*. This is hardly the language of a mystic; but it is, as suggested earlier, the language of someone whose thought is very much bound up with the science, the deductive science, of his time.

NOTES

[1] Cf. IP30 – the intellect grasps attributes and modes, and nothing else.

[2] The importance of this, with reference to the terms used by Spinoza that can be found in mediaeval Jewish and Scholastic philosophers, is stressed by H. A. Wolfson, in *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, Harvard, 1934.

[3] See J. Freudenthal, *Die Lebensgeschichte Spinozas*, Leipzig, 1899, pp.160-164.

[4] *Il Saggiatore*, 1623. Quoted by E. A. Burtt, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science*, 2nd ed., London, 1932, p.64.

[5] For a similar approach cf. S. N. Hampshire, *Spinoza*, Harmondsworth, 1951 and R. McKeon, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, New York, 1928.

[6] 'A quo formari debeat'. The masculine 'quo' indicates that the relative pronoun is governed by 'conceptus' and not by the feminine noun 'res'.

[7] This may seem to be a reversal of what Spinoza calls the 'order of philosophising' (IIP10Sch), which should begin with the nature of God or substance, and end with the objects of the senses (i.e. the modes). The order adopted in this paper, however, is merely one of exposition; it is not implied that the modes are prior in what Spinoza calls 'the order of knowledge' – that is, that they are more fundamental to an understanding of the universe.

[8] Cf. *Categories*, 2a 11ff.

[9] Aristotle usually represented predication by means of the verb 'huparchei' ('belongs to'): e.g. for 'Every X is F' he would write 'F belongs to every X'. Standard Latin versions of Aristotle translated 'huparchei' as 'inest' ('is in'), and so would render this as, literally, 'F is in every X'. (See, e.g., Gerard of Cremona's Latin version of Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, ed. by L. Minio-Paluello, Bruges/Paris, 1954 *(Aristoteles Latinus*, IV 3, p.38).
In *Categories* 2a 12-13, Aristotle draws a distinction between being in a subject and being predicated of it. What is relevant in Spinoza's case, however, is not so much Aristotle's usage as that of his Latin translators.

[10] Df3 explains the term 'conceived through itself'; Ax2 shows that what must be conceived through itself cannot be conceived through another.

[11] IP15Sch, Gebhardt ed., p.60; Ep81; Ep83; CMII.12.1.

[12] One may refer to the well-known Spinozist phrase *causa seu ratio*, IP11, first alternative proof (p.52). See also the discussion of IP16 and IP16 Cor1 in G. H. R. Parkinson, *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge*, Oxford, 1954, p.64.

[13] It may be noted in passing that Spinoza here seems to be breaking his rule that definitions should not be negative.

[14] Cf. F. S. Haserot, 'Spinoza's definition of attribute', *Philosophical Review*, LXII, 1953: reprinted in S. P. Kashap (ed.), *Studies in Spinoza*, Berkeley, 1972, pp.43ff. The 'as if' interpretation of 'tanquam' is defended by H. A. Wolfson, op.cit., pp.146,152ff.

[15] *Principia Philosophiae*, I 52. To be exact, Descartes spoke of corporeal substance, and said (I 53) that its 'principal attribute' is extension.

[16] This suggestion is to be found in Leibniz's notes on the *Ethics: Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, ed. Gerhardt, I, p.139.

[17] E.g. E. M. Curley, *Spinoza's Metaphysics*, Harvard, 1969, p.17. The same view seems to be held by A. Naess, 'Freedom, Emotion and Self-subsistence', *Inquiry*, XII, 1969, p.70,A15.

[18] Besides saying (IP10) that an attribute is ascribed to substance, Spinoza also says (IIP1) that it 'belongs' *(competit)* to God or substance, which again suggests that it is predicable of substance. (Cf. IP19; an attribute 'pertains' *(pertinet)* to substance). Further, if an attribute were both in itself and conceived through itself, it would be impossible to distinguish attributes from substance, and there would be as many substances as there are attributes.

[19] Meditation VI, Haldane & Ross, *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, Cambridge, 1911, I, p.190; *Discourse on Method*, IV, Haldane & Ross, I, p.101.

[20] Cf. *Passions of the Soul*, I 35, 41; *Principia Philosophiae* IV 190.

[21] This is perhaps the point at which to refer to an argument in favour of the view that an attribute is both in itself and conceived through itself. E. M. Curley (op.cit., pp.16-17) argues that if an attribute were in something else, knowledge of the attribute would be dependent on knowledge of that something else, and so the attribute would not be conceived through itself. Against this one may suggest the following. The statement that an attribute is conceived through itself implies, as has been seen, that a mental event is to

be explained in mental terms only, and a physical event in physical terms only. Spinoza would add that this is not the whole truth about a mental or a physical event, in that each is also an expression of one and the same substance, is *in* substance. But in explaining, say, a physical event we do not need to pay attention to this; we do so only when we ask, 'How are mental and physical events related?'

[22] *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, 2.23.2.

[23] Spinoza does not, in the *Ethics*, use the phrase *substantia, sive attributa*, but he uses phrases which have the same meaning as this: see IP4,19,20 Cor2, 29 Sch.

[24] Cf. L. Roth, *Spinoza*, London, 1929, p.67.

[25] Cf. G. N. A. Vesey, 'Agent and Spectator', in *The Human Agent*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. 1 London, 1968, p.148.

[26] Vesey, loc.cit.

[27] E.g. A. Wolf, 'Spinoza's Conception of the Attributes of Substance', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, XXVII, 1927: reprinted in Kashap, op.cit., pp.16ff.

[28] Spinoza, Ep81; cf.Ep83.

[29] *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, Oxford, 1901, pp.65-67.

[30] *Encyclopaedia*, par.136, Zusatz (2); Wallace trans. (2nd ed., Oxford, 1892), p.249. The discussion of force is part of Hegel's account of essence and appearance. Hegel's main point is (par.131) that essence is not something behind appearances; the essence itself must appear *(erscheinen)*, i.e. must manifest itself.

[31] Descartes sometimes says that what is perceived clearly and distinctly is *true* (e.g. Meditation III, Haldane & Ross, I, p.158), and of course it would be in accordance with ordinary usage to say that a proposition may be true without being known to be true. But the whole problem of the *Meditations* is what can be *known*; further, *Principia Philosophiae* I 45 (from which the definition of a clear and distinct idea given above is taken) is expressly about knowledge. Spinoza also says that a clear and distinct idea is true (e.g. IP8Sch2, p.50), but it should be added that he argues that a proposition is true for X only if X knows that it is true (*De Intellectus Emendatione*, Gebhardt ed., p.26). Compare IIP43Sch – to have a true idea involves the highest certainty, for it means knowing a thing perfectly, i.e in the best way *(perfecte sive optime)*. Conversely (II49Sch, p.131) a false idea does not involve certainty.

[32] Gerhardt, op.cit., IV, pp.363,425.

[33] Cf. Parkinson, op.cit., pp.31-5.

[34] It will be recalled that this paper is primarily concerned with Spinoza's mature philosophy, as stated in the *Ethics*. Little, therefore, will be said about the account of the kinds of knowledge contained in the earlier *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*.

[35] I have discussed knowledge from signs in detail in my paper 'Language and Knowledge in Spinoza', *Inquiry*, XII, 1969, pp.15-40.

[36] It is so rendered, for example, in the author's *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge*.

[37] Meditation III, Haldane & Ross, I, p.164.

[38] Metaphysical, in that the proof of the proposition that the body exists as we sense it, which was cited above, is metaphysical and not scientific.

[39] Compare the phrase *quorundam axiomatum sive notionum*, which follows the reference to common notions in IIP40Sch1. See also Meyer's preface to Spinoza's geometrical version of Descartes' *Principia Philosophiae*, Gebhardt, Vol. I, p.127.

[40] It is significant that, after mentioning 'common notions' at the beginning of IIP40Sch1, Spinoza goes on to discuss 'second notions' and 'transcendental terms', which are certainly concepts.

[41] Cf. Leibniz, *Specimen Calculi Universalis, Opuscules,* ed. Couturat Paris, 1903, p.242.

[42] This Scholium, and also IIP20Cor, refer to knowledge 'from the common order of nature'. IIP40Sch2 explains that this term refers to the knowledge of particular things which we derive from the senses.

[43] *Genuine,* in that (TIE, pp.10-11) the first kind of knowledge includes propositions based on induction from experience, such as that water puts out fire. But these propositions, though they may be universal in form, are not 'clear and distinct ideas'; if we doubt their truth, we cannot always be accused of failing to understand the words in which they are stated.

[44] On the question whether Spinoza can be said to have held a coherence theory of truth, see Parkinson, *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge,* Chap. 6.

HERMAN DE DIJN

HISTORICAL REMARKS ON SPINOZA'S THEORY OF DEFINITION

Spinoza's theory of real definition constitutes the very heart of his conception of the perfect or adequate idea. An adequate idea is an idea revealing to us the essence or inner nature of a thing, without leaving out anything essential. Real definitions do exactly this job: explaining the essences of things. Real definitions must be undubitably true, because they have a clearly determined object and express reality; they give us a true description of the thing concerned.[1]

My main purpose here is to clarify Spinoza's theory of real definition by relating this theory to its origins in Hobbes and Heereboord.

I will not elaborate on the relations between Spinoza and Hobbes from the point of view of methodology, as one can read about this elsewhere.[2] Whoever studies Spinoza's conception of real definition carefully, and knows Hobbes' doctrine of 'genetic' definition, must be struck by the resemblance between the two. Spinoza holds that the definition of a finite thing (in fact of everything with a complex structure)[3] must express or comprehend *the proximate cause* of the thing concerned.[4] As one can see in the examples Spinoza gives (definition of circle, globe), a definition through the proximate cause is nothing but a *genetic* definition: a conception of the inner structure or essence of the thing, arrived at by describing the (a possible) '*generatio*' of the thing (as opposed to a description simply of the gener*ated* thing).

Spinoza's (and Hobbes') examples teach us that this description of the generation means a composition of the inner structure of the thing out of certain simple(r) elements (in the case of the globe: semicircle, rotation round its diameter). This composition takes place under the guidance of our first as yet undeveloped idea of the thing (usually the idea of a property of the thing); this idea was the first step or incentive for our search for a real, full-fledged definition. We do not arrive at such a definition as long as we do not combine *all* the elements of the inner structure of the thing. We do not succeed in really defining a thing as long as we take the idea of a property for the real definition (being genetic or expressing the proximate cause, and from which precisely all properties can be derived).[5] To understand a thing perfectly or adequately is for Spinoza (as for Hobbes) to generate it

before the eyes of our mind on the basis of its essential constituents or elements. This understanding yields an insight into why the thing is what it is, penetrates the inner structure of the thing and grasps *all* its 'reasons': it is an understanding of the thing, through its *proximate cause*.

I do not think we should be in too much doubt about Hobbes' influence on Spinoza, even in methodological matters. G. H. R. Parkinson has pointed out the importance for Spinoza of Hobbes' *De Cive* (1642, 1647) with its project of a geometrical (Euclidian) treatment of ethics and politics.[6] Attention has been drawn to the resemblances between Hobbes' logic (*De Corpore I*, 1655) and Spinoza's *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*.[7] Hobbes' geometrical ideas in his *Examinatio et emendatio mathematicae hodiernae...* (1660) seem to correspond very closely with Spinoza's geometrical conceptions.[8] Not only in France, but also in the Netherlands since 1640, great expectations were fostered in Gassendi's en Hobbes' work as an alternative to Cartesian conceptions (especially in matters of natural science). This is testified by certain letters of Sorbière,[9] a Dutch anti-Cartesian,[10] who is certainly not speaking for himself alone when he urges Gassendi and Hobbes to place their own work against that of Descartes.[11] It is rather improbable that Spinoza should not have noticed this struggle for influence between the ideas of Hobbes and Descartes, and that he should not have tried to know more about Hobbes' theories except those concerning morals and politics. One should not forget that Hobbes was one of the favourite philosophers among the political theoreticians of Johan de Witt's party,[12] with which Spinoza had close connections. Furthermore, there were all sorts of relations between Hobbes and his works and many thinkers connected with Spinoza either directly or indirectly: Sorbière, C. Huygens, H. Oldenburg, L. van Velthuysen...[13] Nevertheless, it must have been Spinoza's acquaintance with Franciscus van den Enden, usually situated about 1655,[14] which brought him for the first time into contact with Hobbes' thought. Van den Enden taught Spinoza Latin, and introduced him into the world of contemporary thought, especially as he himself was familiar with Bacon, Hobbes, Gassendi and Descartes.[15] After all this, we can agree with C. Gebhardt, who sees in Spinoza's acquaintance with Hobbes' main writings after the *Korte Verhandeling* (but before the *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione*) one of the major factors in the development of Spinoza's thinking.[16]

I have said up to now that Spinoza's definition through the proximate cause is essentially a genetic definition, and that it has to be understood in relation to Hobbes. The terminology of 'proximate cause', and the whole conception of causality related to it, lead us, however, to a consideration of the relationship between Spinoza and A. Heereboord.[17]

Spinoza's acquaintance with late Scholasticism especially as combined with Cartesian 'innovations', is evident not only from the *Korte Verhandeling*, but also from the *Cogitata Metaphysica*. In this latter work, Heereboord is quoted by name; and Spinoza borrows freely from his works terms and classifications (especially in connection with causality).[18] Closer study of Heereboord's terminology and classifications has turned out to be very illuminating for Spinoza's theory of definition. I will first develop at some length Heereboord's conceptions of efficient causation, science, and definition. The bearing of all this on Spinoza's theory of definition will be shown later.

According to Heereboord, the efficient causes can be divided into eight categories. It is only the eighth category which interests us here, viz.: the subdivision of the efficient cause in proximate ('*proxima*') and remote ('*remota*') cause.[19] A proximate cause is a cause which produces its effects immediately[20] or which is always conjoined itself to its effect; a remote cause produces its effect through the mediation of another (proximate) cause, and is not joined itself with its effect.[21]

The proximate cause exhibits two forms: it is either an absolutely proximate cause ('*Causa proxima absolute*'), or a cause proximate only in its own genus ('*causa proxima in suo genere*'). An absolutely proximate cause is an efficient cause which produces its effects without any mediation whatsoever, such that it is through its very existence joined to its effect; which means that the givenness of the cause necessarily involves the givenness of the effect. An example: the rational soul is an absolutely proximate cause of its power of understanding; each '*forma*' of its properties. A cause proximate only in its own genus constitutes efficient causation whereby there is mediation between cause and effect of a cause of a different order or sort, but not of a cause of the same order and sort (as with a remote cause); nevertheless, this kind of proximate cause also produces its effect through its *own* power. Example: a father is the cause proximate in his own genus of his son; he is not the absolutely proximate cause of the son, because a cause of a different order and sort is also playing a role in the causation, i.e. the semen; moreover, the givenness of the father does not necessarily involve the givenness of the son. A remote cause is an efficient cause where there is mediation between cause and effect by a cause of the same order and sort, and where, therefore, the cause it not joined itself with its effect, nor produces its effect through its own power. Example: grandfather and grandchild, where there is a proximate cause of the same sort mediating, viz. the father.[22]

What is the bearing of all this on science ? True science, according to Heereboord, teaches us the permanent and unchangeable properties[23] of things, and provides definite peace of mind. What one looks for in

science is knowledge of the eternal causes (reasons) of things. Science consists in discursive knowledge proceeding in demonstrations in which one has to state (in the middle term of the syllogisms) the proximate cause of the properties, thus providing the 'reasons' of these properties and proving their belonging to a certain subject; this proximate cause is the cause which, being given, gives the property also, and which, being removed, removes the property also.[24] It is clear that the proximate cause concerned here is an absolutely proximate cause (and not proximate in its own genus). Now, the absolutely proximate cause of a property may or may not be 'in the same subject' as the property itself (properties are never without a subject in which they inhere).[25] Therefore, one can distinguish between two kinds of absolutely proximate causes. Although an efficient cause is, normally spoken, 'outside' its effect,[26] an absolutely proximate cause may be together with its effect, the property, in the same subject: in this case, one has to do with a '*causa efficiens* (*absolute proxima*) *INTERNA*'; example: the absolutely proximate cause of the understanding, which is the intellect, is in the same subject, the soul, as its effect (property of the subject).[27] The '*causa efficiens* (*absolute proxima*) *EXTERNA*' on the contrary, is not in the same subject as its effect (the property of another subject); which means at the same time that this cause is *not part* of the essence of its effect, even if it is the cause of the essence (the property), and even if the essence can neither be nor be conceived without it. An example: the absolutely proximate cause of light, which is the sun, is not in the same subject, the air, as its effect, light (being a property of the air, but also an effect of the sun).[28]

In view of all this,[29] one can easily understand Heereboord's ideas on the definition of those properties which are apt for scientific understanding. A good definition requires the following elements: the subject of the property concerned, its genus, and its proximate cause. So, the true definition of the eclipse is the following: a deficiency of light (= the genus) in the moon (= the subject), because of the interposition of the earth between sun and moon (absolutely proximate cause, and indeed *external*).[30] If the subject always remains the same (as in the case of geometry: '*quantitas*'), it is, of course, not repeated again and again in each definition of each property (the figures); but this does not mean that it is not presupposed in every definition. The subject is sometimes called '*genus*', e.g. when it is the object of a whole science; so, geometrical space (the subject of the geometrical figures) is the genus of geometry.[31] This genus of the figures must not be confused with the common genus 'figure' itself (this last sort of genus is, as said, also an element in the definition of an '*accidens*', besides subject and proximate cause).

What is the relevance now of all this for Spinoza's theory of definition? This relevance must be obvious to all those who know that the figures are considered as properties of geometrical space, and that Spinoza conceives of finite beings or modes as '*affectiones*' of a substance.[32] Because figure and finite mode can be understood as a kind of properties (and indeed of a necessary character), it seems quite normal that Spinoza should conceive of the definition of figures and modes in accordance with the way in which necessary properties are scientifically defined: this is the origin of the definition 'through the proximate cause'. This doctrine found its most perfect application in (Euclidian) geometry, and is perfectly suited to genetico-constructive ideas: the definition through the proximate cause, the invention of this proximate cause, is in fact nothing other than the invention of the manner in which 'the property' generates 'in' the subject. This way in which the property originates (on the basis of certain elements, e.g. point, line, ..., for the figures in geometry),[33] defines the essence of the property. The proximate cause of the property is here in fact nothing other than what others call a *formal* cause, indicating why the thing is what it is.

On the basis of what has been said, many expressions and ideas concerning Spinoza's conception of definition now become clear. First of all, the term proximate cause itself. It is the 'cause' which is reciprocal with the essence of the mode itself. The proximate cause of an '*affectio*' of a subject was defined by Heereboord as the cause which being given, gives the effect also, and which, being removed, removes the effect (the property) also.[34] Now, that which for Spinoza constitutes the essence of a thing is that which, being given, necessarily gives the thing, and which, being removed, necessarily removes the thing:[35] What else can this be than the proximate cause? One can see clearly here why the definition expressing the nature or essence of the thing, should be a definition through the proximate cause. Heereboord called the proximate cause also an efficient cause.[36] Spinoza uses exactly the same terms as synonyms for proximate cause: the definition of the circle through its proximate cause (rotation of a line round one of its ends which is fixed) he also calls a definition of the circle through its '*causa efficiens*'.[37] One has to do here not with the efficient cause of the existence of this or that (material) circle in the world,[38] but with the efficient cause constituting the essence of the circle, being an absolutely proximate cause which is *internal* (as cause and effect (or property) belong in the same subject, geometrical space). Although there is no explicit mention or stressing by Spinoza of subject and genus, they are, at least implicitly, present: the circle is a figure (genus) described by any line..., and is obviously a property of geometrical space (subject).

The definition of any mode, having to reveal to us the essence of that mode, has in the same way to express its proximate cause. At the same time their genus (common genus) must be indicated (i.e. that they are modes), and also their subject, of which they are '*affectiones*'[39] or '*modificationes*'.[40] However, the relation between essence and subject (for Spinoza '*subjectum*' becomes '*substantia*') is here in metaphysics (as against geometry) a *real* causal relation: essences are for Spinoza real entities produced by God.[41] Which sort of efficient cause is God in relation to the ESSENCES? It can be no other than a '*causa absolute proxima*'.[42] And indeed '*externa*'; because God is *not* 'in the same subject' as his effects, the essences, but constitutes precisely the subject or substance in which the essences are; or, in other words, because God is *not part* of the essence, although he is the cause of it, and although the essence can neither be nor be conceived without him.[43] All this means that the subject (or real genus) which has to be brought into account in the real definition, is itself the *real* efficient (absolutely proximate but *external*) cause of the essences of the modes. Indeed, Spinoza brings the subject (or real genus) into account in the definition of the modes. He calls the attributes, which are the real subjects of the modes belonging to them, and without which no mode can either be or be conceived,[47] the '*genera*' of the definitions of the finite things, and their proximate causes.[45]

All this, however, does not yet provide us with that proximate cause which is the most important and most difficult part of any real definition of a mode, and which has to appear in it besides the subject (and the common genus): the proximate cause, of which it became clear earlier that it is equivalent to the formal cause. This proximate cause can be called the '*causa proxima absolute INTERNA*', revealing what makes the thing what it is: this thing, and not any other sort of thing. This proximate cause, reciprocating with the essence, (unlike the external efficient cause, God) can only be found by the invention of the manner of generation of the thing, on the basis of *all* its essential elements;[46] thus providing us with a definition which is perfect and adequate, because it penetrates the inner structure of the thing.

This double significance of 'proximate cause' in connection with the definition of the modes (as referring to the subject or substance and its real causation, or to the formal-efficient cause explaining why the thing is what *it* is) must be carefully kept in mind when one reads Spinoza's statements concerning definition. Not only the definition of finite things, but also the definition of God himself is put in terms of definition through his efficient or proximate cause.[47] As God can have no external cause (nor any subject or genus), it is quite obvious, as is pointed out in *Epistola 60*, that the only proximate cause in question can be internal ('*causa efficiens interna*' = '*causa absolute proxima interna*'). That God has to be defined at all through a proxi-

mate cause (be it an internal one) has everything to do with his essence having a very complex structure.[48]

In view of the above considerations it seems to me that Heereboord's and Hobbes ideas on definition are almost indispensable to a full understanding of Spinoza's doctrine of definition. I do not intend to say that Spinoza's theory of definition is completely reducible to what they had to tell, but at least that the insight into its relation to their conceptions is extremely illuminating. Behind these two philosophers, important also in respect of other aspects of Spinoza's system, the shadow arises of another figure: *Suarez*.[49] Suarez' doctrine seems to have been in high esteem with Heereboord, who said of him that he is '*omnium metaphysicorum papam atque principem*'.[50] But on Hobbes also Suarez seems to have had a decisive influence; he was *the* authority in the Oxford of Hobbes' student days.[51] Therefore, a closer look at Suarez' works could perhaps further improve our understanding of Spinoza's ideas.

Although Spinoza as well as Hobbes has strong roots in late Scholasticism, it must be said that they are full-fledged members of a new Age, also in and through their conceptions of genetic definition.

NOTES

[1] *Ep9*, Opera IV, p.42-44. See further on definition: *Tractatus de intellectus emendatione* Op.II, p.34ff.
Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, Op.III, p.98-99; etc. (All references are to C. Gebhardt's Latin edition).

[2] M. Gueroult, *Spinoza. I. Dieu (L'Ethique, 1)* (Paris, Aubier, 1968), p.20-40 (especially 37-40), etc.
See also my dissertation *De epistemologie van Spinoza*, Leuven, 1971 (Library of the Institute of Philosophy).

[3] M. Gueroult, o.c., p.172-5. A thing completely simple cannot be defined genetically, but is immediately understood or not at all.

[4] TIE, Op.II, p.35.

[5] TIE, Op.II, p.27-28; p.34-35.

[6] G. H. R. Parkinson, *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1954), p.31. Spinoza's library contained Hobbes' *Elementa Philosophica (de Cive)* (See: J. Freudenthal, *Die Lebensgeschichte Spinoza's. In Quellenschriften...* (Leipzig, Veit, 1899) p.163 Nr.(129)).

[7] E. Cassirer, *Das Erkenntnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft der neueren Zeit*. II., Berlin, Cassirer, 1922., p.98ff.
In the *Praefatio ad Lectores* of Hobbes' *Elementa philosophica de Cive*, it is stated that the latter work is intended to be the third part of a larger work, the two other parts of which are announced (the *Philosophia prima = De Corpore*, and the *De Homine*). It is very probable that the *De Corpore* already existed in manuscript form as early as 1644 (See: F. Brandt, *Thomas Hobbes' Mechanical conception of Nature* (London, Hachette, 1928), p.167ff).
One has even discovered another manuscript than the one mentioned by F. Brandt, entitled *Logica ex T.H.*, and being the draft of the first part of the *De Corpore*; this draft is very close to the printed text of 1655 (except for

the last, sixth chapter); on this subject see: *Die Urform der 'Computatio sive Logica' des Hobbes* (i.e. of the first part of '*Elementorum philosphiae sectio prima de corpore*'. Edited with an introduction and notes by Baron C. L. G. C. von Brockdorff, pp.33. Kiel, 1938, 8° *(Veröffentlichungen der Hobbes-Gesellschaft. Ortsgruppe Kiel, nr.2)*.

[8] M. Gueroult, o.c., p.33 (+Note 56). That neither the *De Corpore* nor the *Examinatio et emendatio*... were found among the list of books which Spinoza left behind at his death, is not sufficient to exclude the possibility of Spinoza's having consulted or even having possessed these books. Indeed, as Freudenthal points out (*Die Lebensgeschichte*..., p.287-8), it is clear that Spinoza used certain books one does not find in the list mentioned above (e.g. works of A. Heereboord, G. Bruno, Suarez (!) ...); also, friends of Spinoza must have obtained before or after his death certain of his books which therefore could not possibly be mentioned in the list of his books (such as e.g. his own publications).

[9] See: F. Tönnies, *Siebzehn Briefe des Thomas Hobbes an Samuel Sorbière, nebst Briefen Sorbière's, Mersenne's u.Aa.* (Herausgegeben u. erläutert von –), in: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Bd.III*, (Berlin, G. Reimer, 1890 (X)), p.218-9.

[10] See: F. Tönnies, o.c.: Sorbière's anti-cartesianism is clearly detectable in the letters XIV and XIX. See also: F. Bouillier, *Histoire de la philosophie Cartésienne* (Paris-Lyon, Durand-Brun, 1854), Vol. I, p.224.

[11] Regius, for example, and many others, urged the same. See: F. Tönnies, o.c., p.218-9; also P.-F. Thomas, *La Philosophie de Gassendi*, (Paris, Alcan, 1889), p.19.

[12] See: A. Wolf, *The Correspondence of Spinoza* (London, Allen & Unwin, 1928), p.446; J. Freudenthal, *Spinoza, Leben und Lehre. I.* (Heidelberg, C. Winters, 1927), p.153.

[13] See: K. O. Meinsma, *Spinoza en zijn Kring. Historisch-kritische Studiën over Hollandsche Vrijgeesten.* ('s-Gravenhage, M. Nijhoff, 1896), p.227, p.232-3, p.270, p.167-8, etc.; on L. van Velthuysen, see also: J. Laird, *Hobbes* (London, Benn, 1934), p.255-6.

[14] K. O. Meinsma, o.c., p.124; T. de Vries, *Spinoza. Beeldenstormer en Wereldbouwer* (Amsterdam, Becht, s.d. (1972), p.59.

[15] K. O. Meinsma, o.c., p.130, p.137-8; also T. de Vries, o.c., p.72ff.

[16] C. Gebhardt, *Spinoza und der Platonismus*, p.199-200, in *Chronicon Spinozanum I* (Den Haag, 1921).

[17] Adriaan Heereboord was professor of philosophy at Leiden in the first half of the 17th century; he was a pupil and later the successor of F. Burgersdijck, admirer of Suarez, and defender of Descartes. His principal works, studied by Spinoza: *EPMHNEIA LOGICA: Seu Explicatio... Synopseos Logicae Burgerdicianae...* (Lugd. Batav., 1650), and, *Meletemata Philosophica...* (editio ultima, Amstelodami, 1665). See also M. Gueroult, o.c. p.243-257 (with notes).

[18] See e.g. KV, I, ch. 3; CM II, ch.12 Op.I, p.279.

[19] A. Heereboord, *Hermeneia Logica...*, p.58-59.

[20] This 'immediately' is in opposition not to any sort of mediate causation (cf. the cause proximate only in its own genus) but to the sort of mediation as is found in remote causation.

[21] A. Heereboord, *Hermeneia Logica...*, p.58-59, *Meletemata*, p.261.

[22] *Hermeneia Logica...*, p.58-9; *Meletemata...*, p.261-2.

[23] According to Heereboord, practically the only properties, of which one can prove their inherence in a certain subject, are the '*Propria quarto modo*' or '*accidentia propria*', belonging to a certain species of individuals, and indeed to *all* individuals of that species and *always* (*Hermeneia...*, p.120). This

means that properties (*'affectiones'*) must have a certain *necessary* character in order to be the object of an unshakable science.

[24] *Hermeneia Logica...*, p.167-8; p.171: '... causa proxima affectionis' = 'Qua posita, effectum (= proprietas) ponitur; et qua sublata, tollitur; atque adeo, in qua mens acquiescit'; p.174: '... causam proximam praedicati, quae talis est, ut cum effecto suo reciprocetur'.

[25] Ibidem, p.120.

[26] Ibidem, p.51.

[27] *Hermeneia...*, p.172; *Meletemata...*, p.261ff (point III).

[28] *Hermeneia...*, p.172; *Meletemata...*, p.261ff (III). The *'causa efficiens externa'* is *not part* of the essence of its effect, otherwise there would be total reciprocity between both (there is reciprocity between whole and part), which is impossible, because in that case, cause and effect would be in the same subject.

[29] Slightly simplified, by leaving out certain features incompatible with Spinoza's views, as e.g. the role of final causality in science.

[30] *Hermeneia...*, p.120.

[31] A. Rey, *L'apogée de la science technique grecque. L'essor de la mathématique* (Paris, Michel, 1948), p.182.

[32] I,Df.5;P4; ...The term *'accidens'* disappears in the *Ethics*. In the *Cogitata Metaphysica*, Spinoza called an *'accidens'* nothing more than a *'modus cogitandi'*, not belonging to the thing itself, as do the *'modi'*. One understands then that Spinoza in the *Ethics* calls the *'affectiones'* of substance its *'modi'*. That Spinoza really conceived of the modes as of properties *('proprietates')* of God's essence is clear from IP16Dem, and TTP, ch.4, Op.III, p.60 (l. 8-9).

[33] Hobbes calls these elements universals or universal parts.

[34] *Hermeneia...*, p.171.

[35] IIDf2; IIP10Sch2: '... meum intentum hic tantum fuit, causam reddere, cur non dixerim, id ad essentiam alicujus rei pertinere, sine quo res nec esse, nec concipi potest; nimirum, quia res singulares non possunt sine Deo esse, nec concipi; et tamen Deus ad earum essentiam non pertinet; sed id necessario essentiam alicujus rei constituere dixi, quo dato res ponitur, et quo sublato res tollitur: vel id, sine quo res, et vice versa id, quod sine re nec esse, nec concipi potest.'

[36] *Hermeneia...*, p.172; *Meletemata ...*, p.261ff.

[37] Ep 60, OpIV, p.270 (l.28ff).

[38] TIE, Op.II, p.27 (l.11-13).

[39] I Df 5; IP4; etc.

[40] IIP10; Dem of coroll.; etc.

[41] IP25.

[42] God is never a remote cause in Spinoza's system (IP28Sch); so he is a proximate cause. All essences taken together and at once form an infinite immediate mode (VP40Sch), of which God is *'Causa absolute proxima'* and not *'proxima in suo genere'* (IP28Sch). Now, as there is no causality (as among the actually existing modes) among the eternal essences constituting the eternal infinite mode, and as they are as such produced immediately by God, God must be the absolutely proximate cause also of each of them separately. This does *not* mean that each (finite) essence becomes an infinite mode of God: as Spinoza says in VP40Sch, it is only *as a whole*, and limiting each other reciprocally that they can be said to form an infinite mode.

[43] IP25; IIP10Sch (for quotation, see note 35). Spinoza does not himself call God an absolutely proximate cause which is *'externa'*; nevertheless this is what he means. To be a *'causa efficiens (proxima absolute) externa'* does *not* contradict God being an immanent (as opposed to transient) cause, because it is still to be the very opposite of a remote cause.

[44] I Df5, and Ax4; and IIP6.
[45] TIE, Op.II, p.37 (l.1.-9). I interpret '*fixa et aeterna*' in this text to mean God's attributes.
[46] How this is done should be found out by studying carefully what Spinoza has to say about the definition of natural things, in: TIE, Op.II, p.37; II P10-15; Ep6 and 13; TTP, ch.7, Op.III, p.98-99; etc. (About this some stimulating ideas can be found in the second part of R. McKeon's paper: *Causation and the geometric method in the philosophy of Spinoza*, in *Philosoph. Review*, 1930 (39), p.275-296).
[47] Ep60, Op.IV, p.270.
[48] See note 3.
[49] See note 8.
[50] *Meletemata...*, p.27.
[51] F. Brandt, o.c. p.56.

GUTTORM FLØISTAD

EXPERIENTIAL MEANING IN SPINOZA

I

1. Analytical theory of meaning has recently acquired a new field of inquiry, that of experiential meaning. In his article 'Interpretation and the sciences of man' (*The Review of Metaphysics*, September 1971, Vol.XXV,No.1)* Professor Charles Taylor introduces experiential meaning as follows: 1) It is for a subject (in the sense in which a situation, an action, a demand, a project may be said to have a certain meaning for a person); 2) it is of something (that is, we can distinguish between a given situation, action etc., and its meaning for a person), and 3) it is in a field (that is, no element of experiential meaning occurs alone, it is always related to, and also in part determined by other meaningful elements, similarly to the relation between concepts in a semantic field), (p.11).

Experiential meaning is thus both similar to and distinct from linguistic meaning. Linguistic meaning is also meaning for a subject and in a field, but it is the meaning of terms (or 'signifiers' in Taylor's terminology) and it is about a world of referents, distinct from the signifiers (p.12).

Experiential meaning is furthermore described as 'lived meaning' (e.g. p.16), an expression which suggests that this type of meaning helps to constitute or determine what we are. That is to say, an individual's interpretation of his situation or of an action which he performs, yielding as it does a certain experiential meaning, is or involves at the same time the individual's interpretation of himself.

In his further discussion, in which he draws on a number of examples from the science of politics, Professor Taylor distinguishes between various closely interwoven kinds of experiential or lived meaning, the principal distinction being that between subjective and intersubjective meaning. The introduction of the latter, that is, intersubjective meaning stems in Taylor from the observation that social practice cannot be explained as a set of individual actions. The various types of social practice, characterizing a certain kind of society and distinguishing it from others, form a structure of intersubjective meanings,

* All page references are to this article.

on the basis of which subjective meanings, that is, individual actions and consequently the individuals' self-interpretations, are made possible.

This underlying intersubjective meaning-structure in which an individual lives also provides limits to his capacity to understand, so that individuals living in different social meaning-structures are left without any significant possibility of communication, a point which Taylor illustrates with the student uprising in the U.S.A. In such a situation, well known from all fields of human encounter, it may be perfectly legitimate, given what Taylor calls a superior position, to issue imperatives such as 'Develop your intuitions' and even 'Change yourself' (p.48). The difficulty is that there is no plain procedure, no unambiguous reference point or state of affairs, to which to appeal in order to make such injunctions effective. There can only be new interpretations, new readings of meanings, and reexpressions of interpretations or readings, with the hope that the individual at some point or other, will 'catch on'.

2. To anyone within the empiricist tradition of epistemology, this hermeneutical account of meaning, with its lack of any fixed point of reference beyond interpretation, will, as Taylor remarks, appear shocking. To someone familiar with the classical tradition of metaphysics, however, Taylor's account cannot but appear as an excellent revival of well-known truths, made now more sophisticated in their application to a new historical situation.

Taylor's chief aim in introducing the notion of experiential meaning is to enable philosophy, in this case political philosophy, to deal more adequately with the humanistic or social problems of our day. In an era where a major part of philosophy appears to have willingly disarmed itself in the face of most of these problems, Taylor's attempt must be warmly welcomed. In addition, it provides compelling grounds for a constant reinterpretation of the classical background of his theses, the more so as in fact the neglect of this background by much modern philosophy may indirectly have contributed to the present value crisis.

From this classical background I know of no philosopher who has focuses more thoroughly than Spinoza on experiential meaning and its significance for philosophical problems in general. In terms of Spinoza's system, the various aspects of the problem of experiential meaning referred to by Taylor can be made perfectly intelligible, in an even stronger and therefore perhaps more instructive fashion. With the *Ethics* in mind I shall argue in turn the theses, that knowledge in general involves experiential meaning, that an individual's knowledge of some object involves his self-knowledge, and moreover, what it means, on the basis of these two theses, to say that experiential mean-

ing is for a subject, of something, and in a field. Finally, in terms of the doctrine of the liberation of the intellect and the three kinds of knowledge, I shall give some meaning to the notion of having a superior position and to the distinction between subjective and inter-subjective meaning.

II

1. Experiential meaning has ontological significance: it helps to constitute what we are. It is not difficult to see that the notion of an idea, or of knowledge, or understanding in the *Ethics* fully meets this requirement. What constitutes the actual being of the human mind is nothing else than a complex idea (IIP11,15). In other words the mind or the individual may be conceived as a complex cognitive experience, though of course in the context of the *Ethics* 'cognitive' should not be taken as opposed to 'evaluative' and 'emotional', but rather as integrated with these.

The meaning of an idea, justifying its identification with the mind, naturally presents a serious problem. In the *Ethics* it is not always possible without qualifications to substitute the term 'idea' whenever Spinoza uses 'mind' or the personal pronouns or some proper name. For present purposes, however, it suffices to point out that an idea is more than a specific content, a mental reproduction of some object or state of affairs; primarily an idea is to be regarded as an active entity, where the content signifies and expresses a determination of this thinking activity. It is by being such a determination and an expression of the mind's thinking activity, we may assume, that an idea comes to acquire experiential meaning, that is, to have an ontological impact on the individual, in that it actualizes a part of his power of thinking.

Evidence both of this notion of an idea and of its experiential meaning is to be found in Spinoza's view on the genesis of an idea: it follows from another idea. The expression 'follows from' certainly has a (usually informal) logical sense: Given a set of premises (a complex idea), we may draw a certain conclusion. It is quite clear, however, that it also signifies the factual production of a new idea. To say that one idea follows from another is equivalent to saying that the latter is the adequate or inadequate cause of the former. Every idea or set of ideas thus involves a causal activity of thought aimed at the acquisition of new knowledge.

By way of further explanation of this causal activity, Spinoza refers us to the principle of self-preservation stated in IIIP6: 'Everything in so far as it is in itself endeavours to persist in its own being' (Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur).

The thinking activity is the mind's endeavour to persist, and as

such it functions as a permanent cause of action resulting in the formation of ideas, in the production of knowledge. It is by forming ideas or acquiring knowledge that the mind persists in its being. In producing ideas, the mind we may say, produces itself, a production which may also be conceived as the mind's reproduction of itself, of its thinking activity. Spinoza's use of the term 'affirmation' (as, for instance, in IIIP10Dem) is perhaps particularly illuminating here: 'The first and principal endeavour of the mind is to affirm the existence of the body and of itself'. And since there can be no affirmation apart from that which is contained in an idea (cf.IIP49), we may conclude that an idea is to be regarded primarily as the mind's affirmation of its own (and its body's) existence. Conceived in terms of the mind's reproduction or affirmation of itself. Spinoza's identification of the mind with its ideas, as well as the experiential meaning function of ideas, appear at least intelligible.

One must note, of course, that expressions such as 'thinking activity' and 'endeavour to persist' are abstract constructions. No act of thinking can ever be as it were pure: it is always conditioned and determinate from the outset, which merely amounts to saying that every act of thinking is somehow guided by the individual's previous experience. Or as Spinoza puts it, an idea arises always out of another idea. Knowledge is a necessary condition for further knowledge.

That this 'law of mind', besides enabling an individual to think at all, at the same time puts limits on his capacity to understand, is a point to which I shall return in a moment. First I shall briefly apply this law to the problem of the relation between an individual's knowledge of some object and his self-knowledge.

2. The mind is given with an endeavour to persist in its being. However, it cannot bring about this persistence by itself, that is, determine itself by itself or its body alone. The mind, which is a finite thing and has a determined existence, 'cannot exist nor be determined for actions unless it is determined for actions and existence by another cause, which is also finite and has a determined existence...' (IP28). The proposition indicates a sort of necessary connection between an individual and *some* object or individual in his environment, or, which comes to the same, between an individual's cognitive experience and the new ideas that follow from it.

The proposition also suggests a necessary connection between the mind's idea or knowledge of some other individual or object and his self-knowledge. There can be no other self-knowledge than that which stems from ideas of some other individual or object, or in Spinoza's terminology: 'The mind has no knowledge of itself save in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body by some other body, that is, save in so far as it perceives other bodies' (inferred

from IIP23 and P26). That is why the mind's affirmation of its own existence necessarily involves the affirmation of the existence of some other object (cf.IIIP10Dem and IIP49Dem). It is also the reason why the mind is bound to reproduce itself, its power of thinking by forming ideas, and thus reproducing the existence of some other object. In this sense, the mind may again be said to consist of its ideas.

The necessity involved here does not concern any particular object, but merely *that* there must be some other individual or object. An individual's cognitive experience, the ideas constituting what he is, could always have been otherwise.

3. Experiential meaning is for a subject, of something, and in a field. We are now in a position to give these specific characteristics a Spinozistic interpretation.

An idea of some object has meaning for a subject in that it signifies a (more or less successful) reproduction (or affirmation or modification) of his existence. As such an idea signifies how an individual continues to exist, and as such it is virtually a piece of lived meaning. It helps constitute an individual's self for himself.

Experiential meaning is of something, that is, it cannot occur without some object, a substrate. The corresponding distinction in an idea would be that between some object or, which in a sense comes to the same, one's knowledge of that object and its impact on the individual's way of life and his capacity for understanding (feeling and evaluation). That the experiential meaning of an idea cannot occur without some object should be obvious from the foregoing. 'Cannot' signifies an ontological impossibility.

Taylor makes the further point that the distinction between experiential meaning and its embodiment is not always distinct. The experiential meaning of some object very often originates not in some mental description of the object but in an interpretation of it, expressed in a particular language. The effect is that the object is ontologically affected. What it is, is in part determined by the subject. The object, to use a fashionable term, is constituted in and by consciousness or understanding.

This description, since it is of course itself an interpretation of the being of the subject, goes for physical objects as well as, for instance, and in a more radical sense, actions. That language or a specific terminology may play a significant part in the constitution is a familiar view. Taylor rightly observes, for instance, that a 'feeling' vocabulary often not merely reflects preexisting feelings, but itself makes one's emotional life more sophisticated. In all these cases the relation of a word to its reference becomes a problem, for instance, in that it can no longer without qualification be used for verification purposes.

Spinoza's thought is in no way alien to these viewpoints either. He

knew, perhaps better than we do, that truth cannot be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of the 'extrinsic' relation between an idea and its object. And there are good reasons to assume that the thought and language of the *Ethics* enriches one's ontology, including one's cognitive and emotional life. The constitutive and interpretative function of thought and language emerges perhaps most clearly, again, in Spinoza's view concerning the genesis of an idea: thus an idea does not primarily follow from an observational contact with some object, but from another idea. That is to say, it follows (adequately or inadequately) from an individual's earlier experience, which is again to say that the individual is attributed a significantly active role in his ontological design. This takes us to the third feature of experiential meaning, that of occurring in a field.

For a meaning to occur in a field means that it cannot be identified except in relation to other meanings. The field may be of different kinds. The definition of a colour concept in terms of a field of contrasting colours is an example.

The field of contrast is also extensively used in the *Ethics*, not only in the definition of the emotions, but even more fundamentally in the definition of substance and modes. The definitions are given in terms of the well-known contrast between 'being in itself' and 'being in something else', 'conceived through itself' and 'conceived through something else'. It is also possible and useful to define each of the three kinds of knowledge in relation to the two others, in as much as each kind illustrates in varying degrees an individual's being in himself as well as his dependence on something else. Every proposition of the *Ethics* is accordingly to be understood in terms of the fundamental distinction or contrast between substance and mode, between that which is self-contained and that which is not. The meaning of every proposition comprises both.

It is tempting, however, to take a more radical stand on the question of a field with respect to experiential meaning. The field I have in mind is simply the sequence of ideas, the order and connection in which every idea, due to its active, causal nature necessarily occurs. Every idea depends on previous ideas in so far as it is their effect, an effect which acts as a cause of further ideas. As such, it is part of an infinite sequence, an ever expanding whole. And as an idea acquires its meaning from both its causes and its effects, any definite identification of its meaning presents itself as an impossibility. Any such identification is bound to be temporary, and any amount or degree of clarity and distinctness is due to an artificial limitation of the field, and of the experiential significance of the idea.

There is, of course, a distinction between adequate and inadequate ideas, effects and causes. Inadequate ideas are in part the effect of external unknown forces, and therefore in principle confused. Of

adequate ideas the individual is the sufficient cause, for which reason they are clear and distinct. Clarity and distinctness, however are not absolute but relative notions. There is no clear and distinct idea which cannot be replaced by one which is more clear and distinct, that is, one which represents a more comprehensive knowledge of God and what follows from his nature (inferred, e.g., from VP28).

Such views may appear more plausible as soon as we become aware of what a sequence of ideas and the identification of their meaning in the end amounts to. As the mind is its ideas, a sequence of ideas signifies an individual's life process, his continuation through time, and the identification of the meaning of an idea is self-identification and self-knowledge at a given moment of that life-process. And one's self-knowledge, which according to Spinoza always comprises some inadequate and confused ideas, is clear and distinct to the extent to which it relies upon adequate and true knowledge.

4. To be human is to be subject to change. An ontology of man and the theory of experiential meaning involved in it must therefore account for change. In Spinoza this change is a change in a sequence of ideas. Epistemology is the ontology of man.

Spinoza had a fairly definite view concerning how a sequence of ideas ought to change or proceed. His doctrine of intellectual and emotional liberation makes it imperative for every individual to increase his knowledge and acquire as many adequate ideas as possible. Irrespective of one's attitude towards this doctrine, it provides material for a useful illustration and clarification of the meaning of a certain notion and distinction central to Taylor's hermeneutical philosophy; that is, the meaning of having a superior position and difficulties of communication resulting from it, and the distinction between subjective and intersubjective meaning.

There are in principle two types of superiority of understanding, that within one and the same kind of knowledge, and that between different kinds. My concern is with the latter only. Why, then, is the second kind of knowledge superior to the first and the third kind superior to both the first and second? To say that one kind or way of knowing things is superior to another because it makes the mind apt to perceive many or more things, and more apt to know the proper nature of things, or because it represents a higher degree of knowledge or consciousness of God, of oneself and other things (e.g. VPS9Sch), or because it represents a higher degree of fulfilment of an individual's endeavour to persist in so far as it makes him more a part of God or nature as a whole and thus more eternal and *more* free to shape himself according to the 'laws of nature', or because it makes him happier, is true but not particularly illuminating. Since the word 'superior' points to the relation between kinds of knowledge, a consideration in

terms of conditions of a transition from one kind to another, or, which comes to much the same, in terms of possibilities of communication between kinds of ideas or ways of knowing things, may be more rewarding.

To put it briefly: adequate ideas cannot follow from inadequate ones. Adequate ideas are effects, for the formation of which the causal power characteristic of inadequate ideas are in principle insufficient. Consequently no transition from the first to the second and third kinds of knowledge can occur. Hence an individual which has (or rather *is*) inadequate ideas has no access to adequate ideas and is in no position to understand and communicate with individuals which do have these ideas. From the point of view of being understood, the 'inadequate individual' is far better off, due to the superior position of adequate knowledge. And he is better off not because he is understood and judged as he understands and judges himself, but because from the superior point of view he is better known and persumably judged less highly than he himself does. The individual which has adequate ideas also has access, either in a general way (the second kind) or in a uniquely essential way (the third kind), to the external forces at work in an inadequate idea.

Ideas of the third kind way follow from those of the second, because they are both clear and distinct (cf.VP32Dem). Hence a transition from the second to the third kind and communication between them are possible. However, this doesn't mean that no difficulty is involved. It is conceivable, for instance, that an intuitive idea of the essence of some individual thing, may be interpreted in terms of the second kind of knowledge, that is, converted into a general idea of the essence of such things. And in this case the communication is certainly less genuine and 'powerful' than it could be.

Language by itself does not offer any guarantee of an adequate reception of an idea. There may be words or ways of expressing knowledge which are more characteristic of one kind of knowledge than of another. But no words or expressions as part of an act of communication can escape interpretation by someone who usually understands things in a certain way. And it is this way of knowing things that is the basis of any interpretation of language.

Because any use of language can in principle be interpreted from the point of view of all three kinds of knowledge, some form of communication may take place even between true and false ideas. The quality of the exchange of ideas or of oneself, however, will be obvious to everyone in the superior position.

The difficulties involved here may perhaps be made more perspicuous in terms of the distinction between subjective and intersubjective meaning. Intersubjective meaning elements are, I believe, to be found on different levels in the *Ethics*. The basic level or levels are, or course,

God and his attributes and the immediate and mediate infinite modes. All ideas, for instance, whether true or false, are expressions of God or the attribute of thought. That is to say, the meaning of God is part of the meaning of every idea. It is a finite expression of an infinite power of thinking.

However, this basic level of meaning does not take us very far. Disagreement or lack of mutual understanding cannot be due to the fact that every idea or individuals themselves partake in one and the same divine nature or all-embracing meaning. Rather, God or the occurrence of an infinite power of thinking is a condition for any occurrence of disagreement or mutual understanding at all.

We must therefore search for a less basic level of intersubjective meaning. And it is tempting to interpret the three types of knowledge as types of such lower level intersubjective meanings.

Evidence for this is Spinoza's own view of an idea, indirectly pointed to several times already. An idea certainly represents knowledge of some object. Primarily, however, an idea is a way of knowing things. That is to say, it is an active entity, functioning as a cause of other ideas. All ideas of one kind of knowledge thus express the same way of knowing things, the same intersubjective meaning. A certain aspect or way of knowing things is therefore part of the meaning of every particular idea.

What then are these ways of knowing things? The *Ethics* as a whole is in a sense an account of them. In view of the present purpose which is merely to suggest their intersubjective experiential meaning character, it is enough to draw attention to just a few passages.

For inadequate ideas the general definition of the passive emotions (at the end of Part III) is particularly relevant: these emotions or inadequate ideas are such that they determine the mind 'to think of one thing rather than another'. The definition expresses the nature of desire, that is, of the partial or insufficient thinking activity characteristic of inadequate ideas. Hence all inadequate ideas are (partially) effects of such determinations. They signify dispositional preferences and explain as such each particular idea in a *general way*, and at the same time limitations of the individual's capacity to understand reality.

Adequate ideas of the second kind signify limitations of a different kind. Though clear and distinct, they determine the mind 'to have regard for many things at once only, to understand their agreements, differences and oppositions one to another' (cf.IIP29Sch). The clarity and distinctness of these ideas does not concern particular things as particulars but their common properties. Each idea is a product of such a determination to the effect that every particular idea signifies the individual's ability to understand common properties of things *in general*.

The object left for adequate ideas of the third kind is the essence of

things (IIP40Sch2), that is, each thing as a finite expression of the infinite eternal nature of God and his attributes. These ideas signify, in other words, the ability to understand each thing as it is in God and the infinite variety of things as being but an infinite variety of expressions of one and the same power of God. Each particular idea determine the individual to know things in this way *generally*, a way which therefore is part of the meaning of the particular idea.

In this case, it should be added, the intersubjective meaning reaches down to the basic level. Among the things which may be 'referred to God' (cf. e.g. VP14) in the manner of the third kind of knowledge, we may assume, are ideas of the first and second kinds. An individual which has adequate ideas of the third kind has regard for the overall intersubjective meaning through its expressions or manifestations in particulars and in lower level intersubjective meanings.

As is apparent, the meaning of every idea is both particular and general, both subjective and intersubjective. The particular subjective element can only occur on the basis of the intersubjective one which in turn is accessible only through its particular subjective manifestations.

Difficulties concerning a transition from one kind of knowledge to another in an act of communication occur of course in connection with both meaning elements, primarily, however, with the intersubjective element. This means that for a transition in an exchange of ideas to be successful, no less than a change in one's way of life, in one's intersubjective meaning structure, is required.

Whatever differences a more detailed comparison and analysis may reveal between hermeneutical philosophy, as presented by Taylor, and Spinoza, it should be obvious from the foregoing that Spinoza's thought is highly sensitive to this kind of philosophy, both as an object of interpretation and as a significant contribution to interpretation theory itself.

AUGUSTO FURLAN

LOGIC ACCORDING TO SPINOZA

There is, among the works of Spinoza, hardly any specific consideration to logical science. Hence the aim of this paper which consists in showing – taking as a basis the contents of various passages in the Ethics and the Treatise for the Reform of Understanding – what we think is this philosopher's implicit main thought on this discipline.

To begin with let us remember that in de Preface to the fifth part of the Ethics Spinoza states that the problem that refers to the manner and way which should lead to perfection in understanding should be solved by Logic, thus establishing the aim of that science. De Emendatione – which may no doubt be held as that which most closely resembles a treatise of Logic within Spinoza's works – confirms this thesis as it is there proposed that in order to arrive at the knowledge of the union of man with universal Nature – a union which our author supports as a fundamental metaphysical statement – 'it will be necessary to find a means to cure understanding and purify it in order that it may comprehend things easily, without error and as best as possible'.[1]

Nevertheless, Spinoza states that perfection of understanding depends on the knowledge of God (TTPIV). And understanding God is linked to understanding things through the third form of knowledge since '...the better we understand things through the third mode of knowledge the better we understand God' (VP25Dem).

The third mode of knowledge is the one that '...proceeds from the adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God up to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things' (IIP40Sch2). But we only understand thus – e.g., through the third mode – to the degree that we understand our body under the species of eternity (VP29,31). And there is in God an idea which expresses the essence of the human body; an idea which necessarily pertains to the essence of the soul (VP23) since the idea which expresses the essence of the body under the species of eternity exists in God insofar as it constitutes the human soul. If we add to this that all ideas extant in God are true (IIP39Dem) it appears that the idea which expresses the essence of the body *sub*

specie aeternitatis is given in the human soul and is true, and this enables us to understand according to the third mode.

In order to clarify spinozian thought we should remember that according to our author it behoves reason to consider things as necessary, and that we are dealing here with the very need of the essence of God, which is eternal. Hence, it behoves reason to consider things under this species of eternity (IIP44Cor2Dem).

However, the foundations of reason are the notions which are common to all things, notions which should be conceived under a species of eternity (IIP44Cor2Dem). And in the 38th proposition of the second part of the Ethics it is said that '...common notions are given to all men because all *bodies* agree in certain properties' (underlining is ours). We then see that a) common notions are the foundations of reason, of reasoning. Hence b) they are the foundations of a faculty (reason) which considers things *sub specie aeternitatis*; c) common notions are true ideas – since reason perceives things in a true way (IIP44Dem); d) common notions exist because bodies agree in certain properties. It is than clear that if we only know things through the third mode if we know the body *sub specie aeternitatis*, and if reason, which knows things truly and *sub specie aeternitatis* has as a foundation the notions common to all bodies, it turns out that it is these common notions that, being known, supply us with all possibility of knowledge of the third mode and with our reasoning.

Now then, according to Wolfson, the common notions that we should consider as implicitly accepted by Spinoza are magnitude, figure, number and unity, and those explicitly indicates are movement and repose.[2] Furthermore, it is evident that an adequate knowledge of magnitude, figure, number and unity can only be given by the mathematical sciences, in the same way that the knowledge of movement and repose is the concern of physical science (and is found in fact in the spinozian 'Physics', developed in the second part of the Ethics.)

Mathematics and physics would then be but the developed study of common notions. They would reveal the essence of all bodies and in the last instance would state the essence of things as to extension. Hence: they would reveal the essence of things proceeding from the essence of an attribute of God – Extension – enabling us to reach through them, the third mode of knowledge.[3]

If we add this to the statement that method is not demonstrative reasoning nor is it the true idea but a reflection on them (TIE37), the first conclusion we reach is that logical rules which perfect our understanding derive from the knowledge of the procedures of physics and mathematics. Logic is the set of rules implicit in the demonstrative-cognisant techniques of physics and mathematics.

And if we bear in mind that Ethics is '*ordine geometrico demonstrata*' and that Spinoza's physics is structured '*ordine geometrico*' in the

second part of the Ethics, it appears that our first conclusion can be clarified saying that logical rules should arise fundamentally from a reflection on geometry (the geometrical method) which is the best mode of knowledge of the common notions with which it is concerned (that is, figure and magnitude).

That is to say then that logic arises, at least in part, from the physical and mathematical sciences, and particularly from geometry. Spinozian logic is, at least in part, a logic of mathematics and physics and particularly of geometry, of what is *geometrically* known. There is, however, a question which remains to be clarified within the first conclusion: to find out if there are other kinds of knowledge, besides the third mode, reflecting on which the logician may find other rules or procedures which perfect understanding and which conform new parts of logics. This will be answered below.

In De Emendatione Spinoza searches for the definition of intellect because he believes that he may reach the idea of God through reflective knowledge of the former and because he thinks that the most perfect method will result from reflection on that idea (TIE105).

However, in a letter addressed to Bouwmeester in 1666[4] – that is, after the De Emendatione and the first writing of the Ethics – and confirming to a certain extent what was said in De Emendatione on the impossibility of achieving a definition of understanding (TIE106, 107) – Spinoza states than in order to establish fundamental methodological rules it is enough to reach a description – if not an essential definition – of the human spirit.

However, in the 29th proposition of the fifth part of the Ethics, a part which according to Appuhn Spinoza did not set down under the geometrico – deducive form until at least 1665,[5] we are told that the soul conceives the body under duration and *sub specie aeternitatis* and that 'besides these two things, *nothing else* pertains to the essence of the soul' (underlining is ours), an essence which is elsewhere defined as the 'sole knowledge' (VP36Sch). And within this knowledge which is essential of the soul, only knowledge sub specie aeternitatis belongs to understanding or reason (VP29).

Later, in fact, when Spinoza, again in the fifth part of the Ethics says that logics searches for perfection of understanding and therefore attempts to give rules to produce true ideas – such, indeed, is the aim of the De Emendatione and the Logic – we must suppose that it is that understanding which is defined in the Ethics. From which we gather that to perfect understanding is to perfect knowledge sub specie aeternitatis.

Now then, the reflective knowledge that understanding achieves of itself as well as of everything else can only exist insofar as the soul knows the body sub specie aeternitatis, since, as has already been stated '...this power of conceiving things under the species of eternity

belongs to the soul only insofar as it conceives the essence of the body under the species of eternity' (VP29Dem, in fine).

Hence if logic aims at perfecting intellect by means of a reflection which will provide useful rules to produce true ideas and arrive at an increasingly better knowledge of God and the whole of the essence of understanding is to know sub specie aeternitatis and we know nothing of this mode except insofar as we know the body sub specie aeternitatis it then appears that Logic should then arise completely from a reflection on the way to know the body sub specie aeternitatis, a way which can best be seen in the deductive-geometrical process in particular and in mathematics in general.

We thus arrive at a second conclusion: Logic is not only a science which is partially based on geometry or mathematics but also the logical rules implicit in the procedures of mathematical sciences constitutes all of Logic.

Mathematical science in general and particularly its most perfect form, geometry, would then be the 'continent' disciplines of logical science. Spinozian logic would be the logic of mathematics. All knowledge, insofar as the function of understanding is based on knowledge of the body sub specie aeternitatis, would in the end be a knowledge based on the mathematical and particularly the geometrical method.[6]

Therefore, if Spinoza has followed the geometrical method in the Ethics it is, we believe, because geometry is the science that offers a unique and irreplaceable example in the treatment of common notions. Moreover, those notions common to alle bodies appear, in the end, to supply the knowledge sub specie aeternitatis of the body which is an absolutely necessary condition of all knowledge. And those common notions are perfectly and exhaustively well known, particularly through the method which belongs to geometry.

The third result at which we arrive is that Ethics is 'ordine geometrico demonstrata' since if knowledge sub specie aeternitatis of the body is absolutely necessary for all knowledge and if geometry is, through its expositive method, the most perfect knowledge of common notions, which are the 'foundations of our reasoning' (IIP40Sch); of course the geometrical method or logic must perforce be the adequate method for the knowledge of God and His effects,[7] a knowledge which generically embraces all and which constitutes the contents of Ethics.

And insofar as geometry proceeds from the axioms of space, from its general properties, and according to them demonstrates the properties of various figures, thus Ethics, using the system of axioms, propositions, scholiums, etc., which belongs to geometry, proceeds from the essence of the attributes of God to the essence of things, which corresponds to the aforementioned third mode of knowledge.[8] Let us now consider the question of the intrinsic need of method which truth has.

There are no isolated thruths according to Spinoza (TIE46) and thus, to obtain true knowledge, which is given in the third mode, we should proceed from the essence of some attributes of God towards the essence of things. Bearing this in mind we should conclude that method, that is, the set of procedures and deductive rules within geometry are absolutely necessary for the achievement of a perfect, full and intrinsically true idea, that is to say, an idea which is true. This is confirmed by the fact that according to Spinoza there are no true ideas which are isolated from the rest; they all trade among one another, in the same way that in nature the formal essences respective to those ideas bear relationship to one another (TIE41).

Moreover, Spinoza states that in order to reproduce reality in a proper way we must refer ideas to a single one which represents that which is the cause of all nature (TIE42,91).

This relationship that all ideas bear to one another and its reference to the first and foremost idea can only be expressed – if we bear in mind the ruling need in spinozian metaphysics – (IP29) through deductive – geometrical logic.[9] And since this relationship and reference is essential to true ideas, that is, to true knowledge, we then arrive at a fourth conclusion, which is that logic is essential to metaphysical truth; this truth would not be reached without logico-geometrical knowledge. The method through which truth has been learned, is intrinsic, essential to the very truth which would not be such without it.[10] This can also be expressed saying that the knowledge of God, which is our intellective perfection and is displayed through the Ethics (since the knowledge of the effects of God in the Ethics is but a better knowledge of the cause, that is to say, of God Himself (TIE92)) is only possible through the geometrical method.

Truth is not then independent of the method of logic through which it is reached[11] but *assumes* unto itself the method or logic used as a constituent which is necessary in order to be truth. Disregarding existing differences with Hegel we can also say that truth is essentially result: the logical concatenation which leads to truth 'makes' truth.

Let us now deal with the question of the relationship of logic to the freedom and happiness of man. From what has been said above it is clear that Ethics is a knowledge reached thanks to geometrical logic and the latter can only give us, if we admit the absolute exclusiveness of the geometrical method and its perfect application to Ethics, a concept of understanding in which the latter appears as a liberator of passions only when it knows (Eth. parsV), that is, only when it applies the geometrical method. Hence we arrive at the fifth conclusion: Logic appears as a source of happiness, liberator of passions and a means to set us free.

We shall now analyse the question of the self-justification of Logic.

It is the awareness that the knowledge of the body sub specie aeternitatis (which is a knowledge of a geometric kind) is an absolutely certain knowledge based on a safe method which permits Spinoza, after having used it in the Ethics, to find out that there can only be true knowledge insofar as the body is known sub specie aeternitatis, that is, geometrico-demonstratively.

The method used in the Ethics serves thus to demonstrate that this method gives birth to learning, which is the source of all knowledge. That is to say: one of the propositions of the Ethics, demonstrated through the geometrical method or logic, states the need of that logic as a condition of all demonstration, that is, of all knowledge.

The method or logic thus appears to be self-justifying. The Ethics carries out the postulates in the De Emendatione in the sense that we have certain innate instruments, a certain absolute and evident method and that it is not necessary to wonder about the method to discover the true method (TIE30,31). Consequently, as a sixth conclusion we have that logical rules can, according to themselves, be shown valid. This is confirmed in the De Emendatione insofar as '... in order to reason and prove truth we can avail ourselves of no other instrument but truth itself and good reasoning; if we reason properly can we confirm correct reasoning'.[12]

Let us now deal with the development of logical science. Logic should concern itself with the perfection of intellect and should achieve this striving to make all things known through a logical way, that is to say, reasonably – geometrically, proceeding from the essence of an attribute of God towards the essence of things, thus increasing the knowledge of God and at the same time increasing the power of understanding through new rules and processes of discovery. It is only possible to know through the application of method. In doing so we obtain new instruments in order to know (TIE31,32). That is: method leads to knowledge and the latter increases the power of method. We therefore have as a seventh conclusion that spinozian logic must be conceived as a science which, bearing in mind that it has its foundations in the geometrical method, should be considered susceptible of continuous accretion. And as logical rules are usefull for the achievement of new knowledge, they would enable us to obtain new rules. Hence there is an interaction between learning and logic; logic gives birth to learning and learning gives birth to logic.[13]

However, it is clear that, not neglecting the possibility of an accretion of the power of understanding through the finding of new logical rules, the Ethics will always remain as the most perfect expression of spinozian logic. Through its chain of reasoning it expresses the highest perfection which understanding can achieve as it supplies the 'geometrical' knowledge of God (TIE49).

The Ethics contains then the rules of the most perfectly applied

method, supplies the perfection of our intellect, the example of its maximum power.

We hereby achieve an eighth conclusion: If logic is concerned with the perfection of understanding then it is the reflective knowledge of the geometrical method and fundamentally of the geometrical method as it is set down in the Ethics which supplies us with the fundamental rules in order to know and, moreover, the basis of the intellective perfecting method we search for, that is, the basis which provides the foundation of logical science.

NOTES

[1] TIE16 (we cite this work according to the paragraph division by Bruder – Leipzig, 1843).

[2] H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, II, 15, p.126.

[3] IIP40Schol.2; C. De Deugd, *The Significance of Spinoza's first Kind of Knowledge*, Assen, 1966: '...all bodies are modes of extension and so the notiones communes include the concept of the attributes of extension' (VI, 11, p.241).

[4] Ed. van Vloten and Land, III, 135.

[5] *Spinoza, Oeuvres*. Trad. Notices et notes par Ch. Appuhn, Paris, 1966, vol. III, p.11 nota 3 in fine.

[6] L. Brunsvigh, *Spinoza* (Ecrits Philosophiques, Paris 1951, vol. I, p.113: – Reproduced from an article in the 'Grande Encyclopedie, 1901): '... la démonstration géometrique est particulierement appropriée à la conception spinoziste de la verité...'

[7] J. Freudenthal, *Spinoza. Leben und Lehre*. Heidelberg, 1927. Zweiter Teil. Fünftes Kapitel, 102: 'Ist es gelungen, den Zusammenhang aller Dinge aus dem Begriffe Gottes in mathematisch sicherer Methods abzuleiten, dann ist das Ziel der Philosophie erreicht'.

[8] In order to further support the 'geometrism' of the Ethics and of the knowledge of God which is therein achieved it is worth noting that as Deleuze states in his 'Spinoza et le problème de l'expression', p. 129: '... il arrive à Spinoza de dire que l'existence de Dieu ne nous est pas connue par elle-même; il veut dire que cette connaissance nous est nécessairement donnée par des 'notions communes' sans lesquelles elle ne serait même pas claire et distincte, mais grace auxquelles elle est adequate'. Cfr. M. Gueroult, *Spinoza*; Dieu, p.425: '... tout en different... de la Géometrie, la Métaphysique s'en rapproche en tant qu'elle déduit a priori génetiquement les essences des choses à partir de l'essence formelle de certains attributs éternelles et infinis, de la même façon que la Géometrie déduit a priori génetiquement ses essences à partir de l'étendue infinie déterminée par le mouvement. D'où la nécessité pour la Métaphysique d'emprumter la méthode de la Géometrie en tant que celle-ci constitue le modèle imprescriptible de toute connaissance d'essence.'

[9] H. Hubbeling, *Spinoza's Methodology*, Assen, 1964, ch I, p.49: '...this following of things from each other takes a logical caracter...God's activity is the logical connecting of effectus and causae'.

[10] Eth., I, Appendix: '... mankind would have remained forever ignorant of truth if mathematics, interested not in the aims but in the essence and properties of figures had not shown man another way of truth'.

[11] A. Banfi, *Spinoza e il suo tempo*, 1969, p.172: '... la ricerca del metodo di verità è una sola cosa con la verità stessa. Il metodo sicuro è per Spinoza

l'ordine di esplicazione della verità stessa... La via alla verità non e altro che l'attualità stessa della verità nell'intellecto...'

[12] TIE44; Cfr. G. Parkinson, *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge*. Oxford, 1954, p.9: '...the method does not enable one to acquire knowledge starting from a condition of absolute ignorance, but rather it presupposes some knowledge, and on this basis tells one how to acquire more'.

[13] A similar thesis is supported by G. Bachelard in his *Philosophie du Non*, ch. VI, par. 3, when he states that science instructs reason. However, we may emphasize that although Bachelard admits a variation through the development of science, Spinoza, however, takes for granted the inmutable truth of common notions and the geometrical method.

J. J. GROEN

SPINOZA: PHILOSOPHER AND PROPHET

INTRODUCTION

The 'truth value' of a philosophical or scientific system is determined by the concepts and axioms on which it is based and by the validity of its methods. Modern science recognizes that we shall never know an abolute 'objective' truth because the truth of our basic concepts cannot be established with absolute certainty and because there are no methods of observation without error. Moreover, the human mind (or brain) is fallible in the way it derives cause and effect relationships (hypotheses) from its observations. Instead we regard our knowledge (i.e. our hypotheses) as scientifically supported and thereby *approximating a certain aspect of the truth with significant probability*, the better we know, preferably quantitatively, the biases of our concepts and the margin of error of our methods.

The critical reexamination of the basic concepts and methods of a scientific or philosophical system is therefore useful, because it reevaluates the truth value of its results and hypotheses. Even if this leads to the rejection or relativation of some of these, it means a purification of our knowledge. It is better to know the limits of one well supported hypothesis than to believe in a 'universal' truth which is no more than a fiction. This does not mean that a scientist or philosopher is forbidden to extend his hypotheses beyond what can be supported by observation and reason; he should be aware, however, of where 'truths' or 'convictions' become fantasies, speculations or even slogans.

Spinoza had similar ideas about the necessity of basing his philosophy on 'true' axioms and logical reasoning. Indeed a large part of his 'Treatise on the Improvement of the Understanding' is devoted to the problem of finding the right epistemology. In it he wrote: 'Before all things, a means must be devised for improving the understanding, and purifying it, as far as can be, from the outset, so that it may apprehend things without error in the best possible way'.*

This striving for methodological purity forms the link between Spinoza and ourselves; even if we, three centuries later, are not seeking methods without error – such methods do not exist – and are content

* In this and the following quotations we have followed the Elwes translation.

to know the errors inherent in our methods, so that we can evaluate or correct our hypotheses accordingly. This is exactly what we intend to do: to appraise Spinoza's basic concepts and methods as we would appraise our own, critically and honestly. Several others in the course of time have done the same, with the same aim in mind as which he set out to achieve and which he defined in the first pages of the Treatise: 'The chief good is that man should arrive, together with other individuals if possible, at the possession of ... a knowledge of the union existing between the Mind and the whole of Nature'.

SPINOZAS METHOD

Spinozas method is the deduction. From Definitions and Axioms he derives 'Propositions', which are 'proven' by logical reasoning based on the definitions, axioms and previous propositions. We, largely influenced by the Viennese circle, would prefer to designate propositions as hypotheses or deductions, to be tested *empirically* by suitable, validated methods, but these criteria of what constitutes a 'proof' were not yet applied in his time. This makes it even more imperative that we reexamine the basis and limitations of the deductive method. Apart from the doubts about the logic of some of the proofs for certain propositions, especially in Part V of the Ethics, we will consider some of the basic concepts first. These are found in the Definitions, Axioms and Postulates of the First and Second Book of the Ethics: 'Concerning God' and 'On the Nature and Origin of the Mind'. It is obvious that as Spinoza was out to find the chief good for which man was to live, he had first of all to settle the relations of man to God. In the true spirit of the method of Euclid he began therefore to define God, and his 'geometrical' definition has become rightly famous:' An absolute infinite being, that is a substance consisting in infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essentiality'.*

He then proceeded to 'prove' the existence of such a God, 'besides which no substance can be conceived' and of which he said 'Whatsoever is, is in God and without God nothing can be or can be conceived'. In this concept God is the immanent and not transcendent cause of all things. In later propositions he speaks of 'Deus sive Natura' and thereby Spinoza became, if not the creator of Pantheism, certainly its most important proponent.

Unfortunately, Spinoza has not defined what he meant by the Mind or the Intellect although he uses these terms repeatedly (in the latin text designated by the words *Mens* and *Intellectus*). This is a geometrical-methodological inconsequence which we would not have expected from him and the vague description on the lastpage but one

* We would have translated the last word by 'existence' but in Spinozas concept there is no difference between Gods existence and his essence.

of the treatise cannot replace this omission. However, we can understand what he means from Part II, Definition 3 and Axiom 2 where he speaks about the mind as 'a thinking thing' and says that 'Man thinks'. Next follows the first Proposition of Part II: 'Thought is an attribute of God or God is a thinking thing'. From this follows the Corollary after Proposition 11 of the same Part: 'Hence it follows that the human mind is part of the infinite Intellect of God; thus when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we make the assertion that God has this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind'. This is the place where I felt that something was geometrically wrong with this definition of the mind. Spinoza must have felt this also because it is interesting that he adds to this statement a Note. 'Here I doubt not, readers will come to a stand, and will call to mind many things which will cause them to hesitate; I therefore beg them to accompany me slowly, step by step, and not to pronounce on my statements, till they have read to the end'.

Even so, as one who has continued to read and later reread the Ethics many times, the present author still has cause for hesitation and even to a serious objection about the notion that certain ideas which the human mind perceives, are actually Gods ideas, because Man shares with God the attribute of thinking.

One of the most important developments in western philosophy during the last half century has been the concept that thinking, just when it is reasonable, takes place in words and sentences. In other words, thinking is a function of language. The human being is the only animal species which has the acustico-neuro-vocal potential to learn to understand and speak a word language. Thinking is speaking under simultaneous inhibition of the motoric apparatus of speech. What we designate as the human intellect can only develop in a being which has learnt to speak understand and think in a word language. If Spinoza had known the modern science of linguistics he would have named the second axiom of the second Part of the Ethics not: 'Homo cogitat' (Man thinks), but 'Homo loquitur' (Man speaks), like Descartes instead of his famous: 'Cogito ergo sum', (I think therefore I exist), would have written: 'Loquor ergo sum' (I speak therefore I exist). It is only because we have learnt to understand and speak in words that we have learnt the concept and the word 'I'. We might even go so far as defining the mind (resp. the intellect or the spirit) as the mode (or attribute?) of the human existence which expresses itself in verbal language.* Man (Spinoza would say: The human body) can

* In a similar way as man is a thinking something, man is a body occupying space (extension), and thereby related to one other of Gods infinite attributes viz. Extension. But we will not go further into this part of Spinozas system.

learn to speak and think because of his somatic organization, like only birds can learn to fly. Actually in at least two places of the Ethics Spinoza has expressed somewhat similar ideas (IIP14,23) without however realizing that if thinking (like writing and reading) is nothing else but a modified way of speaking a language, this upsets the hypothesis that when man thinks in adequate ideas God is thinking in him.

Because, if thinking is the typical *human* way of 'inwardly' speaking a word language, it is hard to conceive of thought as an attribute of God or that God is also a thinking being (IIP1). This would mean that God, like man, can learn to speak also because of a peculiar audio-neuro-vocal organization! Moreover man can only speak or think in the language(s) which he has learnt. But in what language should God have learnt to speak or think? It is because of this simple reasoning, deduced from our definition of what is thinking, that we must doubt Spinozas reasoning that man 'shares' with God the two attributes of Extension and Thinking. And therefore we must conclude that IIP47, 'The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God', is inadequately supported, viz. neither by empirism nor by logic. A thinking God would be a typical anthropomorphic God and as Spinoza himself wrote: 'The intellect and will of God resemble the human intellect and will as much as the heavenly constellation called 'The Dog' resembles the barking animal which carries that name on earth'. In the same way we regard as naive and inadequate Spinozas idea expressed in the Note to VP40 'that our mind, in so far as it understands, is an eternal mode of thinking, which is determined by another eternal mode of thinking etc. and so on to infinity; so that all these taken together constitute the eternal and infinite intellect of God'.

Spinozas concept of an immanent God which is identical with Nature, implies that man is a finite and temporary part of this eternal and infinite God (IP15,18). This is true for every mode of man's existence, for his body and his emotions as well as for his thinking, whether adequate or inadequate. Man is totally in God with all his manifestations. But he is essentially a temporary and finite being; there is no logical or empirical proof that he, by his human way of thinking, can have an adequate knowledge of the eternity and infinity of God or Nature. All our temporary knowledge of God is imperfect and the realization and, if possible, quantitative measurement of this relative imperfection, brings us as near to 'the truth' as we can hope to achieve. The only certitude we have is that we do not possess an absolute 'proven' or absolutely 'adequate' knowledge but only more or less probable systematic results of more or less imperfect observation and more or less supported hypotheses which are built on them. Starting from this concept the natural sciences and recently also the human

and social sciences (insofar as they strive to be scientific) have accepted the modern socalled hypothetico-deductive methodology. In this method, like in geometry and in the Spinoza system, 'propositions' are logically deduced from concepts and observations but they are not considered 'proven' by this deduction (which in many cases would be a tautology anyway). Instead propositions are regarded as hypotheses from which we deduce predictions which can and need to be tested by suitable independent *empirical* methods. If the predictions are confirmed by the results of the independent observations (or experiments) we regard the hypothesis as supported (not 'proven') and continue to derive further deductions from it, test these and so forth. If the results do not confirm the predictions, the hypothesis is considered not supported and an alternative hypothesis is formulated, similarly tested and so forth.

By this method certain hypotheses have indeed received so much support that they approximate the reality with a high degree of probability, expressed in statistical figures. But even the strongest supported hypotheses are no more than probable knowledge and our only adequate knowledge is that about the degree of its (im)probability.

WHAT KNOWLEDGE REMAINS AFTER THE 'IMPROVEMENT OF THE UNDERSTANDING?'

After having rejected the axiom and consequent propositions that God is a thinking thing from which, as man thinks, follows that man can think adequately like God, we have to consider what this 'purification' changes in the Spinozistic system. To begin with, the definition of God as an infinite being, possessing an infinite number of attributes, each of which expresses infinity, has lost nothing of its importance. The deduction from this definition that God is immanent and therefore identical with the Universe (Deus sive Natura) needs no revision either. After 300 years, it is still the basis of Pantheism and as such a tribute to the genius of Spinoza. In the same way, even though we rejected the deduction that man can think adequately and without error and thereby all deductions deduced from this, there are other concepts and hypotheses in Part I and II which retain their validity, viz. those which are not contaminated by this impurity. A still larger part of the Ethics, viz. Part III, 'On the origin and Nature of the Emotions' is also not based on divine but on human knowledge, logical thinking and honest empiricism. In his treatise on the Emotions Spinoza was far ahead of his contemporaries and this chapter, both methodologically and in the formulation of its concepts and hypotheses, is still a classic.

In the introduction Spinoza declared that he would 'consider human actions and desires in exactly the same manner, as though I were

concerned with lines, planes and solids. Nature's laws and ordinances, whereby all things come to pass, ... are everywhere and always the same; so that there should be one and the same method of understanding the nature of all things whatsoever... Thus the passions of hatred, anger, envy, and so on, ... follow from this same necessity and efficacy of nature; they answer to certain definite causes, through which they are understood ... I shall therefore treat of the nature and strength of the emotions according to the same method as I employed heretofore'. By this methodological principle he became the father of what we now designate as the biological, scientific method in psychology and of the objectivistic, behavioral approach to the study of emotions. Moreover in at least two places of the Ethics (IIP7, IIIP2) Spinoza rejected the dualistic separation of Mind and Body and instead formulated the concept that the two are but different manifestations of one Substance which can be conceived either under the attribute of Thought or of Extension. In this concept he was far ahead of his time and actually the founder of the modern holistic anthropology and of psychosomatic medicine. It took centuries before psychologists gave up their subjective emotional approach; instead of following Spinoza they remained convinced that man's emotions, because they are experienced subjectively as irrational, cannot therefore be rationally studied. It may be said that the development of the science of human behavior would have proceeded faster if the western academic world would not have suppressed Spinozas ideas for more than a century, out of fear for the 'atheistic jew', with whom no respectable man liked to be associated.

Our critical appraisal therefore, detracts nothing from the greatness of Spinoza as a scientific philosopher, so long as he limited himself to man's temporary existence within the framework of Nature. However, when we continue our confrontation with his ideas about the relationship between man and God, we encounter a second time an epistemological issue which requires 'emendatio' (the word which he used himself for the improvement of the understanding).

THE THREE KINDS OF KNOWLEDGE

The possibility for the human mind to obtain adequate knowledge through thinking, was deduced by Spinoza not only from the definitions and axioms we have mentioned, but from yet another set of concepts. In the Treatise, in the 'Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand' and in the second note added to IIP40, he proposed to distinguish between four, resp. three kinds of knowledge. The first kind is 'perceived from things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly and without order through our senses, or from having read or heard certain words from which we remember things

and form certain ideas concerning them, similar to how we imagine things'. This knowledge of the first kind Spinoza called *Imaginatio*. The knowledge based on 'notions common to all men and adequate ideas of the properties of things' he called *Ratio* or knowledge of the second kind. Besides these two he recognized a third kind of knowledge which he proposed to call *Intuitio*; 'this kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the absolute essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things'.

The distinction between Spinozas first and second kind of knowledge still makes sense to us. It coincides more or less with what we designate as Unscientific and Scientific knowledge. The latter, as we have already explained, is obtained by systematic, controlled observations by validated methods and is expressed in terms of more or less supported hypotheses. The first is derived from 'trial and error' information and expressed in 'statements', 'convictions', 'views' or 'slogans'. It is composed of a peculiar conglomerate of traditional views, transfered by hearsay, dogma, wishful thinking, superstition and conformism, mixed with common sense and every day more or less tested empiricial experience. It is not all 'imagination' but it contains a lot of it. For the large majority of people it is the only kind of knowledge they possess. 'Ratio' or scientific knowledge is relatively new in human evolution; it is achieved by a relatively small number of people who have mastered the methods to make systematic observations and formulate and test the appropriate hypotheses and logical conclusions. Even they however cannot live with only the second kind of knowledge because our store of scientific information, even though we have made considerable advances since Spinoza, does not suffice to comprehend Nature (God) or Man 'adequately' and completely. It should not be forgotten, for instance (and Spinoza in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus emphatically pointed this out) that some of the greatest *biblical values* like 'Love thy Neighbour like Thyself' and similar commandments were perceived by the prophets, who hardly possessed any rational kind of knowledge: 'The power of prophecy implies not a peculiarly perfect mind but a peculiarly vivid imagination'.

At this point Spinoza would probably protest and argue that in his later years he had realized that the prophets in so far as they had perceived the revelations of God adequately, had obtained these through the third kind of knowledge. It is imperative therefore that we go somewhat more at length into the significance of the *Intuitio* as an important basis of his epistemology. In IIP41-43, Spinoza states that ideas which are obtained by the second and the third kind are necessarily true because they are 'adequate in God, in so far as He is displayed through the nature of the human mind' (referring to IIP11 which we have already discussed). In IIP43 he further claims that

'he who has a true idea, *knows* that he has a true idea and cannot doubt the truth of the thing perceived' because understanding a thing means the highest certainty.

'Truth is its own standard'. 'Even as light displays both itself and darkness, so is truth a standard both of itself and of falsity'. And further: 'The clear and distinct ideas of the mind are as necessarily true as the ideas of God'.

But this means that just as we could not support Spinozas deduction that the human thinking is as adequate as the thinking of God, we, using our epistemological criteria cannot support either this contention that the understanding by the human mind is an absolutely reliable standard for truth or falsity. And if we cannot support this for the second kind of knowledge, obtained by scientific research and reasoning, we cannot accept it for the third kind, obtained by intuition, either. The example which Spinoza gives of the third kind of knowledge enforces our scepticism: 'When three numbers are given of an arithmetical series to find the fourth, which shall be to the third as the second is to the first, this can be found by multiplying the second by the third and divide the product by the first. But we can also infer the fourth number from an intuitive grasping of the ratio which the first bears to the second', This example is badly chosen. There is nothing 'intuitive' about this inference; it is nothing but the logical consequence of the definition of an arithmetic proportional series. In general, once one has accepted the definitions and axioms of arithmetics or geometry, there is nothing new to be discovered by any kind of intuition because the whole conceptual system follows logically and necessarily from the starting points.

Better examples of what Spinoza meant by Intuition and how he used the third kind of knowledge are found in Part V of the Ethics. Here we find the third kind of knowledge mentioned in Proposition 25 to 33: 'The highest endeavour of the mind and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge'; 'In proportion as we understand things more in this way, we better understand God'. 'He who understands things by this kind of knowledge, passes to the summit of human perfection'; 'From the third kind of knowledge arises the highest possible mental acquiescence'. 'The endeavour or devise to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first, but from the second kind of knowledge'.

From VP29 on, Spinoza introduces the term *sub specie eternitate*: 'Whatsoever the mind understands under the form of eternity, it does not understand by virtue of conceiving the present actual existence of the body, but by virtue of conceiving the *essence* of the body under the form of eternity'. 'The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause in so far as the mind is eternal'. 'We are certain that the mind is eternal in so far as it conceives things under the form

of eternity'. 'Whatsoever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, we take delight in, and our delight is accompanied by the idea of God as cause'. 'From the third kind of knowledge necessarily arises the intellectual love of God'. 'The intellectual love of God, which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal'.

From these propositions and corollaries it is clear that Intuition, the third kind of knowledge, is used to prove that the human mind not only has an adequate understanding of God and in doing so loves God with an understanding love (*Amor dei intellectualis*) but shares eternity with God and that the mind who achieves this, experiences 'the highest delight and acquiescence (*Beatitudo*) because he loves God, like God loves himself, with an infinite intellectual and eternal love'. We are now far beyond the simple laws of Euclidian geometry and equally far beyond the laws of logic. If we further remember that all this is derived from the concepts that man thinks and God thinks and that *therefore* man's thoughts are adequate to know God and that all the rest is derived through the third kind of knowledge, we are almost sorry that when *we* use our logic and ratio we have to disqualify, together with the third kind of knowledge, all the magnificent propositions which are built on it. It is obvious that Spinozas third kind of knowledge is *not* rational, *not* built on science and reason, but indeed on Intuition, e.i. on a not necessarily logical subjective conjecture of relations between events, things, God and people. As intuitive knowledge it is usually not tested; it is a peculiar combination of more or less probable and more or less possible ideas and therefore there is no place for it in scientific thinking and logical reasoning.

RATIONALISM AND MYSTICISM

But does this mean that we should eliminate Intuition altogether from our concept formation, philosophy, and ways of life? We could, but if we would restrict our lives and activities, our thoughts and our feelings, our social and religious ideologies, our artistic creations and experiences, in short all our human culture and interhuman communications, to only what science and the ratio have to offer, we would no longer be human beings but models, computers, programmed to remember and behave with known degrees of accuracy and probability within the limits of our programmes, but no more. Our lives would be shaped by what is known with known accuracy but this is not enough to live by! This is the essence of the problem which Spinoza tried to solve and which still confronts us today: In the search for concepts and methods which will give us a true knowledge of God (or Nature), including ourselves, we, western scientists have learnt that the more certainty we wish to attain, the narrower are the limits within which our observations and thinking can function. About God

(or Nature), we have only partly supported scientific hypotheses. Spinoza had complete confidence in both the accuracy and wideness of the scope of human Science, Ratio and Deduction but his concept that these would lead to adequate knowledge of the infinity and eternity of God has not been upheld by our critical appraisal. When he introduced the third source of knowledge, Intuition, he did not realize that although he gained in width of vision, this was achieved by a loss of certainty.

Spinozas Intuition is not rational but mystical. By introducing the third kind of knowledge he added to his rational concept of Pantheism the mystical religious superstructures of Amor Dei Intellectualis and Beatitudo. The Old Testamentic: 'Love God with all your Heart, your Soul, your Completeness', from Deuteronomy *6*, 4 and 5, and 'Love thy neighbour like thyself' from Leviticus *19*, 18 and 34 (both quoted by Jesus as the essence of the Law: Marc *12*, 28-34) he transformed into the concept that men who live by the second and the third kind of knowledge will *understand* God (Nature) and *love* him by a love, embracing both Nature and humanity and which would be both logical and divine. Spinozas Intuition in other words is not logical, therefore not 'waterproof' as a validated scientific method; it is essentially an introduction to religion! It led him to a reformulation, in different form and words, of the same high *ethical* values as proclaimed by the jewish prophets thousands of years ago and reaffirmed by Jesus and a large number of less great but certainly not less wise men till the present day. Our inquiry like that of many other logical philosophers, has shown that these ideas are not, like he believed, divine, that they are not absolute truths, *sub specie eternitatis*, but human cultural values *sub specie temporis*.

The combination of these high ethical statements, integrated with Spinoza's concepts about God or Nature, the unity of Intellect and Intuition, of Understanding, Love, Freedom and Acquiescence ('Beatitudo') makes the reading and rereading of the Fifth Book of the Ethics from Proposition 15 on above all a religious experience, almost like a New Gospel. The beauty and ecstacy of the language enhances this experience of a mystic union with Eternity in the reader. The similarity in atmosphere with Deuteronomy 5 and 6 and the Sermon of the Mount in Mathew 5-7 is striking, although the wording may be different. It is this experience which makes us recognize Spinoza in this respect not as a philosopher but as a prophet, perhaps the greatest in the Western culture after Jesus. Like Jesus he was a link in a chain which extends from the early writers of the Old Testament through Christianity to the religious and spiritual leaders of our days, whether philosophers or non-philosophers. Thus, although his own religious Sephardi community in Amsterdam cast him out,

Spinoza when we view him in a wider cultural and historical perspective, fulfilled a religious prophetic function.

To illustrate this further let us quote the aim which he set himself to attain in the Treatise: 'To find the true and highest Good, because man, although human weakness cannot attain to this order, can conceive a human character much more stable than his own': 'This chief good is to arrive, together with other individuals if possible, at the possession of the aforesaid character. This is the end for which I strive, to attain such a character myself and to endeavour that many should attain it with me'.

Compare this with the definition he himself has given in the Theologico-Political Tractise of prophecy and revelation as 'Sure knowledge revealed by God to Man'. And as a prophet he regarded: 'One who interprets the relevation of God to those who are unable to attain to sure knowledge'. This is exactly what Spinoza tried to do, both by Ratio (and there we accept and admire him as a philosopher) and by Intuition (and there we accept and admire him no less as a prophet).

He himself would probably have rejected to be classified among the prophets although in several of the moral lessons he left behind, in the humbleness of his ways of life and in his being rejected by his contemporaries, he resembled especially Jesus (whom he admired and perhaps unconciously imitated) to an asthonishing degree. In our opinion he deserves to be designated as a prophet both by the religious nature of the 'sure knowledge' and ethical message he tried to convey and by his own definition.

We are not the first to point out that Spinoza's epistemology has both rational and mystical aspects. Before World War II there existed in The Netherlands two Spinoza Societies, one admiring the Master because of his rationalism, the other because of his mysticism. Our inquiry leads us to conclude that they were both right (One of the two Societies has since then dissolved itself on behalf of the other!).

But is this not illogical? Can a philosophy be both rational and mystical? Are rationalism and mysticism not fundamentally opposed and thereby mutually exclusive? To a large extent they are, especially with regard to the rules of valid deduction and testing which are totally different in the two ways of search for the truth. As a result there are some mystical systems and statements which are incompatible with the rational approach. But from the way Spinoza described his second and third kinds of knowledge it is clear that he saw no fundamental incompatibility between the results of the two methods. Indeed, according to him, the two could not and should not yield contradictory results, as both were supposed to yield adequate i.e. true ideas only. As rational thinking is one of God's infinite attributes it could never lead to a different knowledge of God (or Nature) than the equally eternal Intuition (VP28).

The modern scientific thinker, just because he denies the eternity of man's truths obtained in either way, comes to a 'parallel' conclusion with regard the relative merit of both methods. The modern scientist, largely influenced by the Viennese Circle and philosophers like Ayer and Popper, and considering himself a 'logical empiricist', maintains a critical attitude to both ratio and intuition. He regards both logical deduction and mysticism as human and therefore limited in their scope; neither leads to eternal truths, both can yield no more than finite sense data and hypotheses which need testing by other independent methods.

As neither ratio nor intuition can 'truthfully' pretend to reveal 'the' truth, both can be accepted '*sub specie temporis*' as mutually complementary rather than mutually exclusive. In the framework of the modern hypothetico-deductive methodology we are willing to give both methods a chance to show what they can achieve. When Intuition can yield hypotheses, the deduction of which lend themselves to be tested by rational (i.e. empirical-scientific) validated methods, there is nothing against it. Even (as it is the case with most intuitive hypotheses) where no method of testing a deduction exists, it would be in line with Spinoza's thinking to try to *harmonize* the intuitive hypotheses with the available body of supported rational sense data. Thus Spinoza's intuitive mysticism (or prophetism), in contrast to certain other mystic systems, tries to maintain a logical compatibility with the empirical scientific hypotheses, even to build on them, and not to offer an irrational alternative. This 'religious' striving to harmonize intuition and ratio, even in the human finite truth value we attach to both kinds of knowledge, makes the Spinozistic system still valuable for modern non-professional philosophers and scientists who recognize that although the scientific method is the only philosophical, it is not the only possible road to Wisdom. The professional logicians, however valuable as scientists, have become a specialized, almost technical group of twenty century intellectuals; they make probably the fewest mistakes and the smallest deviations from the truth in their statements. But this is because their statements are so limited in scope! As technical professionals they are almost compulsively afraid to tread outside the prescribed footpaths of the scientific methodology. This is certainly the assigned task of the scientist and as such, of all of us who use scientific methods. But their carefully weighed testable hypotheses do not answer our most fundamental questions. Anybody who consciously seeks to try where a more audacious, adventurous trail would lead to, is therefore inclined to associate himself in his search for the Mystery of God or Nature with other guides, less scientific perhaps, but also less negativistic about the a priori futility of any other than the purely scientific approach. Spinoza did not limit himself to demonstrate that superficial 'Imagina-

tion' did not lead to adequate knowledge. He tried instead whether a combination of Ratio and Intuition would be a better path to the summit of Wisdom.

We know now that he was only successful to a limited degree but at least he tried. And it is in this constant search for a better, alternative ascent to the top of Wisdom that many of us still regard ourselves as his pupils, even his followers. As Anatole France expressed it: 'Spinoza is one of the great heroes of humanity. He took away from people the idle hope of being immortal, but he made them realize and experience that somehow they are part of eternity'.

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KLAUS HAMMACHER

SPINOZA'S CONCLUSIONS DRAWN FROM SYSTEMATIC REFLECTION ON THE AFFECTIONS

A CRITICAL REVIEW

Let us begin with a remark of Nietzsche, taken up by the Spinoza research of the twentieth century,[1] which seems to open up for our ideologically-minded era a new approach to the philosophical main work of Spinoza, in particular as this is claimed to be an *ethic*: 'I have a precursor, and what a one! I had read hardly anything of Spinoza's works: that I longed to do so now was an "instinctive reaction". Not only that his entire tendency is the same as mine – to make cognition the strongest affection – but I also identify myself with five main points of his theory'.[2] Also moral knowledge is in itself an affection: *'Cognitio boni, et mali nihil aliud est, quam Laetitiae, vel Tristitiae affectus, quatenus ejus sumus conscii'* (IVP8), and, therefore, only truly effective as such: *'Vera boni, et mali cognitio, quatenus vera, nullum affectum coërcere potest; sed tantum quatenus ut affectus consideratur'*. (IVP14).*

Perhaps they are essentially the same five points referred to by Nietzsche which I also wish to discuss here, only that I don't agree with Spinoza in all of them as Nietzsche did.[3] First, however, it must be established that Spinoza doesn't infer from the above observation – that cognition is an affection – the task of reducing the connections of concepts to a determination of action 'by the general constitution of external things' which affects us and whose constraints he already realises. For instance it's not sufficient to declare 'Humanity' as 'Ambition', to see the others follow one's own point of view,[4] from which one only may discern what is good and what is evil[5] (TPII18). On the contrary, all human action must be regarded as being based on knowledge and all affections must be definable, from which Spinoza concludes: 'Nulla est Corporis affectio, cujus aliquem clarum et distinctum non possumus formare conceptum' (VP4).

* All quotations, also those taken from Spinoza, that are not given in original language (f.i. latin) have been translated by the author.

I

The first important discovery that Spinoza made was that human conduct is always based on some thought, a process, therefore, which results from 'ideas', it's being a matter of complete indifference whether the thoughts are muddled or intelligible. The claims made by Spinoza in the foreword to the third Part of *Ethics*, to discuss the emotions – or, as he calls them, 'affections' – in terms of what he calls 'Geometric Teaching Process', are justified by the fact that 'they provide certain reasons, by which they may be comprehended, and possess certain peculiarities which are just as worthy of recognition as the peculiarities of any other thing, the mere contemplation of which we enjoy.' The fact that the literature about Spinoza has often refuted this claim, is certainly due to the false impression that formerly was accepted about 'geometric teaching'.[6] It also arises, however, from the sensitiveness with which we resist any attempt to formulate our emotions. But this is Spinoza's express intention (VPrae,P4Sch). This resistance originates in the universality which characterizes such a cognition intended to define the emotions (see VP4 in connection with VP2Lm2) and which is contrary to personal self-preservation, from which principle Spinoza himself otherwise starts. This resistance of personal identity is not even overcome by psycho-analytical teaching, which is in agreement with Spinoza in this method of regulating the emotions by means of cognition.[7] I shall show more clearly later what stands in the way of such a conception.

But this regulation of affections by cognition must be differentiated from the philosophical cognition of emotions. Spinoza himself accepted this distinction between moral theory and the doctrine of ethics, because he carefully separates the theory of affections, which is treated in Books 3 and 4 of the *Ethica* from the doctrine of ethics which is dealt with in Book 5. However, so far as the methodic treatment of the problem of affections is concerned, i.e. their development in accordance with geometric teaching, quite different principles could be involved here as for the question of ethics. They are justified, according to Spinoza, by the motivation which is to be found in all emotions. This method must be proved then by emotional experience. And only the correct understanding of geometric teaching shows how this is possible.

I should like to restrict myself here to a few observations about the *definition* in so far as this is directly involved in the basis of the system of affections. However, because a specific paper on this subject been given here, I shall try to keep myself as closely as possible to the context.

If the *definition* is supposed to determine a basis which has been proved by emotional experience, it must check the origin of this basic

state by a process of thought. This concept of 'genetic definition' has now been more precisely realised as a process of determining the basis of something from its structure.[8] But this process will be misunderstood if it is only thought of as forming an analogy to Euklid's theory of geometric definitions. Because contrary to this, in the philosophical context, the specific designation of the basic expression must be guaranteed by specific experience to be able to understand it as a definition.[9] In order to fully realise how Spinoza sees this guarantee, we must take note of the influence of Hobbes[10] and, as De Dijn proves, also of Heereboord,[11] and above all of the *ramistical* method still effective in Cartesianism. The *definitio* could only act as proof according to this tradition 'that objective facts correspond to the concepts'.[12] By means of psycho-physical parallelism, Spinoza guarantees this *ramistical*, rather naive, easily-formulated condition of relying on the immanent logical consequence of the concepts to support the objective existence of facts[13] (IIP7): 'The power of effect is defined by the power of its cause, in so far as its essence is explained or defined by the essence of its cause.' (VAx2). That means, however, that each process can only be explained as human action by reason of its basis in the mind. 'What, therefore determines the mind to think, is a mode of thought and not a mode of extension, that is to say, it is not a body.' (IIIP2Dem). So that only the mind is *responsible* for influencing the emotions (VPraef). Obviously ¡this is more than a mere interpretation of association, according to which every change in a thing is presented as being due to a change in the ideas of the corresponding mode of thought. The basic concept of psycho-physical parallelism 'The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things' (IIP7) is intentionally reversible: the order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of ideas (VP1Dem) following IIP6,7Cor. Every emotion of the body is eo ipso a thought of an emotion (VP4). Therefore, all processes which concern us represent an order and connection of ideas, that is, they form their own thought connection. As such one is able to control them: 'interne disponitur' (IIP29Sch). Human conduct is, therefore, formed from 'within'.

II

But this explanation of human conduct is not sustained by Spinoza, because he does not succeed – in my opinion at any rate – in distinguishing between this mental autonomy and the individual consciousness. He infers another principle from the co-ordination of thought connections and physical actions, that should answer to the autonomy without falling a victim to the limitations of the individual consciousness. The importance of this statement lies in the fact that, even in

modern philosophy, it still forms the seemingly incontrovertible basis of the scientific explanation of all organic processes. The urge of each and every thing to remain itself – conatus in suo esse perseverandi – represents in general the principle of each individual being, and is not primarily an individual phenomenon of consciousness (see IIP6,7,8). All knowledge of the relationship between cause and effect in life is still governed even now by this rule of self-preservation, which Spinoza, however, contrary to modern usage, tried to base on the relationship of cognitions. This provides food for thought. Obviously this cognition of a relationship between cause and effect – in so far as it represents at the same time the regulation of organic self-dependent systems – is only possible when the relationship of such cognitions is understood as being parallel to a self. According to Spinoza, the basis of this principle is really ultimately tied up with the identity structure of consciousness.[14] The thinking of thoughts (idea ideae), which we understand as consciousness (idea Mentis – IIP21Sch), differentiates itself from the 'thought-of' (ideatum – IIP43Sch) in such a way that as thinking of something it must conform to the 'thought-of' (IAx6). In this way, however, consciousness reveals itself as nothing other than this knowledge of something in knowledge, as Spinoza tries to explain in the iteration of such knowledge: 'that is to say, when somebody knows something, he knows directly that he knows this, and at the same time he knows that he knows that he knows this, and so on ad infinitum' (IIP21Sch). The objective cognition becomes, therefore, the order from which consciousness is deduced. So consciousness can be explained by this order, and order needs no longer to be explained by consciousness.

By means of this interpretation about the experience of consciousness, Spinoza at the same time gets rid of the representation of the consciousness as a model of persistance. What is still gained here by reasoning from the process of consciousness has since then become a presupposition which is taken for granted in scientific research. Johannes Müller pointed out the importance which this 'static', as he called it, had as a law for the working together of the emotions.[15] But it was cybernetics that first provided scientific interpretation of nature with a means of explaining how the maintenance of stability of selfcontrolled systems can be conceived without having to recourse to a model of consciousness. How far, however, the phenomenon of knowledge itself is in this way grounded in the 'mind', is revealed by an efficiency correlation of the emotional system which is analogous to a feed-back, and on which Spinoza based his concrete explanation.

Spinoza had even already basically seen that such systems reproduce themselves exactly, on which matter I shall speak in a moment. However, the view that such systems were really formed by chance contradicts its notion according to which they ought to affect them-

selves.[16] The 1st Axiom of the 5th Part of *Ethica* defines this conceptual function which is necessary for self-control, when it discusses the change which equalizes out opposing actions. In Spinoza, however, we can only observe this function in a duplication of the roll of emotions: the efficiency of our bodies is increased or changed by the emotions themselves, but at the same time the ideas can be aware of these emotions and, in this way, act once more as an emotion (IIIP3Df).

On closer inspection, urge is doubly featured in this explanation. This can also be seen in the conclusions which Spinoza draws from it.

On the one hand, the urge is a complete expression of physical state in the emotions, because the object of the idea which the human minds forms is the body (IIP13). From which Spinoza concludes, however: 'The nature, therefore, of each passion must necessarily be so explained that the nature of the object that affects us is expressed in this way.' (IIIP56Dem). However, in the famous proposition 7 of Part III, which states the principle of self-perservation, this urge is defined as the essence of each thing itself. The spiritual existence (psyche) of the whole person must be regarded as consisting of the emotions which affect the momentary physical state. Because man as an individual is himself composed of individuals – which is to be understood here in the original sense – and the effects and counter-effects of these individual parts ordain the peculiarity of the person as an individual being. His self-preservation can also be understood from the working together of his individual parts, 'because nothing exists from which no effect results' (IIP13Dem).

Spinoza has, indeed, developed this idea with great consistency. This leads him to an explanation of all the diverse ways of action of such a being which itself is composed of many individual units, we would say such organisms – as may be gathered from any modern textbook on biological behaviourism. The individual beings themselves consist of many individuals – we would call them the more highly organised creatures – and act in accordance with the law of self-preservation in such a way that this can be fully explained as resulting from the partial processes of the individual parts (IIAx1 following Lemma 3 to Schol. following Lemma 7). This persistance of the complete system – even though he quite definitely only thinks of this as the whole of Nature – should not be understood as a teleological system (IVPraef), but rather as a stability of the conditions which may be explained entirely causally. Here Spinoza takes into consideration the principle of the regeneration of organic systems: to maintain themselves as a whole by altering the individual parts within the laws of order (ea tamen proportione retinebit Individuum–IILm 4,5,6,7 and post.).

The complexity of the part-system results in an increasingly varied web of effects and counter-effects in the human being and also,

according to their interpretation in the mind, of emotions and perceptions (IIP14,IIIP17Sch). An explanation of the power of human intellect may be found here, which it attributes to the increasing complexity of such actions in the human body in contrast to other forms of life (IIP13Sch14,15). This ultimately allows for an ever greater independence of direct outside influences, so that these beings can no longer be clearly defined, but 'the same object can be the cause of many and conflicting emotions.' (IIIP17Sch; see also IIIP51Sch).

By this means of thought Spinoza goes over to the daring hypothesis – particularly when he attempts to refute the postulation of free will (we could say, more precisely, of choice) – that all actions, even the greatest cultural achievements of mankind, can result in this way from the physical conditions. These notorious representations of, as he says, pictures and architecture as being accountable for purely as a result of bodily function, appear to us today in another light. In the first instance, according to Spinoza, only a very confused system of Nature is revealed to the mind beyond the emotions. As we are only very insufficiently informed about the causes and effects relationship by the things that directly affect us, we should, by knowledge, according to Spinoza, regard the structure of the human body as consisting purely of its functions, being able to exceed everything so much in artistry that it is able to produce such highly constructive creations (IIIP2Sch). The above-mentioned reproductive and self-representative ability of such organic systems, as modern biology understands it, is surmised here.

At the same time, however, through Spinoza, the actual philosophical problem is brought to existence, as to how consciousness itself can be explained by such cause and effect relationships without going round in a circle. For in order to understand such a system by its functions, this explanation of the cause and effect relationship already pre-supposes unity of the consciousness. Spinoza tries to get round this problem by using the distinction that men 'are aware of their actions but ignorant of the causes by which they are determined' (IIIP2Sch).

III

On the other hand, the mind is conscious of the urge to preserve its existence that is expressed in these actions. What this signifies, according to Spinoza, we must recognize as the reverse side of this urge. If self-preservation is also a phenomenon of consciousness, an interpretation of Nature is presented which relates to the consciousness. This conception, which according to Leibniz is the basis of all Nature, is already hinted at in a reference of Spinoza's, when he says that all individuals are animated even though in differing degree

(IIP13Sch). Spinoza probably arrives at this interpretation from the pantheistic inclination of his thinking. Because, however, the mind only recognizes itself, i.e. possesses a consciousness, in so far as it reflects on the influences on its body (IIP23), both the consciousness of the urge and the urge itself must be indicated by the emotions of the body. For this urge is recognized as a driving-force (appetitus) and inevitably indicates what is necessary for self-preservation (IIIP9). Moreover, this urge is also equated to the essence of the human being. Man consists of body and mind, and so the urge must be related to both. And, indeed, this shows itself in the basic emotions of joy and sorrow and their variations, which show the transition to an increase or decrease in this urge (IIIP11Sch; 57Dem). However, when we feel joy and sorrow, we actually only comprehend the urge in so far as this is either increased or decreased due to external causes, that is to say, so far as it is responsible for the preservation of the body. And neither does consciousness let us get away from this urge-constraint, for urge with consciousness of urge only makes desire (Cupiditas est appetitus cum ejusdem conscientia – IIIP9Sch). Even though knowledge may enable us to control our actions – which is a matter still to be discussed –, this knowledge still remains within the emotional framework which shows us the way to self-preservation. 'If [...] a desire of this sort could be in excess, then human nature, considered solely as itself, would surpass itself and so be capable of more than it actually is, which is an obvious contradiction'. (IVP61Dem). It only increases then from *urge* to *desire*, that is to say, to an individual experience which we can probably best describe as *enjoyment* (IIIP57SchDem). Even the regulation of our actions by knowledge only follows the drive to self-preservation, only in this case it follows it because it understands it, and joy and sadness only manifest themselves here in this reference to our self-enjoyment. So it is said that this joy and sadness, which man feels to have caused from within himself, are only a consequence of the fact that he *imagined* that he had himself thought of the idea which he had at the time (IIIP51Sch).

This experience will be illustrated by a quotation which dates from the beginning of the era of Spinoza-research. It is taken from a letter of Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi to his friend Wizenmann in 1784: 'It is probably 17 or 18 years since, that – after comparing all theories on thought and perception – I saw the result as NIL. I still remember what a cold sweat ran over me ... I still believe, however, that on close reflection you also will come to the realisation, if not in my way then in another, that an endeavour *to enjoy one's existence*, as the prime source of all urges is an absurdity and indeed a horrifying absurdity.'[17]

Can anything be said, however, to refute Spinoza's interpretation? The evidence must prove conclusive that consciousness cannot be

explained as the equating of the urge to self-preservation and one's own possibility of action. Developing this counter-proof from Spinoza himself, I still stick to some extent to the importance that the consciousness has, in his opinion, for thought.

Just as the idea of an emotion presents itself to the mind once more as an emotion, so the decision is understood, which we are aware of in the action, as being simply an affirmation of that which one comprehends, whereby the form of the emotion already implies this affirmation, i.e. it shows in the urge that which the effect increases or decreases (IIIP2Sch; Aff.Gen.Def.). Spinoza's examples declaring that our consciousness of the decision is merged in the natural urge, were taken from precise mental self-examination, and have been repeatedly confirmed by modern brain physiology: it is not within our power to expressly remember a particular thing, and dreams indicate that our decisions cannot be distinguished from power of memory and imagination (IIIP3Sch). The affirmation is, therefore, understood from the parallelism of thought and physical process. An illustration of Spinoza's allows us to understand how, in this way, the affirmation as a function of consciousness is related only to the cognition. One affirms, as he says, that 'the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation implies the notion or idea of the triangle, that means that it cannot be understood without the idea of the triangle [...] Furthermore, this idea of the triangle must imply the same affirmation, that is to say, the affirmation that the three angles are equal to two right angles.' (IIP49Dem).

IV

This means, however, that in all thinking, the affirmation is precisely the consciousness of the thought. And now, however, a characteristic of this consciousness must be noted, which ought also to be mentioned with regard to the urge or drive,[18] that is that this thought is *itself a power*. And so Spinoza equates it with the *Will*, when this urge for self-preservation is solely related to the mind (IIIP9Sch), that is to say, to that what thinks (IIDf3). Later on he also talks explicitly of the Will as a mental power (animositas IIIP59Sch) which does not originate in the passivity of the emotions (IIIP59Sch; IVP53Sch).

In this way a differentiation is actually made between the urge for self-preservation and one's own potentiality of action (volitio). For the potentiality of action, as Will in the cognition, represents the power by means of which the 'idea' is effective. So that this Will is thought of as being rational, that is as the essence (essentia) of a thing itself in so far as it fixes its effect. The Will, therefore, is not desire (IIP48Sch), i.e. simply consciousness of the urge whose direction is determined by the emotions, or it is, at the most, desire of reason,

i.e. a desire which is brought into being by the necessary natural order.

That which Spinoza called idea, which is understood as the representation of the processes of the physical world, is contained in every individual potentiality of action, in so far as these can be experienced (IIP49Dem). Hereby Spinoza puts forward a second important philosophical elucidation, which has, unfortunately, still not been fully treated in philosophical ethics: *The Will is the identification of the consciousness with a particular causal effect.* In this way our actions can only be understood, because, according to Spinoza, the Will is an idea 'by means of which we explain all the individual volitions (volitiones), i.e. what they have in common.' (IIP49Sch). To this extent the individual Will is always comprehended as being something universal (IIP49Sch), and that is exactly the affirmation on which we base every real and true cognition.

Even though Spinoza does not go over directly to connecting the general comprehension of the processes from their causes as causality with the Will as consciousness of effective power, he still describes their equality of function in action. What is common to all things must always contain an actual effectiveness, i.e. it cannot merely result from the specific emotions of the individual being (IVP30). This was already to be seen from the justification of the cognition as a general theory of relations (see IIP37-40). And so the causal relationships in which our Will is effective, are generated by the emotions which are gained in the cognition as is the universal tendency of things (VP7Dem). Proposition 48 of the 2nd Part of *Ethica* expresses quite clearly that the Will must be comprehended as the cause in such a chain of causes and effects. This is identified with consciousness of action, for Spinoza says, that that which seemed good to us, resulted from the urge for self-preservation and then declares in proposition 39 of the 4th Part of *Ethica*, that to be 'good' which follows the law of motion and inertia in such a way that our bodies are preserved.

V

With this important definition of the human Will, Spinoza ought actually to have arrived at a complete distinction between the urge for self-preservation and the consciousness of one's own potentiality of action. However, he does not maintain it, because he equates the Will with Intellect (IIP49Cor), and so he only finds the known urge again in the Will's consciousness of action. Spinoza thereby wants to avoid the interpretation of action from an individualistic scale of values. This will be clearly recognized in this context when he explains the *teleological cause*. It is sufficiently well-known what antipathy Spinoza had to an ethical system of values which has arisen from our intentions. The teleological cause is, according to him, the human

urge itself in so far as it is regarded as the actual cause of a particular thing (IVPraef). And so a causal explanation is given instead of the merely imputed, assumed reasons, which, according to him, really only arise from the emptiness of ignorance. Here we have arrived once more at the proposition, that although we are indeed aware of our actions, we are ignorant of the causes by which they are determined. It will be obvious from an example which ought to explain the purpose of this interpretation, that it is indeed another consciousness that distinguishes itself in our actions from mere consciousness of efficiency. 'When we say, for example, that the purpose of this or that house is a dwelling, then we clearly mean nothing else than that a person had the urge to build the house because he imagined the amenities of domestic life.' (IVPraef). A consciousness – and indeed an emotional one (imagination of the amenities) – distinguishes itself here from efficiency, and by means of this we first arrive at the power of causally directing the effect.

Herewith I come to the actual significance of the emotions for our actions, and to the last and most difficult point of my subject which must be discussed in somewhat more detail. Getrud Jung has already demonstrated the uncertain meaning which Spinoza gives to the term *affectus*.[19] First of all the passions (passiones) are understood, whereby the mind is inactive (III after Df3), then, however, the activities of the cognitive mind, *animositas* and *generositas* (IIIP58,59). This inexactitude is undoubtedly based historically on the influence on Spinoza of Descartes's *Passions de l'âme*. Descartes also left the ambiguous meaning of the term *passion* or *émotion* untouched. I see, however, in the case of Spinoza, a symptom which points to the eliminating of the self-control of the consciousness in the emotions, whose importance for ethics I myself want to discuss here.

On the one hand, the emotions show by means of joy and sadness the increase or decrease of bodily activity. If the reasons for the emotions are fully comprehended, however, then the ideas of these emotions ought to be activities of the mind and at the same time once more themselves emotions (IIIDf3 and minor term). Such ideas of the emotions are, however, also formed in the desire (cupiditas), in that one is aware of being directed by the emotions (IIIAffGenDf1Expl). It is obviously a question of a different consciousness in each case. We can, today, once more find the last-named reaction of the emotions on the emotions, which arises from the interpretation of the urge, described in studies, on animal behaviourism as *Appetence Behaviour*. If, however, the same consciousness were to be considered in regard to the emotional reaction of the cognition, then it would be a case of the emotions, denounced by Kant as 'pathological', being the motive of our action.[20] One particular remark of Spinoza shows that he also feels that this cannot be basically the case, because he says that this

increase of the emotions through reaction does not have its origin in the affirmation of the intellect (IIIAffGenDfExpl).

The difference in this consciousness, however, is not taken into consideration by Spinoza, because he traces back the possibility of influencing action to the interpretation of the emotions in their ideas of them, but at the same time, he also sees in it the basis of the transformation of the passions in the self-determination from cognition.[21] They should then be related solely to the mind, whereby they only differ in the manner of observation (VP3), that is to say, no transformation occurs in them which is aware of itself.

Should a direction of action be possible, then this difference must be noticeable in the activities of the mind otherwise it could not be in contrast to the suffering, in which emotion only can be counteracted by emotions as Spinoza establishes. Spinoza gained this important insight from the peculiarity of the mental-physical relationship. Proposition 23 of the 2nd Part of *Ethica* states that 'The mind only recognizes itself in so far as it perceives the ideas of the bodily emotions.' Spinoza proves this by means of his conception of God as a unique substance.

The cognition of the human body is not related to God in as much as He determines the nature of the human mind, and the emotions of the mind cannot also be extended to God because He does not possess a limited consciousness that relies merely on individual effects in order to develop His thought associations (IIP23Dem). To put the matter simply: there is a difference between relationship of perception and cognition.

In spite of this Spinoza still tried to genetically derive the cognition relationship from the *affectiones*. 'The more things an image is related to, the more frequently it occurs or the more often it becomes alive and the more it occupies the mind', as is stated in the 11th proposition of the 5th Part. In this way habits and connections are formed which are defined in usage (VP10Sch). The common peculiarities occur the most frequently and so we must finally succeed in combining them (VP12).

Obviously, however, these explanations of the relationship of cognitions from patterns of action are not sufficient to account for action itself – that is to say, the activity of the mind –, because action can only be induced by the emotions, which, in relation to the urge, contain increase in power. If the 'pathological' notion of regarding these emotions as causing their own realisation be avoided, then the 'power of correctly ordering and connecting the bodily emotions' (potestas ordinandi et concatenandi corporis affectiones – VP10) as consciousness of independence and of the ability of disposition, must be in contrast to the emotion. If independence is developed, as stated by Spinoza, in the clear and definite idea itself, then an emotion does

not simply contain a clear and definite concept – as Spinoza says (VP4Cor) – but is separated from the emotion by consciousness of the idea. Only this difference in consciousness makes it possible to think of the emotions separately, in their own system. Spinoza avoids this reasoning, because he understands the independent relationship as originating in the attributes of God, and thereby suddenly regards God as 'cogitans' – that is to say as finite consciousness.

Indeed the change in the action involves the emotional consequences of the ordering and connecting of notions, which only then provide the basis for a consciousness. The power of imagination which was much derided by Spinoza, is given, therefore, when one looks more closely, a decisive role in human action. An example given by Spinoza himself should make this more clear to us. He writes: '[...] when man supposes that he cannot do something, he supposes this of necessity, and he will be influenced by this supposition in such a way that he is indeed unable to do that which he supposed to himself he was unable to do. That is to say, so long as he supposes that he is unable to this and that, then so long is he destined not to do it, and as a result of this it is, also, so long impossible for him to do it.' (IIIAffGenDf28).

The cognition, therefore, does not itself contain its emotional effect. Even if we assume with Spinoza that by means of the cognition – here as Spinoza classifies it, is meant the 2nd degree cognition – the effect is comprehended with the essence according to the necessity of Nature, then men's actions are only possible via the relationship of the emotions, because at first we only know ourselves by means of these alone.

According to proposition 2 of the 5th Part of *Ethica*, in ethics the emotions must be set free from the thoughts of the external cause and connected to other thoughts. In this way, the relationship of the emotions and its efficacy are distinguished from the recognised relationship, and human action realizes itself only through the intermedium of the emotional consciousness.

Instead of this, Spinoza sees the action as proceeding directly from the recognized necessity. But his own example ought to explain that the necessary effect of the cognition does not confirm this result. We do not feel sorry for a little child because it can neither talk nor walk. 'If, however, most people were born as adults,' he goes on 'and only the one or the other as a child, then everyone would be sorry for the children, because one would then not regard childhood as something natural and necessary, but rather as a mistake or failing of Nature' (VP6Sch). On closer inspection, the determination of our feelings, according to this description, does not proceed from 'the laws of Nature' as Spinoza thought, but rather from the habitual – and therefore, emotional – connections of our ideas (see VP7Sch).

The system of the cognition, however, appears also to Spinoza as the true system of self-preservation from which every virtue springs

(IVP22). This manifests itself in the term *use* (IVP20). Although the use expressly does not proceed from the recognition of purposes (IVP26Dem) but rather from pure cognition, it represents the system of self-preservation.

The self-determination of man (IVP37Sch1): 'ea, quae ipsa ipsius natura, in se sola considerata, postulat', which is realised with the cognition of necessity in which way those emotions which contain suffering are removed, ought, therefore, to be indicated in the urge of all individuals for self-preservation. Here it is obvious that the cognition cannot produce that agreement with the claim to self-determination – as Spinoza believes – but on the contrary, that the emotions, as subjective experiences can only form the basis for a responsibility from which self-determination results.

For the cognition is ultimately related through the system of the emotions to the external causes. According to proposition 38 of the 4th Part of *Ethica* the manifold ways of affecting and of being affected make us more capable of perceiving and recognizing the true use, which is identical with the law of Nature. The illusions in the emotions were caused by necessarily limited participation in the processes between the bodies. We only have ideas of them in so far as they are directly related to our own bodies. In particular, however, the ideas which belong to the emotions can only be removed by another emotion, but that does not need to take place, and then emotions may continue in the idea without the true presence of the objects.

The universal cognition is, therefore, related to the external causes and brings about emotions to the extent that they, themselves, are related to the external causes. These declare the urge for self-preservation and the increase or decrease of the urge as indicated by joy or sadness. Because these emotions are related to external causes, however, they call forth love and hate at the same time (IIIP13Sch; IIIAffGenDf6). Self-determination should distract from just this idea of external things being the cause. The validity of the cognition has its emotional background here in the 'wavering of the mind' (fluctuatio animi). Because it is expressly paralleled with doubt (IIIP18Sch), it will be clear that the agreement which can be achieved here in no way signifies a mutual agreement of the emotions, because doubt is solved not in the realm of the emotions, but in the cognition.

But the same 'wavering of the mind' is then used by Spinoza to define the emotional basis of a human urge, which, as an urge, demands such an agreement between the urges. It is that urge to see the others follow one's own point of view (IIIP31Sch). And so we have here reached again to the observation of the emotional side of social powers in action from which we started.

This urge, however, in no way harmonizes with the urges of the others, on the contrary it carries itself over from the desire for self-

justification through a chain-reaction of associated, emotional connections (IIIP27Dem and Sch). On the contrary it is just the inter-human effect of the urge for self-preservation that explains the diffusing of the egoistical urge for self-preservation by means of the universality of the cognition. Only when consciousness is found in one's own, at all times individual, emotions and is differentiated from the universal cognition of the cause and effect relationship, is it possible to penetrate into the true essence of Man 'in so far as he is determined by every given emotion to do something' (IIIAffGenDf1). Spinoza establishes, however, that when 'in a man who is not guided by reason, this urge becomes a passion which is called ambition (ambitio) [...] on the other hand, when a man lives according to the laws of reason, it becomes an action or virtue which is called dutifulness' (VP4Sch). How could that come about, however, without that consciousness of one's own emotions to which justification of action is always related? He who denies that the consciousness of self-determination can only be contrasted to the individual emotions, and who wants to reduce it to the power of some kind of external condition, deprives Man of the possibility of responsibly ordering his own actions. This may be said in contrast to the present way of thinking, which contrast we also find in Spinoza.

NOTES

[1] See Ernst Altkirch, *Maledictus et Benedictus*, Leipzig 1924, p.171.

[2] Nietzsche to Franz Overbeck, 30.7.1881, taken from Schlechta, Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Works* in three volumes, München 1956, III, p.1171.

[3] Nietzsche makes the following points about Spinoza's thoughts in the above-mentioned letter: 'he denies the free Will –; the purposes –; the moral (ethical) order of the world –; unegoism –; evil –; (ibid.). I will treat approximately the same points in the following order: under I – the denial of the purposes, i.e. the substitution of causes which takes the place of a basis in human behaviour; under II – the denial of moral order in the world, i.e. the explanation of all actions from a physical disposition to self-preservation; under III – the denial of the unegoistic, i.e. the urge for self-preservation as the highest principle of the determination of the emotions; under IV – free Will or rather the Will as consciousness of the efficacy; under V – the problem of evil, in so far as responsible action only by means of the consciousness of the emotions is at all possible, that is that good actions can be distinguished from bad.

[4] IIIP29Sch declares that this ambition to do something to please others is usually called humanity (humanitas), but with the condition that we do not try by omission or otherwise to do something that hurts ourselves or others. See also, however, IVP37Sch, which indicates the ideological thought and delineates 'humane' dealing as originating only in the just consciousness from this ambition.

[5] In order to describe the immediate tendency of thought or intellect, Spinoza uses the term 'ingenium', which latin word implies not only the ethymological related words ingenuity (ingeniosus) and innate (ingenuus), but also honorable social conduct (ingenue, ingenuitas).

[6] In recent times a series of explanatory works on this problem has appeared, the most important being:
H. J. de Vleeschauwer, *More seu ordine geometrica demonstratum*, Pretoria 1961.
Georgio Tonelli, *Der Streit über die mathematische Methode in der 1.Hälfte des 18.Jahrh. und die Entwicklung von Kants Schrift 'Über die Deutlichkeit'*, Archiv für Philosophie, Bd.9, Stuttgart 1959, pp.37-66.
Hans Werner Arndt, *Methodo scientifica pertractatum. Mos geometricus und der Kalkülbegriff in der philosophischen Theoriebildung des 17. und 18. Jahrh.*, Berlin 1971.

[7] See, for example, the article by Hamblin Smith, *Spinoza's Anticipation of recent Psychological Developments*, British Journal of Medical Psychology, Vol. V, 1925, pp.257-278. p.263: 'This is just what psycho-analysis contents, that we shall only have the power to control human emotions, in so far as we endeavour by study to understand them.'

[8] For this interpretation of the 'genetic definition' see the recent work of Martial Gueroult, *Spinoza I*, Hildesheim 1968, pp.29-38 and 172-175.

[9] The change which geometric teaching has undergone in the method of Modern Philosophy has now been more exactly analysed by H. W. Arndt, Loc.cit. p.76.

[10] For the influence of Hobbes on Spinoza's use of the definition, see G. H. R. Parkinson's *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge*, Oxford 1954, p.31.

[11] See here in particular the 2nd Part of Herman de Dijn's paper given at this Symposion.

[12] Wilhelm Risse, *Die Logik der Neuzeit*, vol. I, Stuttgart – Bad Cannstadt 1964, p.150.

[13] ibid.

[14] I have attempted to take this concept of identity into consideration in my article *Spinozas Gedanken der Identität und die Begründung im menschlichen Verhalten*. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, vol. 23 (1969), pp.24-35.

[15] See Johannes Müller, *Handbuch der Physiologie des Menschen*, vol.II, 1st section, Koblenz 1837, p.543. According to Müller the 'static' of the quasi-cybernetics of emotion does not refer to the direction of reason.

[16] This problem which has been revived by mircrobiology as discussed by Jaques Monod in *Le hasard et la necessité*, Paris 1970, can only be solved in philosophical theory by a transcendental analysis of the terms which are used in science.

[17] See Alexander Freiherr von der Golz (editor), *Thomas Wizenmann, der Freund Friedrich Heinrich Jacobis* in Mitteilungen aus seinem Briefwechsel und handschriftlichem Nachlass, Gotha 1859, vol. I, p.356.

[18] Bierens de Haan has discussed this meaning of the term 'conatus' in his famous essay *Conatus in suo esse perseverandi. Chronicon Spinozanum III*, 's-Gravenhage 1923, pp.45-67. For the diverse literature of this period see the remarks of Gertrud Jung, *Die Affektenlehre Spinozas, Kant-Studien 32* (1927), p.121.

[19] cf. Gertrud Jung, loc.cit., in particular pp.99,104-5,110,112.

[20] cf. I. Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, Akademie-Ausgabe, Berlin 1908/13, vol. V, p.85 and I. Kant, *Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie*, Akademie-Ausgabe, vol.VIII, pp.395 note, 402.

[21] Gertrud Jung has in consequence of this distinguished two ways of overcoming the emotions in Spinoza's *Ethica*.

OSKAR HANSEN

SPINOZA'S PROOF OF AN EXTERNAL WORLD

It will probably not be considered a very extravagant hypothesis to state at the beginning of this paper, without the proof of questionnaires or other empirical methods of finding out people's opinions, that most people who are not spellbound or infected by philosophy will not be very willing to enter into an earnest discussion about the existence of the external world.

They do not find it necessary to prove what any normal man knows without any proof whatsoever, that chairs and tables and trees and animals and mountains and clouds and wives and children and a system of taxation exist, and that the sum of all such things is precisely what the phrase 'an external world' means.

During the Middle Ages philosophers agreed with the opinion of ordinary men about the existence of the external world: they did not think that it was in need of any proof. It was left for the great century of scientific progress, the seventeenth, to discover that nobody had yet given any proof of the existence of the outer world. For Descartes it did not suffice to hold up his hand, to see it and feel it and show it to his audience and then to declare: 'Here is hand and so it exists'. He might be dreaming it all, and if he dreamt, the acceptance of his claim of the existence of the hand by the audience would also be a dream. Not until he had given proof of the existence of a perfect God who could not possibly find his satisfaction in deceiving us could he be confident about the existence of the external, physical world. Thus our knowledge of this existence was dependant on our knowledge of the existence of God. The problem of the existence of the external world had come into existence to remain in it until 1925, or 1939, or until to-day or perhaps even to-morrow.

To Spinoza the problem was in a certain sense much more intricate than to Descartes. When Descartes had ascertained the existence of a perfect God, he could be confident that there must be some resemblance between his ideas of physical objects as presented to him through his senses and their causes, i.e. the physical objects themselves (6th Meditation). To Spinoza the interaction between body and mind or soul was not possible, and so it was impossible that our ideas of

tables and chairs, the contents of the representations of our senses, could have the physical tables and chairs themselves for their causes. How then can we know that there is a real table or chair or hand, when we have the idea of such a thing in our mind? The problem is dealt with in the second book of the *Ethica*, and Spinoza's solution is going to be expounded here at some length.

First let us state the problem as it presents itself not only to Spinoza but to the whole generation of thinkers after Descartes: 'Whenever I am inclined to think that I see a table, I must be aware that I have the idea of a table in my mind. How then can I prove that a table exists corresponding to my idea?' Comparing Descartes and Spinoza O. Baensch gives us the solution of the latter in the following words: 'So kann auch er die Gewissheit der Seele von sich selbst nicht unmittelbar zu einer Gewissheit vom Dasein der raümlichen Welt ausser ihr erweitern: auch er bedarf des Weges über die Gottheit. Aber für ihn ist dieser Weg rational geebnet. Descartes dem Christen und Vertreter der Freiheit war Gott ein aus Willkür handelndes persönliches Wesen, und die Erschaffung der Welt und der Körper daher ein der Vernunft undurchdringliches Wunder. Spinoza sieht in Gott die wirkende Naturkraft, die alle Dinge mit verstehbarer Notwendigkeit aus sich hervortreibt und mithin, wie die Seelen-, so auch die Körperwelt. Die Realität der Aussenwelt ergibt sich aus der Gotteserkenntnis von selbst und hört damit auf, ein gewichtiges Problem zu sein.' (In: E. v. Aster: Grosse Denker, Bd. 2, Leipzig 1923, p.14). Surely this is correct. Only what are the single steps for Spinoza, when he takes the way via God to the external world? In the words of Stuart Hampshire, 'one does not ordinarily suppose that all states of my body could be explained without reference to states of my mind or vice versa'. The problem for Spinoza is to find his way to the external world via God without 'any reference to states of his body'. Isn't that as much as to say that Spinoza must come to the knowledge of the existence of bodies without having any direct access to these bodies? In fact it is, and Spinoza thinks that he succeeds, and even in such a way that: 'Die Realität der Aussenwelt hört auf, ein gewichtiges Problem zu sein.'

In many expositions of Spinoza's thought the problem of the existence of the external world is completely overlooked. Yet it can be seen from the often quoted proposition 15 of Part I of the Ethics, that there must be a problem: 'Whatsoever is, is in God, and without God nothing can be, or be conceived.'* So the existence of things cannot be conceived without God. In the note to IIP10Cor Spinoza returns to this formulation: 'Everyone must surely admit, that nothing can be or be

* All quotations from the Ethica are from the translation of R. H. M. Elwes.

conceived without God... At the same time many assert, that that, without which a thing cannot be nor be conceived, belongs to the essence of that thing; wherefore they believe that either the nature of God appertains to the essence of created things, or else that created things can be or be conceived without God; or else, as is more probably the case, they hold inconsistent doctrines. I think the cause for such confusion is mainly that they do not keep to the proper order of philosophic thinking. The nature of God, which should be reflected on first, inasmuch as it is prior both in the order of knowledge and the order of nature, they have taken to be last in the order of knowledge, and have put into the first place what they call the objects of sensation; hence, while they are considering natural phenomena, they give no attention at all to the divine nature, and, when afterwards they apply their mind to the study of the divine nature, they are quite unable to bear in mind the first hypotheses, with which they have overlaid the knowledge of natural phenomena, inasmuch as such hypotheses are no help towards understanding the Divine nature. So that it is hardly to be wondered at, that these persons contradict themselves freely'.

Now that the problem has been stated, the solution will be given in the following propositions. We next learn that the first thing to constitute human mind in its reality isn't anything other than the *idea* of some particular real thing (IIP11). The proof of this need not occupy us here. But the corollary is of importance. It runs thus: 'Hence it follows, that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; thus when we say, that the human mind perceives this or that idea, we make the assertion, that God has this or that idea, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is displayed through the nature of the human mind, or in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind'. Thus when man thinks, God thinks in him. Whatever happens in the object corresponding to any idea will be in the knowledge of God, so whatever happens in the object corresponding to the human mind will be in the knowledge or thinking of God, and also in the thinking of that human being. And if the object of the idea constituting human mind is a body, whatever happens in this body will be perceived by the mind (because the knowledge thereof will be in God) (IIP12). Now only one further step is needed in order to see the truth of proposition 13 which runs as follows: 'The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain mode of extension which actually exists, and nothing else.' In plainer terms the note says: 'We thus comprehend, not only that the human mind is united to the body, but also the nature of the union between mind and body.' In the proof of the proposition it is stated that if man's body did not exist the ideas of the modifications of the body could not be in God by virtue of his constituting our mind, but if these

ideas were not in God, they would not be in our mind either. But we do possess ideas of the modifications of our body. So the body exists. That is to say, the body exists in reality and not only as an idea in our mind.

We could give the following concentrated formulation of the proof of the existence of our own body: as man's thinking is part of God's thinking, and as a reality must correspond to God's thinking of reality, so also a reality must correspond to our thinking of reality. So we must have a physical body corresponding to our idea of it.

In the note to proposition 13 Spinoza now takes the final step, from the existence of his own body to the existence of other bodies. There must be in God an idea of anything whatsoever, and so, what we have said about the idea of the human body can be said about the idea of every thing. This is also the reason why we can say that all individual things are animated, though in different degrees. It might seem that Spinoza has proved too much. If we can rely on our thinking because it is part of the thinking of God and so must be true, couldn't we then use the same argument to prove the existence of, say, a unicorn: When I think about a unicorn as a real being, God also thinks about a unicorn as a real being. God's thinking is true, and so the unicorn exists.

If this were the consequence of Spinoza's argument, we couldn't conceive of anything as existing without its really existing, and surely this would be an absurd consequence. The argument holds good for true ideas and only for them. So the next task for Spinoza is to show what is the difference between truth and falsehood, a task which he sets about solving later in part II, just as Descartes has the task in the Meditations to explain how false opinions can occur, having previously established God as a guarantee for the possibility of true human knowledge. Spinoza says that 'all ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true' (IIP32). So the question is still left whether we have a true idea of our body, an idea which can be referred to God. In the proof of IIP13 Spinoza refers to IIAx4 which states that 'we perceive that a certain body is affected in many ways.' Have we got this perception through true ideas? I'm not going to answer this question here, with an exposition of the structure of Spinoza's proof of the existence of physical bodies being the topic of this paper. I only have a few comments to make about this proof in its historical context.

To Parkinson (Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge, 1954, pp.106-107), 'The view that all individuals have their corresponding soul is little more than a curiosity: Spinoza himself merely notes that it follows from his theory of attributes and leaves it at that.' I would say that this view is a necessary part of the whole system. The doctrine of attributes necessitates the identification of mind and idea and through

it Spinoza not only commits himself to considering the idea of the human body as the same thing as the human mind or soul, but he also commits himself to the view that the idea of every individual thing is part of this thing itself, i.e. it is not only the idea of the thing, as it enters into our thinking, when we think about it. The idea exists in itself as part of, as the soul of the thing. So I think that Stuart Hampshire is quite correct in saying that 'our status as natural objects wholly depends on the type of idea which constitutes our minds, and the type of idea which constitutes our minds wholly depends on our status as natural objects; and this, and (I think) only this, is what is meant by the paradoxical statement that all things are in their different degrees animated. Spinoza is not saying that all things have minds, in the popular sense in which human beings are said to have minds; it follows only that for every extended thing there is an idea of that thing, and in the special case of human body, the idea is a human mind. The paradox arises from Spinoza's peculiar interpretation of the union of personal minds and bodies, by which a human body is the *ideatum* of which the animating mind is the idea. He makes the union of mind and body which constitutes a person only a special case of the general principle of the coincidence of ideas and their *ideata*.' (Spinoza', 1936, p.52). When we take into consideration that it is an integral part of Spinoza's thought that all things are animated, we will find in certain respects a close relationship between Spinoza and Leibniz. For Spinoza interaction between body and mind is impossible, so we cannot see a chair, but we can have an idea of a chair in our mind, and we can prove that if we can know that God exists, we can also know that there is a physical chair corresponding to our idea of it.

But with only a few alterations this could also be taken as a statement of Leibniz' view. According to him the monads have no windows, so sensation in the sense of ideas of objects being caused by these objects is impossible. But we can prove the existence of God. God must have created a world full of reality, and even if we have no direct access to the external world we can prove its existence and qualities with the help of the principle of the harmonia praestabilita. Like Spinoza's modifications of the substance, Leibniz' monads are animated, the qualities of the physical bodies being in reality perceptions. According to Spinoza things are animated in different degrees, these degrees corresponding to the stages of knowledge. To Leibniz the perceptions of the monads differ in degrees of clarity, culminating in rational thinking, just as to Spinoza human knowledge culminates in knowledge of the third kind.

It is no wonder that there is this similarity between the philosophies of Spinoza and Leibniz. They wrestle with the problem which has arisen since the time of Descartes: how can we come to a knowledge of an external world when interaction between body and soul appears to be

impossible after the acceptance of the mechanical conception of physical bodies? Before Descartes there were no difficulties of this kind. The mechanical explanations did not exist, and there was no difficulty in understanding sensation with the help of the sensible species. When interaction between body and soul had become impossible, it was also impossible to talk about sensation in any naive way. Ratiocination, therefore, was the only road to the external world. This ratiocination had to start with God.

In the light of the above exposition a few indications will suffice to show how Malebranche fits into the scheme of the problems discussed. As interaction between body and soul is impossible, we can only consider our idea of a thing as a sign of the thing itself, as a causa occasionalis, God being the only causa efficiens*). We only know it by seeing all things in God. 'Nous voyons toutes choses en Dieu'.

Probably nobody would deny that all these theories are very complicated. Berkeley intended to bring all these futile speculations to an end, cutting the Gordian knot: the substantial physical world does not exist at all.

All that we perceive are ideas, and besides ideas, created minds and God, nothing exists. Among all the arguments of Berkeley against the existence of a substantial external world we also find the impossibility of interaction between body and soul in the production of ideas, and so Berkeley in his radical way solves the problems raised by Descartes and brings the discussion to a temporary close. 'Principles', par. 19: 'But, though we might possibly have all our sensations without them [external bodies], yet perhaps it may be thought easier to conceive and explain the manner of their production, by supposing external bodies in their likeness rather than otherwise; and so it might be at least probable there are such things as bodies that excite their ideas in our minds. But neither can this be said; for, though we give the materialists their external bodies, they by their own confession are never the nearer knowing how our ideas are produced; since they own themselves unable to comprehend in what manner body can act upon spirit, or how it is possible it should imprint any idea in the mind. Hence it is evident the production of ideas or sensations in our minds can be no reason why we should suppose Matter or corporeal substances, since that is acknowledged to remain equally inexplicable with or without this supposition. If therefore it were possible for bodies to exist without the mind, yet to hold they do so, must needs be a very precarious opinion; since it is to suppose, without any reason at all, that God has created innumerable beings that are entirely useless, and serve no manner of purpose.'

* Also for Malebranche God is the guarantee of the existence of the external world.

ERROL E. HARRIS

THE ORDER AND CONNEXION OF IDEAS

I

'The order and connexion of ideas is the same as the order and connexion of things'. So says Spinoza in the seventh proposition of the second part of the *Ethics*. The reason and explanation of this he states as follows: Everything that the infinite intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance pertains to one substance only, and consequently extended substance and thinking substance are one and the same. Likewise a mode of extension and the idea of that mode are one and the same thing expressed in two different ways. It follows that whether we conceive Nature under the attribute of extension, or under that of thought, or under any other whatsoever, we shall discover one and the same order, or one and the same connexion of causes, that is, the same things following one another in succession (IIP7Sch).

We are naturally led to ask, what the order and connexion of ideas is which is the same as that of things, and to wonder whether this refers to all ideas, false as well as true, or if it is only true ideas of which Spinoza here speaks. We are told in the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* that the best method of discovery is that which reflects upon, directs the mind towards, the norm or standard of a given true idea; and as the relation between two ideas is the same as that between their formal essences (*i.e.* their *ideata*, or the things of which they are ideas), it will follow that reflection upon the idea of a perfect being will be more excellent than reflection upon any other idea, and so will yield the best method. We ought, he says, to have in us, before all else, a true idea, as an innate instrument (of knowing), by which the intellect may understand the difference between such an idea and all the rest. The best method, then, is that which relates all ideas in the right order to that of the most perfect being.

If now we turn again to the *Ethics* we read in IP16 that infinite things in infinite ways (*modis*) follow of necessity from the divine nature; and Spinoza never tires of telling us, both in his treatises and in his letters, that things follow from the nature of God in the same way and by the same necessity as the equality of the internal angles of a triangle to two right angles follows from the nature of a triangle.

From all this we may gather that the order and connexion of ideas is that necessary order in which they follow rationally from the idea of God, that *debitus ordo* which is the right method of knowing and which Spinoza himself pursues in the *Ethics*.

But what we need to understand is *how* precisely ideas and things flow necessarily from the eternal and infinite essence of Substance and whether the account that Spinoza gives of false ideas, the ideas of the imagination, can be reconciled with this doctrine of the identity in substance of ideas and things.

One might be inclined to say that with respect to false ideas the question is inept. For Spinoza quite definitely maintains that false ideas are confused. They will then surely be such ideas as confuse and disrupt the *debitus ordo* and we must not expect the quotation from which we began to apply to them. They are, however, none the less ideas and they have their specific causes, and Spinoza tells us that we should find the same connexion of causes in every attribute. We cannot, therefore, make an exception for the ideas of the imagination and the difficulty is not so easily surmountable as the supposed objection would suggest. Moreover, Spinoza explicitly writes (IIP18Sch) that the order of the imagination (in this context, memory), the order and concatenation of affections of the human body, is to be distinguished from the order of the intellect, by which the mind perceives things through their first causes. Which of these then is the same as the order and connexion of things?

It seemed at first that the order and connexion which is one and the same for both things and ideas was this order of the intellect – the order and connexion of causes; and if he now maintains that there is an order or concatenation of ideas different from this, is Spinoza not being inconsistent? Alternatively, if the affections of the human body are, as they must surely be, among the things to be understood through their first causes, and if they are caused by things which are connected in the necessary order found in the attribute of extension, why is the concatenation of bodily affections different from the so-called 'order of the intellect'?

Perhaps we shall best be able to resolve this difficulty if we begin by trying to answer the question we first raised, what is the *debitus ordo*, the order and connexion which is the same in all attributes. We may then be able more easily to discover how, if at all, the concatenation of bodily affections and imaginative ideas fits into it.

As God is an absolutely infinite substance of absolutely infinite reality, and as the more reality a thing has the more attributes it must possess, God has an infinity of attributes, each eternal and infinite in its own kind. Thus the attributes follow of necessity from the eternal and infinite essence of God. They express that essence. Further, what follows necessarily from an eternal and infinite attribute must

itself be eternal and infinite (IP22). So from the attributes there follow directly certain infinite modes. Those of the attribute of thought are the infinite intellect and that which it knows – the infinite idea of God. Those of extension are motion-and-rest and what it produces, the configuration of the entire (physical) universe, *facies totius universi*.

Spinoza does not explain further how the finite modes of thought are related to the infinite. He does say of finite modes in general that they have determinate existence, caused in each case by a finite cause itself having determinate existence, and that again likewise, and so *ad infinitum*, so that God is the indirect cause of finite things, through the infinite modes of which he is the direct cause.

We now need to understand how the infinite series of finite causes follows from the infinite modes and, in the case of thought, we are not told. In the case of extension, however, Spinoza gives us somewhat more detail, and brief though his explanation is, we may glean from it much of importance. Then, as the order and connexion of ideas is the same as that of things we may conclude that what is true of the modes of extension will be true likewise of ideas.

In the Lemmae following the thirteenth proposition of *Ethics* II, Spinoza briefly sets out his theory of bodies. In summary it is that a simple body is distinguished from others only by the proportion, or quantity, of motion and rest involved in it. If a number of such bodies are so conjoined that they transmit one to another motion and rest in a constant proportion, they are to be regarded as one complex body. The complexity of bodies may thus be increased to any degree, and the individuality of any such complex entity will not be affected by movement within it of its parts, so long as the condition is fulfilled that the proportion of motion and rest transmitted mutually among the parts remains the same. What has to be maintained constant is, so to speak, the pattern or *Gestalt* of motion and rest in the individual body. Thus some bodies become more capable than others (as Spinoza puts it) of doing and suffering many things. In particular, the action of some bodies is more dependent upon themselves alone and requires less the cooperation of other bodies. These we may surmise are the bodies of living organisms and significant consequences follow (to which we shall presently turn) for the ideas of such bodies, what Spinoza identifies as their minds.

Finally, a composite body of the sort described may include within it many kinds of change while nevertheless it preserves its individual character. Further, we may conceive all bodies together to constitute one single individual, as in fact they do in the physical world taken as a whole – for Spinoza insists that extension is not divisible into parts but is a compact continuum (the contained bodies being modes, differentiations, or affections of substance, but not separable parts). The whole physical world then will retain its individual character

unchanged and will possess an invariant configuration despite infinitely multifarious changes going on within it. Moreover, these changes will be determined or 'compelled' (Spinoza says) to be what they are by the structure or nature of the whole. This whole, moreover, is the *facies totius universi*, an infinite mode of extension.

In an illuminating passage in the 32nd letter, Spinoza explains this matter with the help of a simile. He points out that the blood is a composite body composed of different fluids so related that modifications in one vary concomitantly with modifications in the others so that the general character of the blood remains the same. A minute creature ('a worm') inhabiting the blood would not be aware of this general regulation and would perceive only apparently independent particles and changes. So we notice only seemingly disconnected and contingent events in a world which is in reality one individual, the nature of which determines all the changes that occur within it and the order in which they happen.

'Now', he writes, 'since all bodies in Nature can and ought to be conceived in the same way as we have here conceived the blood: for all bodies are surrounded by others and are determined one by another to exist and to act, preserving always and in all at the same time a fixed and determinate proportion, that is, in the entire universe, the same proportion of motion and rest; hence every body, so far as it exists modified in a certain manner as part of the whole universe, ought to be considered to conform with its whole and to cohere with the rest...' (loc.cit.).

In this way we are brought to see the connexion between the infinite modes of extension, motion-and-rest and the total configuration of the universe, with the finite modes which both constitute and are determined necessarily by the whole. But the order and connexion of things is the same as the order and connexion of ideas. Therefore we should be able to conclude to a similar relationship in the attribute of thought. Just as the power, or essence, of God expresses itself under the attribute of extension as motion-and-rest (today, perhaps, we should prefer to call it energy), so it expresses itself in thought as his infinite intellect. And, as motion-and-rest disposes itself in an infinitely diversified configuration as the physical world, preserving always an invariant proportion (*ratio*), so the intellect of God forms the idea of himself, *infinita Dei idea*, which we may suppose is a single infinite idea, internally differentiated into finite ideas in accordance with eternal laws or principles (*rationes*).

So far as the infinite idea of God is (or comprises) the idea of extension, its finite differentiations will be ideas of finite bodies and these will be in varying degrees complex. But the idea of a body, according to Spinoza, is its mind; for, he says, all things, although in varying degrees, are beminded (*animata*), the minds differing in

capacity and complexity as do the bodies. The more complex bodies (what we have presumed to be organisms), capable of doing and suffering many things at the same time, have minds similarly capable of perceiving many things; and, to the extent that they can act from their own nature alone without the concurrence of other causes (as we might say, the more self-sustaining they are as organisms), the more capable are their minds of understanding clearly. The degree of this capacity is proportional to the 'amount of reality' contained in the thing, for the idea or 'objective essence' of the thing will contain a corresponding amount of reality or truth.

It is at this point that we encounter the complications which give rise to the difficulty from which we began. As every body has its idea or mind, so the human mind is nothing more nor less than the idea of the human body. In it is the awareness of everything that happens to and in its body. We feel (*sentimus*) all the changes and processes which occur in our bodies – but not all of them, or always, do we understand clearly. As the human body is very complex, so is its mind. It is no simple idea, but one diversified in innumerable ways. In the first place it comprises three grades of ideas, or three kinds of knowledge, and within each grade it is articulated in manifold ways.

The use of the term 'idea' has the great disadvantage that it suggests a fixed and static sort of image or picture, and Spinoza, who is aware of this, warns us strongly against the suggestion. An idea he defines as 'a conception of the mind', something active, not passive. It is not to be thought of as 'something dumb, like a picture on a tablet' but 'as a mode of thinking, understanding itself' (IIP43Sch).

The idea of the human body, therefore, is not an image but a complex activity, as the body itself is a complex process and not a mere lump of matter.

We must now try to understand how the diversifications of this ideal activity which is 'the idea' of the human body, all belong to that order and connexion which is the same as the order of real causes, how they can, as they must, all be in, or part of, the mind of God, while at the same time some of them are confused and false and belong to the order of the imagination, and others are true and adequate and belong to the order of the intellect.

Ideas of the imagination are the ways in which we feel or become aware of effects in our bodies caused by external bodies. These effects are all determined. They belong to the series of real causes governed ultimately by the structure of the physical universe. As so understood they belong to the real order and connexion of things. So the ideas of them occur in a determined order and can be understood as the effects of their (psychological) causes. But ideas of the imagination are not themselves such understanding. When scientifically understood as the effects of the causes which produce them they are grasped in adequate

ideas, but they are not themselves adequate ideas. They are awarenesses of effects the nature of which appears in them as the nature of the external bodies which cause those effects; but it is as much attributable to the nature of the human body as to the external bodies. The ideas are thus partial or truncated; each is really only a mutilated piece of the totality to which they really belong. It is as such bits and pieces that we imagine them. They are, indeed, in God's mind, but there they are in their proper setting; there they are understood in their complete context; they are not imagined but are made complete and adequate. Our minds, however, are so limited that in them they appear disconnected and dissevered from their proper causes, so we tend to associate them haphazard, in fortuitous concatenations. Such concatenation is not the order of the intellect nor is it the real order and connexion of things; but neither is it the real order of ideas, and the images of our fantasy are not real ideas at all – at least, they contain only a fragment of the reality – they are fractions, shards (as it were) of the truly adequate ideas of their objects (the actual effects in the body, in relation to their actual causes). Hence they are confused and false.

Does this falsity, however, introduce into the order of ideas something foreign to the order of things? According to Spinoza it does not, because it consists in nothing positive. The ideas in themselves are not false only their assertion as true, as presenting something real, when in fact they omit so much. But their omission is mere privation, it is nothing really in them, but only a lack of something needed to complement them. The complement when supplied does indeed alter their aspect or intention – their meaning – but it makes no difference to their actual content which is equally essential to their adequation. Thus the sun may appear to the eye like a relatively small luminous object some hundreds of feet away; and even when we learn that it is not so but is a vast incandescent mass many times larger than the earth and millions of miles distant, the appearance does not change. But it does come to have new meaning, we are no longer deceived by it; and when we fully understand how the sun comes to appear as it does, our idea of it is true as well as that of its sensible appearance. This, then, is the idea belonging to the order of the intellect, but it includes the imaginative idea, now set in its right context.

So we see that the order of ideas is the same as that of things. That of imaginative ideas is the same as that of their causes, but taken out of context they are false; taken in their proper order and relations they are understood, as they are in the intellect of God. True understanding is the grasp of ideas in their proper relations according to the principle or law (*ratio*) established by the divine intellect.

Some commentators object that the assertion of a part as if it were the whole is itself a positive error, and the idea of a fragment misplaced

in the wrong context or affirmed out of context is itself a misplaced idea; and Spinoza cannot, on his theory accommodate such ideas. Again, the possible answer, that the content of these ideas is not changed when they are rightly placed and seen in proper context, is rejected on the ground that content is changed when in a different context, as the elements of a *Gestalt* vary with the total pattern. There is no explicit answer to this objection in Spinoza, but there is one implicit in his doctrine. I shall return to it at a later stage; here I shall note simply that the error of *imaginatio* is one of attitude rather than subject matter, and this attitude (to which Spinoza refers as *affect*) is incident upon the level of apprehension. It is proportional to the degree of reality or 'perfection' of the idea, and, as we shall see presently, the order of things for Spinoza does involve a scale of degrees of perfection 'from the highest to the lowest'.

II

A more serious difficulty presents itself in Spinoza's philosophy, than those we have hitherto considered, one which has not gone unnoticed in the past and which was raised in his own day by Spinoza's correspondent, Tschirnhaus. If the order and connexion of ideas is the same as that of things, and things are expressed under infinite attributes in each of which there is the same order of causes, then either there must be a greater number of ideas and a more complicated structure in the attribute of thought than in any other attribute, which would contradict the seventh proposition of *Ethics II*; or else each idea should be that of the corresponding mode in all attributes, so that there should be no bar to our knowing all the attributes other than extension.

Spinoza dealt with this difficulty briefly in his reply to Tschirnhaus:

> '...although every thing is expressed in infinite ways in the intellect of God, yet those infinite ideas by which they are expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a singular thing, but infinite minds: since each of these infinite ideas has no connexion with any other, as I have explained in the same Scholium, Prop. 7 Part II Ethic...' (Ep. LXVI).

He adds that a little attention to this Scholium and to IP10 will remove all difficulty.

Each attribute must be conceived through itself alone; thus the ideas of modes in any one attribute will be separate from, and incommunicable with, the ideas of modes in any other. Each idea will be the 'mind' of its *ideatum*, but not the mind of any mode expressing the same thing in any other attribute. That will have a separate mind, or idea, of its own. But in that case the relation of *idea* to *ideatum* will not be the same as the relation of the corresponding modes in other attributes and the order and connexion of ideas in the

attribute of thought will not be the same order and connexion as that of things. For there is but one substance in which the modes in different attributes are identical each to each. But the ideas of those modes, so far from being identical, have no connexion with one another. There should then be a distinct attribute of thought for every other attribute – in fact, an infinity of attributes of thought. But this clearly is not Spinoza's intention. Nor can one argue that as there is an infinity of ways in which each thing is expressed in God's attributes and correspondingly an infinity of ideas of each thing in God's intellect, the order and connexion of ideas is indeed the same as the order and connexion of things. For, not only must the infinite ideas in God's intellect of each single thing be mutually identical as the modes of which they are ideas are substantially one thing, but if they are not the attribute of thought will be multiplex while every other attribute is single.

On the other hand, if we press too hard the insistence that each attribute is conceivable only through itself none will be conceivable at all. For thought is an attribute and should therefore not be the medium through which other attributes are conceived. The idea of a body should be impossible and only *idea ideae* should exist.

Spinoza's belief that a little attention to the relevant passages in the *Ethics* would remove all difficulties is clearly much too complacent. In fact there seems to be no way, within the strict letter of his exposition, in which this difficulty can be removed, despite the fact that Spinoza's reasoning for each of the colliding statements is apparently unchallengeable. There must be infinite ways of expressing the essence of an absolutely infinite substance, yet we obviously know of only two; and this is not surprising for we are material bodies, modes of extension, and are aware only of (or through) the effects registered in our bodies.

Perhaps Spinoza ought to have said that there is but one way of expressing (or conceiving) the essence of an absolutely infinite substance and that is as an infinite mind or spirit. In effect this was Hegel's solution to the problem. He complained that Spinoza identified the ultimate reality with substance, whereas in truth it is Subject. But if one does this, what becomes of extension and the physical world?

III

The solution to this problem seems to me to be implicit in Spinoza's doctrine though it never became clear to his own mind. It is to be found in the conception of a scale of forms of reality, progressively increasing in degree of perfection or concreteness and dialectically related to one another. The final form in the scale is the infinite mind

of God, but in that mind the whole scale is expressed as thought, or awareness of itself. Thought is then the attribute of the infinite whole which in the lower phases of the scale is extension and its modes of successively increasing perfection.

Let us look for the seeds of this conception in Spinoza's theory. At the end of the first Part of the Ethics he tells us that to God 'there was not lacking material for the creation of all things, from the highest to the lowest grade of perfection; or, to speak more exactly, because the laws of his nature were so comprehensive as to suffice for the production of everything that can be conceived by any infinite intellect.' He did therefore envisage Substance as a range of such grades of perfection comprehended in the intellect of God.

Then, as we have seen, he describes *facies totius universi* as one infinite whole comprising bodies graded from the most simple, through more and more complex, up to its own all embracing wholeness. And these degrees of complexity he again describes as degrees of greater and less perfection to which the greater and less perfection of their minds (or ideas) correspond:

> '...ideas inter se, ut ipsa objecta, differre, unamque alia praestantiorem esse, plus realitatis continere, prout objectum unius objecto alterius praestantius est, plusque realitatis continet.' (IIP13Sch).

Next, in his discussion of human welfare, he speaks of what is 'good' on different levels of perfection. First he speaks disparagingly of man's habit of regarding as good whatever he finds useful to himself. On this level the terms 'good' and 'evil' are purely relative and correspond to nothing in reality. Then he asserts quite seriously that the good for man *is* what is useful. But in the first instance men take what pleases them to be good and whatever they desire, both their conception of the object and their emotions being the product of imagination and so confused. It is only when men become aware that their true advantage is served only by what really increases their power of action, and that that is their capacity for determining themselves by their own nature alone, that they recognize and pursue the true good. This true good turns out to be the perfection of the intellect bringing with it action from reason alone which overcomes the vagaries and tempestuousness of the passions. And so the conception of real freedom is reached leading to blessedness, the intellectual love of God, and eternal life in union with the divine intellect. This is the perfection of man that we may set before us as a goal of action – 'the love of an eternal and infinite thing that feeds the mind with joy alone and excludes all pain.' Once again, the degree of perfection is proportional to the degree or amount of 'reality' contained in the appropriate stage of moral and intellectual development and the culmination is the infinite intellect of God.

Remarks dropped almost as if casually in his letters point to the same idea of a scale of varying degrees of perfection. In his reply to van Blyenbergh (Ep. XXIII) he says that a mouse equally with an angel and sorrow as well as joy depend upon God, but a mouse cannot therefore be a species of angel, nor sorrow a kind of joy. In the context the implication is that, while all things equally depend on God, they differ in their degree of 'perfection' or reality. Writing to Oldenburg on the question of freedom and responsibility he says: 'A horse is excusable for being a horse and not a man; yet none the less it is a horse of necessity and not a man.' Once more the implication is that the difference between wrong-doing and virtue is not one of culpability so much as of differing degrees of reality – as a horse is on a different level from man.

How then could Spinoza's system be reconstructed to bring out the force of these hints that he gives us of a series of grades and to solve the problems we have found troublesome?

Let us return to his account of the physical world. We begin with motion-and-rest which, he says, is an infinite mode of extension, and extension he insists is an indivisible infinite continuum and is the essence of God *qua* extended Substance. Now all these points are important. We begin from God as the infinite whole of being, but we take first the manifestation of that whole as an extended totality expressing itself actively as energy-motion-and-rest. This is differentiated into a series of bodies ranging from the simplest to the most complex. The series may be, perhaps must be, viewed either as successive, simple combining progressively into more complicatedly compound bodies, or coexistent, all grades existing together but the simpler subserving the more complex. This subservience is again important. The grades relate to one another transitively the more complex presupposing and containing the more simple, but not *vice versa*.

As we go up the scale bodies become more self-contained and self-sustaining, more comprehensive; they progressively contain more reality and are more self-determinate.

Motion-and-rest is an expression of the power of God, but God's activity *par excellence* is thought. This we may for the moment postulate, but we shall presently find that the postulate is justified. So we shall say, with Spinoza, that there is in God's intellect an idea of every body, or that every body is, in its degree, *animata*. As the minds of bodies are capable and versatile to the same degree as the bodies are self-sustaining and apt for doing and suffering many things, the minds of the simpler bodies are so-called only by analogy or courtesy, and only those of the most highly complex are conscious and intelligent. Their consciousness is the feeling or awareness of the bodies, which, as they are in principle all mutually interactive,

record in themselves the effects upon them of all the rest. Consciousness in consequence becomes the awareness or knowledge of nature. In its first phase it is *imaginatio*, but from this, as Spinoza explains, the mind, more capable of understanding as its body is or becomes more capable of action from its own nature alone, advances to *ratio* and adequate ideas. Thence it proceeds to an adequate knowledge of things from an adequate grasp of the attributes of God – it sees everything and understands it in the light of the whole, bringing it within reach of that union with God which expresses itself as *amor intellectualis Dei*.

But, as we saw, Spinoza extrapolates the series of bodily complications right up to the totality of the universe and it culminates in *facies totius universi*. The mind or idea of this must be the *infinita idea Dei* itself as conceived by God's intellect. And this comprehends the entire scale of degrees of perfection up to itself. The scale as a whole, therefore, comes to fruition in the idea of itself, which is the whole scale as comprehended in the mind of God. The activity of God in its explicit form, then, is, as Aristotle held, νόησις νοήσεως, a thought which thinks itself by expressing itself as a complete gamut of degrees of perfection from mere extension, through motion-and-rest, right up to the totality of the universe, the higher phases becoming more and more fully aware of themselves, and, by so doing, of the totality. The attribute of God is thus infinite self-knowledge expressing itself as (creating) extension and the scale of degrees '*ex summo nimirum ad infimum perfectionis*.' Everything, in short, which can be conceived by an infinite intellect.

There is now no need to postulate an infinite number of other attributes to express God's infinity; for absolute self-consciousness is itself absolute infinity, which includes everything in itself. Equally there is no need to demur to the assertion that idea and ideatum are one in substance, for indeed they are. Nor need we be troubled by the existence of confused imaginative ideas, they too are in the intellect of God, certainly not as errors, but as incidents of a relatively low grade of perfection. As such, they are adequately understood. And finally we can truthfully affirm that the order and connexion of ideas is one and the same as the order and connexion of things.

P. VAN DER HOEVEN

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CARTESIAN PHYSICS FOR SPINOZA'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Spinoza's fundamental thesis of the existence of one substance with two recognizable attributes, thinking and extension, seems to push overboard the Cartesian theory of Dualism and thereby remove the problems of interaction between thinking and matter. Both attributes are manifestations of one and the same substance; they express the same thing in two different ways. Since then Spinoza's arguments show a definite structure. They always proceed via the 'knowledge in God'.

Oddly enough, however, the parallelism of the two attributes is ruled by a strongly one-sided link. A priori one could imagine that thinking as well as extension could show their own individual spontaneity or that this spontaneity concerned thinking alone, but being reflected in extension. But Spinoza puts it the other way round. In IIP13 he formulates his main thesis in this respect: 'The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body, in other words a certain modus of extension actually existing, and nothing else.'* Everything the human mind experiences, is an experience within its sole object, the body. So Spinoza's abstract and metaphysical doctrine of human knowledge is based on a strong material precondition. Therefore his *doctrine of natural bodies*, immediately following IIP13, aquires fundamental significance for the whole theory of knowledge. As the human mind has no other experience but only through its object, body, so the nature and the properties of this object must be of conclusive importance for all our knowledge. However Spinoza's 'doctrine of bodies' is directly related to Cartesian physics. Spinoza has occupied himself with Cartesian physics thoroughly since early days. The only study he published during his lifetime under his own name, concerns the first two parts of the *Principia philosophiae* by Descartes. The accent is placed on the second part. In it Descartes treats the fundamentals of his physics; it is the very part Spinoza deals with in great detail. And though he takes his independent stand contrasting Descartes' ideas, he is nevertheless strongly in-

* Quotations of Spinoza from the translation by R. H. M. Elves (Dover ed.), sometimes slightly altered.

fluenced by them. So he declares in IP15Sch, he had proved previously how no vacuum could possibly exist in nature, thereby referring to Descartes' theory.

CHARACTERIZATION OF CARTESIAN PHYSICS

Substratum of physics is, in Descartes' opinion, only extension, space. Space is indefinitely extended, isomorphic, continuous.[1] Matter and space are identical. No vacuum exists. – With this principle Descartes combines an opinion of quite another kind, i.e. atomistics. Extension is indefinitely divisible. As all parts consist of one substance, they differ only in form, volume and movement, and are fully characterized by these properties alone. To these basic properties, describable in mathematical terms, the so called 'secondary qualities' must be reduced. Colour, fragrance, sound, warmth – even gravitation and magnetism are explained by the interaction of moving matter and matter at rest. The only authentic physical element Descartes introduces, is the idea of inert mass. As Koyré points out, he is the first to formulate the law of inertion in an irreproachable way;[2] and he makes use of it in his treatment of centrifugal forces, which he needs for his explanation of gravitation.

The law of inertion leads Descartes to the introduction of the idea of 'quantity of movement', and this idea in turn leads to the first (tentative) formulation of a general conservation-law. As Descartes puts it, in creating matter God has given it a certain amount of movement and rest. This amount remains invariable in all interactions between particles of matter, because at each impact there is only a movement from one particle to another, the total amount remaining unaltered. For the different cases of impact Descartes formulates his seven laws of impact; and though they are incorrect, they indicate the way to the new physics: the way of a *mathematical description of natural processes*. The rigourous abstraction required as a necessary preliminary makes concrete prediction and testing possible.

Thereby the importance of the senses and of the information provided by these is very much reduced. About the essence the senses can teach us nothing. What we gather from them, we have to treat with utmost caution. The senses refer to mathematical properties often totally unknown to us. They teach what is useful and beneficial for daily life: what we should strive after, and what we should avoid. They help us to remain healthy and they are indispensable to ordinary life. But they cannot serve theoretical reflection.

SHORTCOMINGS OF CARTESIAN PHYSICS

The means these physics dispose of to explain natural phenomena, are very limited. Particles can only interact by means of impact and

pressure. The shortcomings that are most strongly felt are these. First of all, the identification of space and matter implies, that the quantity of matter of a body is only determined by extent. So it becomes impossible to account for differences in specific density. The idea of *mass* cannot adequately be developed. Next, Descartes demands in his physics only clear and well defined principles to be tolerated. Interactions between particles, other than impact or pressure (such as for instance cohesion forces) are characterized as 'occult' and rejected. Particles that can attract each other, should know something about each other. – But in this way it is not possible to make understandable the *connection* between matter, and the difference between hard and soft matter cannot be put on a physical base. Descartes tries to introduce *rest* as a uniting element between adjacent particles; but even in his own physics this proves to be insufficient.

EXCEEDING THE LIMITS OF THE THEORY

1. *The elimination of mathematics*

Descartes himself exceeds in several respects the limits of his own theory. First of all, he eliminates the mathematical elements. His laws of impact, he argues, are only valid if the two impacting bodies are not at the same time in contact with other bodies. Obviously they must be in a vacuum. But this is a theoretical impossibility (for there exists no vacuum), and a practical impossibility as well: for, as matter and extension are identified, there does not exist any approximation to the idea of a vacuum. So these laws are totally useless. After he has introduced his laws of impact, Descartes clears away all mathematics in his *Principia*, and he puts forward a physical principle of quite another character. It is the idea of an incompressible liquid, carrying solid particles with it. In this continuum there occur currents and whirlpools. Descartes handles his new principle with much imagination and virtuosity. Certain experimentally observed simple processes in a moving liquid he uses as a visual model. He explains all that happens and could possibly happen. But never again is he able to put things in an exact form, or to construct a quantitative prediction.

2. *The structure of the organic body*

As a consequence of Cartesian presuppositions, matter has no structure at all: it is amorphous. With this matter it is not possible to describe the human body in a satisfying way. How should we lay down all those differences in structure, functions, connection, interaction,

specific operations of the parts? Nevertheless, Descartes pays much attention to these elements. His 'Treatise on the Passions' is based on a description of the human body, that is as exact as possible. His description is arranged in accordance with the great vital systems: circulation of the blood, respiration, digestion and nervous system. All these systems are directed to what now should be termed the *centre of information* of the body. This centre Descartes situates in the brains. According to him it is a little, singular gland (glandus pinealis); all our nerves are linked to this centre, and in it our soul may get a direct knowledge about what passes on in the body, and may in a direct way influence its processes.

In studying Descartes' exposition, we must keep in mind: firstly, that it is always necessary, if you wish to get hold of a complicated matter, to apply a radical simplification; secondly, that Descartes integrates modern knowledge (as the circulation of the blood, in 1600 discovered by Harvey) in his philosophical account; thirdly, that his prodigious imagination and his rationalistic radicalism sometimes cause him to follow wrong tracks. Nevertheless it belongs in my opinion to Descartes' greatest merits, that he exposes himself in this way to a serious challenge to his findings. For only so it becomes possible to verify the theory, if necessary to reject it or to improve on it.

WHAT USE DOES SPINOZA MAKE OF CARTESIAN PHYSICS?

Spinoza accepts the whole of Cartesian theory. But he eliminates all mathematical elements, as Descartes himself did before him, and so he is a faithful disciple of Descartes as regards his qualitative physics of the continuous matter, but he rejects resolutely the philosophical importance Descartes attaches to the material structures of the human body.

Acceptance of Cartesian theory does not imply, of course, recognizing Descartes' thesis on extensive substance. Spinoza holds on to his attributes. But this difference is not essential for a physical distinction. The experimental basis of Descartes' theory will do for Spinoza's theory as well. According to Spinoza, there exists only one material 'substance' (or: attribute), indefinitely extended, continuous and isomorphic, indivisible and yet divided in particles of different hardness. This inconsistency, becoming acute in the question of the infinite divisibility of matter (which Spinoza denies), becomes apparent in several arguments.

But Spinoza does not at all agree with Descartes' opinions on the human body, as laid down in his Treatise on the Passions. His opinion on this topic we find in the Introduction to Ethica III. As follows: 'I do not forget, that the illustrious Descartes, though he believed, that the

mind has abolute power over its actions, strove to explain human emotions by their primary causes, and, at the same time, to point out a way, by which the mind might attain to absolute dominion over them. However, in my opinion, he accomplishes nothing beyond a display of the acuteness of his own great intellect, as I will show in the proper place.' – This sharp rejection indicates a philosophical controversy. In Descartes' philosophy, the structure of the human body is exactly adjusted to the interactions with the mind. The body is the pre-eminently prepared instrument for the mind. The centre of information is, therefore, its most striking instrument of expression. But for Spinoza, matter and mind are two totally different attributes, each expressing in its own way the essence of God. In describing one attribute, you may not make use of the other. Therefore Spinoza leaves out of consideration the material structure of the human body. He probably intended to give a universal and abstract theory, enabling him to be independent of all specialized knowledge.

SPINOZA'S THEORY OF THE 'INDIVIDUAL'

Now we come to a fundamental problem. Based on accepted theory we should be able in the material continuum to isolate a body, an 'individual', and this individual should obtain its own independence and its own functional totality. In consequence of his theory, it was here possible for Descartes to relate to a 'cohesion by being at rest'. But for Spinoza this way out does not exist. According to him, rest is rather a metaphysical principle, equivalent to movement, and, therefore, of no use to explain local connection. His solution of the problem is laid down in the following *Definition* (IIDf,Elwes p.95). 'When any given bodies of the same or different magnitude are compelled by other bodies to remain in contact, or if they move at the same or different rates of speed, so that their mutual movements preserve among themselves a certain fixed relation, we say that such bodies are in union, and that together they compose one body or *individual*, which is distinguished from the other bodies by this fact of union.'

Two distinctive features of Spinoza's 'definition' come to the fore: 1. The individual owes its unity to the forces, exerted on it from the outside by the surrounding bodies. In this way physicists have attempted to evade the introduction of cohesional forces. 2. The individual becomes a functional unity because its 'mutual movements preserve among themselves a certain fixed relation'. There is connection by means of an appropriate transfer of movement. – This is really a fertile thought, but far too general, so that it can never be put to a test. In a certain sense Spinoza admits this objection. He remarks that 'we may easily proceed thus to infinity' (i.e. in complicating the

composition of our individuals) 'and conceive the whole of nature as one individual, whose parts, that is, all bodies, vary in infinite ways, without any change in the individual as a whole.' (IILm7Sch).

On the basis of the foregoing theory and of his definition of it, Spinoza now develops (in the Lemmata 4-7) some indispensable properties of the organic body. The body must be metabolism-proof; i.e. interchanging certain particles or subordinate bodies may not affect the individuality (Lm4). In the same way it must be capable of growth and decrease. Therefore Spinoza demands that the particles of the body, even becoming greater or smaller, preserve their inter-relationship in the same mutual proportions (Lm5). The organic body must be able to move certain parts separately (e.g. its limbs), and to move about as a whole (Lm6,7). Spinoza tries to bring this about by allowing certain movements in a greater context, provided that the mutual transfer of movement remains intact. His conclusion is: 'We thus see, how a composite individual may be affected in many different ways, and preserve its nature notwithstanding.' (IILm7Sch).

In the Postulates, Spinoza achieves in the same way a description of the human body. He tries to account for the greater influencibility and susceptibility of human individuals, by increasing their material complexity. 'The human body', he says, (IIPost1) 'is composed of a great number of individual parts of diverse nature, each one of these is in turn of extremely complex composition.' In the Postulates Spinoza sets out to realize the same aim as he did in the Lemma's: he tries to justify the inclusion of a great deal of daily experience in the context of his theory. Thus he expresses himself in so many words: '... I think it sufficient for me here to have indicated one possible explanation, just as well as if I had proved it by means of it's true cause. Indeed, I do not think I am very far from the truth, for all my assumptions are based *on postulates, which rest, almost without exception, on experience,* that cannot be controverted by those who have shown, as we have, *that the human body, as we feel it, exists.*' (IIP17Sch).

This clear and convincing confirmation of the theory by means of experience, goes back in a direct line to Descartes. At the end of his Principia Descartes says plainly: 'I think to have done enough, if the causes I have explained are such that all the effects they may produce agree with those we actually meet in the world, without asking myself whether they are being produced by these causes, or perhaps by others.' (Princ.Phil.IV art204).

THE INFLUENCE OF THIS THEORY ON SPINOZA'S OWN THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

1. *Formulation of the 'knowledge of the first kind'.*

Spinoza's central idea, put down in IIP13: 'that the object of the idea constituting the mind is the body' – an idea that necessitated the development of the theory of bodies – is now fully elaborated. The question is now, what the human mind can get to know of this object, and in what manner. In accordance with the complicated composition of the body, 'the human mind, too, is not simple, but compounded of a great number of ideas.' (IIP15). The interaction of our own body with other bodies does not indicate the nature of the bodies that partake in the interaction, but only those aspects that play a role in the interaction. Therefore, 'the human mind has no knowledge of the body, and does not know it to exist, save through the ideas of the modifications whereby the body is affected.' (IIP19). Indeed: 'The mind does not know itself, except in so far as it perceives the ideas of the modifications of the body.' (IIP23). As a consequence, all such knowledge is in every respect *inadequate*.

So in IIP24 we learn that the human mind 'does not involve an adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body', because (Dem) 'the parts composing the human body do not belong to the essence of that body, except in so far as they communicate their motions to one another in a certain fixed relation, not in so far as they can be regarded as individuals without relation to the human body.' Here, and in other similar cases, Spinoza makes use of a remarkable *logical construction*. So he says in the just cited example, that '...the knowledge of each part composing the human body is in God, in so far as he is affected by very many ideas of things, and not in so far as he has the idea of the human body only, in other words, the idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind; therefore, the human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human body.' This construction recalls to memory the theoretical presuppositions. But it has no real significance for the train of thought, which essentially connects the theory of bodies with its interpretation in the doctrine of knowledge.

The 25th Proposition puts down that 'the idea of the human body being affected in any way does not provide an adequate knowledge of the external body', no more than 'an adequate knowledge of the human body itself.' (IIP27). And: 'the ideas of the modifications of the human body or affects on it, in so far as they have reference only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused.' (IIP28). A modification of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of the human mind (IIP29), and of the duration of our body's existence, as well as of the duration concerning particular

things external to ourselves, we can only have a *very inadequate* knowledge (IIP30,31).

Now what is the precise character of all this *inadequate* knowledge? This Spinoza formulates in IIP29Sch and in IIP40Sch. In the first passage he says, 'that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused knowledge of itself, its own body, and of external bodies, whenever it perceives things *after the common order of nature*; that is, whenever it is determined from without, namely, *by the fortuitous play of circumstance*, to regard this or that in isolation, but not at such times as it is determined from within, that is, by the fact of regarding several things at once, to understand their points of agreement, difference, and contrast.' And in the second passage he continues, that as we start from particular things represented to our intellect fragmentarily, confusedly, and without order through our senses, ...such knowledge only rests on 'the mere suggestions of experience'. The same sort of knowledge we get 'from indications obtained by reading or hearing certain words we remember, ... and from certain ideas concerning them, similar to those through which we imagine things.' All such knowledge I shall call ... *knowledge of the first kind, opinion, or imagination.*

2. *Influence of the theory on this formulation*

It is evident that Spinoza, in the way he is describing the first kind of knowledge, tries to characterize *knowledge, based on sense perception.* Thereby he stresses the negative aspects of this kind of knowledge: the material is not ordered, is chaotic, and any comprehensive clearing up of the material is missing. But this negative description shows a strong influence of the physics that lie at its base. For, in contrast to Descartes in his Treatise on the Passions, Spinoza has abandoned all considerations about the specific nature of sense perception, and about the operation of the central nervous system. And as we may observe in the theory of knowledge of his contemporary John Locke, the specific nature of the senses introduces a natural order in the arbitrary perceptions: the eye introduces another order in perception than does our sense of touch or our hearing. But Spinoza reduces all perceptions to shapeless and undifferentiated pushing and influences. Our body as an instrument never registers any specific reaction.

In this way sense perception has no relation at all to the secondary qualities of things (as colour, fragrance, sound, taste, warmth etc.) but is put in a direct relation to the primary qualities, as bulk, form, movement – qualities that are of central and exclusive importance in science. In sense perception they have only a function in the impact, contingent and partial, and so there is nearly nothing left of the idea of sense perception. We can understand Spinoza's dictum: 'Knowledge

of the first kind is the only source of falsity.' (IIP41). But this dictum is very strongly influenced by his theoretical preoccupations.

3. *Formulation of the 'knowledge of the second kind'*

With his treatment of true or adequate knowledge, Spinoza starts in Prop.32. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true, because in God they agree in every respect with their objects. So the only question is, to know which ideas can be present in the human mind in a true and adequate way – i.e., in the sense of the logical construction: '...in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind'. (IIP34Dem).

In Spinoza's exposition of adequate knowledge, Lemma 2 of Part II plays a predominant role. It runs as follows: 'All bodies agree in certain respects. Proof: All bodies agree in the fact, that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute. Further, in the fact that they may be moved less or more quickly, and may be absolutely in motion or in rest.'

This lemma formulates in the shortest possible way to what extent Spinoza makes use of Cartesian physics. He refers to it in IIP37: 'That which is common to all (cf. Lemma 2 above), and which is equally in a part and in the whole, does not constitute the essence of any particular thing.' Because, if it constituted the essence of some particular thing, it could not be conceived without that thing; but we assume that it is contained equally in all things. And so IIP38 continues: 'Those things, which are common to all, and which are equally in a part and in the whole, cannot be conceived except adequately.' Of special importance is, what he adds in the Coroll.: 'Hence it follows that there are certain ideas or notions common to all men; for (by Lemma 2) all bodies agree in certain respects, which (by the foregoing Prop.) must be adequately or *clearly and distinctly* perceived by all.'

Spinoza concludes his theory in the following way. In IIP39 he says 'that, which is common to and a property of the human body and such other bodies as are wont to affect the human body, and which is present equally in each part of either, or in the whole, will be represented by an adequate idea in the mind.' And the Corollary adds: '...that the mind is fitted to perceive adequately more things, in proportion as its body has more in common with other bodies.' This remark is paradoxical, because, as Spinoza's model of the human body is so simplificated that there is only one sort of interaction left, he now tries to support the complexity of the human mind in referring to the complexity of the affections of the body. He concludes with the pronouncement: 'Whatsoever ideas in the mind follow from ideas which are therein adequate, are themselves adequate as well.' (IIP40). Apparently the true idea legitimates itself. Spinoza expresses himself

in a pithy way in IIP43: '*He, who has a true idea, simultaneously knows that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing perceived.*'

4. *Influence of the theory on this formulation*

This 'second kind of knowledge' is adequate. The mind obtains this knowledge by means of its object, the body. This sort of knowledge consists of which is common to all bodies, and which is equally in a part and in the whole: i.e. rest and movement, a lesser and a quicker movement. It is the foundation of Cartesian physics. Spinoza stresses the fact that this is abstract, itself legitimating knowledge. He takes the view that the foundations of Cartesian physics are in an autonomous way laid down by the intellect, and are independent of all sense perception. This agrees with Descartes' pretensions, but it disagrees with the facts of the case. The irony in this case is, that Spinoza bases his opinions on the pure experimental part of Cartesian physics, the model of a continuous liquid.

5. *Metaphysical unfolding of the theory*

In the now following propositions of the second book (IIP44-49) Spinoza introduces a number of metaphysical notions, which must characterize adequate knowledge, and, besides, have to fit the theory for handling it in the 5th book. These notions are: *necessity* and *essence*, *infinity*, '*a certain form of eternity*' (sub quâdam aeternitatis specie) as positive notions, and, as negative ones: *imagination*, *time*, *contingency*, *past*, *present* and *future*. We now must ask ourselves, in how far these terms characterize the Cartesian component in the 'second kind of knowledge'.

We start with the idea of *eternity*. In book I the definition thereof reads: 'By eternity, I mean existence itself, in so far as it is conceived necessarily to follow solely from the definition of that which is eternal.' (IDf7). According to Spinoza, a 'definition' is not a formal definition or description, but the essence of the matter. He who knows the 'definition' of a thing, has all the possible knowledge thereof at one's disposal. So in the definition of the triangle all properties are included that ever will be demonstrated as belonging to the triangle. As Spinoza puts it, the idea of eternity cannot be seperated from the related ideas as *necessity* and *eternal truths*. Even *willing* is nothing else than 'this or that affirmation, and this or that negation' (IIP49Dem) and so nothing else than the acceptance or negation of an idea, for instance 'the particular volition, ... (or) the mode of thinking whereby the mind affirms, that the three interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.' And as this true proposition follows of

necessity from the definition, 'there is in the mind no absolute faculty of positive or negative volition.' (Ibid.).

This interpretation of the idea of eternity fits exactly in the abstract and general knowledge Spinoza aims at. 'It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary ... It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form of eternity.' (IIP44Cor2). It is important in this case to add the proof. 'It is in the nature of reason to regard things, not as contingent, but as necessary. Reason perceives this necessity of things truly – that is, as it is in itself. But this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God; therefore, it is in the nature of reason to regard things under this form of eternity. We may add that the bases of reason are the notions, which answer to things common to all, and which do not answer the essence of any particular thing: which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time, under a certain form of eternity.'

About *time* Spinoza and Descartes have totally different opinions. According to Spinoza, time is strongly connected with imagination. Time, that may be measured, is duration, an abstraction that plays no role in the formation of real insight. According to Descartes, however, time is a power which treatens all knowledge, for instance by oblivion: we are not able to think time, as we can think space. Things are not time-proof; only through God's 'continued creation' they are kept in existence. – But in this way the conclusion from both opinions is the same for science: *time must be eliminated from physical theory*.

Descartes brings this elimination about in his mathematical theory by means of the idea 'moment of time', but in his physics of incompressible liquids he discards all theoretical preoccupations, and he makes an extensive use of physical models including processes in time. And so the model Spinoza uses, is pervaded with time too.

So we see that there exists a remarkable contradiction between pretension and interpretation of the theory on one side, and the factual working-method on the other; this discrepancy applies as well to Descartes' theory as to that of Spinoza. The theory is considered as dealing with timeless, eternal truths, rationally deduced, independent of all sorts of sense perception. However, during actual procedure – and how could it be different – this experience plays a decisive part. The whole image of the 'object of the mind' is determined in a visual way, on the base of sense perception – be it that, in behalf of admission in the philosophical system, it had first of all to undergo a 'scientific transformation'.

So the further metaphysical characterization of the 'second kind of knowledge', which Spinoza adds, maintains the Cartesian traits of this knowledge – be it that these claims have a closer relation to the supposed ideality of this knowledge, than to its factual existence.

NOTES

[1] For extension and matter Descartes uses the word 'indéfini' in stead of 'infini'.
[2] Alexandre Koyré, Etudes Galiléennes III, (1939), p.164.

H. G. HUBBELING

LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE IN SPINOZA'S MYSTICISM

The problem, whether Spinoza's philosophy can be called a kind of mysticism, is a much disputed question. It was very often a hot issue at many a Spinoza conference. Before the war we had two Spinoza associations in the Netherlands, which were opposed to each other with respect to this point: 'Besides the religious – mystical interpretation, which is referred to as "The Hague School", a rationalistic point of view, which could appeal to a long standing tradition, has been preserved in "The Rijnsburg School"'[1]. This contest is over now, but the problem has not yet been solved. I do not pretend to give a definite solution either, but I shall try to clarify the problem a little bit. One can take mysticism in different senses. We shall try to see according to which sense of mysticism Spinoza's philosophy can be called mystic and in which sense this cannot be done.

The thesis which I should like to defend is: *If one is to be called a mystic, only if one has mystical experiences and refers to them, then Spinoza is no mystic. If, however, a philosophy is to be called mystical, if certain doctrines are defended that very often occur in mysticism, then Spinoza is indeed a mystic.*

These doctrines include among others: (i) participation of the human mind in divine thinking, (ii) seeing the world and the human self in one great all including vision, i.e. seeing things 'sub specie aeternitatis' (from the view point of eternity), etc. This thesis requires, however, further explanation and I hope to do this in the following manner. In a short introduction I shall first expound what is meant by experience and what by mystical experience. Then I shall say something about the various possibilities of rational (logical) thinking and then I shall compare Spinoza, by way of contrast, with an undoubtedly 'real' mystic. For this purpose I have selected the well-known Dutch mystic Ruusbroec, who belongs according to some present day scholars of mysticism to the greatest mystics of all times.[2] Finally, as a small additional problem, I shall examine the question whether Spinoza's third way of knowledge, the *scienta intuitiva*, can be called the mystical way of knowledge.

First the question: What is experience? This question cannot be answered, without facing the more general problem how to acquire knowledge. Now this is one of the main problems of philosophy and I shall not be able to solve this problem here in a few words. I can only indicate some points that can easily lead to misunderstandings and that are relevant to our problem.

If I say e.g. that I have here a hand (the famous hand of G. E. Moore!), then nobody will doubt that. Still it is one of the great problems of mankind how we know that for sure. One might say: 'I see a hand'. But here we have to do with an ambiguous use of the word 'see' as Moore has so clearly pointed out.[3] For if we investigate what kind of impressions are exactly given by our senses, then we discover that these are certain impressions of colour, certain impressions of form and size, but nobody really *sees* a hand. Our mind, however, combines certain sense impressions, interprets them and gives them a certain structure.

After that we may say: 'I see a hand'. But then we use the word 'see' in a different sense. It no longer refers only to sense impressions, but to an activity of the mind as well. The German Neo-Kantian Aloys Riehl therefore characteristically formulated it like this: 'I do not see a ship, but I think a ship!'

Of course, there are several theories as to how to solve the problem of the relation between the sense data and the activities of the mind. I do not want to go into this difficult question, for our exposé does not depend on any of its solutions, provided that one distinguishes between a rational (logical) and a sensorial source of knowledge.

Experience is always a synthesis of the two sources.

All this is even more clear, if we are asked to look at something unknown. An untrained investigator sees very little under a microscope. We need some training to discover something. People who themselves paint see a greater variety of colours in a Rembrandt painting than someone who is not a connoisseur of art, etc. From this last example it may be clear that there are fields, where some people experience something and some do not. With respect to religious experience in general and mystical experience in particular two human beings may have the same 'ordinary' experiences; one will interpret these in a religious way and the other will not. It would, however, be a mistake, if we were to say that this is a characteristic of religious and mystical experience. In all experience there is some form of interpretation and activity of the mind. There remains, however, of course a great difference between religious and mystical experience on the one hand and ordinary experience on the other, in that the latter is accepted by everybody and the former is not. But the classifying and interpreting function of the mind is at the root of all experience.

Moreover our mind makes another important contribution in the acquisition of knowledge that is independent of sense impressions, viz. logic. By logic I understand the science of correct reasoning. In logic we study how to infer correctly our conclusions from certain given premises. Usually philosophers reflect less upon their logical than upon their empirical presuppositions. If a scholar e.g. acknowledges religious experience as a source of knowledge, he will as a rule clearly indicate this. This is, however, usually not the case with the presupposed logical rules. This emerges from the fact that the misunderstanding is widespread that there is only one form of logic.

There are, however, various systems of logic that still do not exclude each other. One logical system is to be seen as an 'addition' to the other. In one logical system more axioms (or rules of deduction) are valid than in another system. We call that system stronger, where more rules of deduction (or axioms) are valid and where therefore more theorems can be proved than in another system. The latter system, where less rules of deduction (or axioms) are valid ,is called stricter.

Now a variety of philosophical systems is possible. They may differ with respect to their logical and with respect to their empirical presuppositions. Therefore various systems of logical empiricism are possible.[4] I will not discuss the problems that arise here. For our purpose the following two logical systems are important, classical and dialectical logic. Classical logic is that kind of logic that is the foundation of the majority of sciences. The word 'classical' is not to be taken in opposition to 'modern'. It is in contradistinction to some stricter systems, among which especially intuitionistic logic is very important. In intuitionistic logic the 'law of excluded middle' is not valid. This kind of logic is very important for the study of the foundations of mathematics, but for the majority of sciences this kind of logic is too strict.[5] Dialectical logic does not belong to ordinary sciences with the exception perhaps of the historical sciences. Hegelian and Marxist dialectics are very important, but they have come into existence only after Spinoza. Spinoza therefore does not make any use of them. There is however another form of logic, sometimes called Platonic dialectics, that certianly also occur in Spinoza's philosophy. The name 'Platonic dialectics' might, however, lead to misunderstandings, because it also occurs in other philosophers. I propose therefore 'dialectics of the infinite' or 'dialectics of the absolute' as a name for this kind of logic. What is meant is the following. We are inclined in our thinking to jump from the finite to the infinite, or from the relative to the absolute. E.g. we reason as follows: We say of certain propositions that they are only relatively true or only true with a certain degree of probability. Now relativity and probability can only be acknowledged, if we presuppose the absolute. According to the

dialectics of the absolute we can only speak about more and less probable knowledge, if we presuppose absolutely certain knowledge. This rule of dialectics is used in many traditional proofs of God's existence. Thomas Aquinas e.g. used it in his fourth way: There are many degrees of perfection, therefore absolute perfection must be presupposed or there must be an absolutely perfect being. The fundamental conception in this kind of dialectics is that all finite things must be founded in something infinite and that all relative things must be founded in something absolute.

It is the merit of the Dutch logical philosopher E. W. Beth that he has shown by a certain formalization of this rule of the dialectics of the infinite that it cannot be maintained as a universally valid rule.[6] This does not mean that it is always invalid. But it cannot claim universal validity. Spinoza does use this rule, but he does so carefully. This use partly contributes to the mystical structure of his philosophy.

Before I demonstrate this, I think we should listen first, by way of contrast, to a 'real' mystic.

For this purpose I have selected the Dutch mystic Ruusbroec, but I could also have chosen another. The advantage of Ruusbroec, however, is, that he is closer to us than e.g. the Indian mystics. One of the characteristics of all good and great mysticism is, that it tries to lead people via various ways to experience mystic ecstasy, the *unio mystica*. There are various stages on this way, before one reaches one's goal. In a nice book *Paradijselijke visioenen* (visions of paradise) the psychiatrist J. V. Teunissen collected a series of people's testimonies of their experiences shortly before they were about to die or were in a state of apparent death.[7] These people testify that they have seen visions of a kind of paradise. Now such visions correspond with the first stages of the mystical way. The same is true for the many experiences that result from the use of drugs.[8] I do not go into the question whether such experiences have a 'real' reference or are only a product of the imagination. An interesting feature in the various mystical systems is that they resemble each other in their doctrine of the itinerary of the human soul towards the *unio mystica*. The disciple is first to give up all worldly desires and to open his mind to God's spirit. This is a process of purification, in which usually moral demands are made to the disciple. Then a stage follows in which the disciple is taught to see the world from the view point of eternity (cp. Spinoza). He sees the unity of all things in spite of their variety and learns to see himself as a part of this unity. Then finally the moment comes in which he learns to contemplate the Deity. Whether he will reach this final stage is a matter of grace. In contemplating the Deity he also passes through various stages. As for the nature and structure of the final stage of the mystical ecstasy there are different opinions about it

among the various mystics. There is a variety of view points as to the relation between the Deity and man.

According to some mystics the human soul totally submerges in the Deity. The human personality completely disappears. Other mystics deny this and according to them in some respects a duality remains between God and man. These different conceptions do not coincide with the different religions. It is not true that the dualistic form is only to be found in e.g. Christianity or Islam and the monistic form in Buddhism or Hinduism. We find both forms in all religions.

The names that are given to the various stages differ in the various religions and cultures. Thus the Hindus distinguish between *samprajñâta samâdhi* (conscious ecstasy) and *asamprajñâta samâdhi* (unconscious ecstasy).

Buddhists know the *Nirvana* as their final stage. Before reaching this, one has to pass through the stages of reflection and meditation (*vitakka-vicâra*, in original Sanskrit: *vitarka-vicâra*), the stages of bliss and spiritual satisfaction (*pîti-sukham*), the stages of equanimity, consciousness and satisfaction (*upekkha* / in original Sanskrit *upeksha* /, *sati, sukham*), and the stages of completion of the equanimity and consciousness (*upekkha – sati – parisuddhi*). Pseudo – Jamblichus, a Neo-Platonist, knows an introductory stage (εἶδος συναγωγόν) the stage of communion (εἶδος κοινωνίας) and the stage of unity (ἕνωσις). The Mohammedan Ghazali knows the following stages: (i) concentration of energy, (ii) deep absorbation and finally (iii) the termination of self-consciousness, the submersion in God.

The Spanish mystic Teresa di Jesu knows the stages of meditation (*recogimento*), rest (*quietud*), union (*union*) and rapture of the soul (*arrobamiento*). We could continue this enumeration indefinitely.[9] Ruusbroec, who, by the way, had a great influence on French and Spanish mystics, such as Teresa di Jesu, John of the Cross and others, describes very carefully the various stages in the itinerary of the soul towards its God. As a good pedagogue he indicates the various dangers that threaten the human soul on its way. In particular he repeatedly warns against the temptation to look for a quick way to ecstasy by neglecting moral purification. The stage of this moral purification has to precede the ascent of the mystic ladder. Sometimes it seems, as if he directs his warning to our 'hippies', who indeed want some kind of ecstasy, but not the preceding moral purification. The various stages are described by Ruusbroec in his main work *Die Gheestelike Brulocht* (Spiritual Marriage), also available in several English translations. The first stage is that of cleansing and purification. It is the stage of the working life. Humility is its foundation. It is the mother of all virtues (cp. also the fundamental role of the *humilitas* in Geulincx's ethics, a fellow countryman of Spinoza and his contemporary; Spinoza, by the way, did not consider humility a

virtue!) Then the stage of the longing for God comes. Ruusbroec describes here, how the soul more and more opens itself for the coming of its Lord. The intellect is illuminated, the will is subjugated. Then the union with God takes place. In this final stage we reach our original image, our ideal self, such as it exists in God without sin. We contemplate thus the threefold God and submerge in Him. Ruusbroec writes his book as a sermon on the text: 'Siet de brudegom comt; gaet ute Hem te ontmoete' (Behold, the bridegroom cometh; go ye out to meet him, Breviarium Romanum, Officium of The Virgins, 7th lesson, cp. Matthew 25:6). This text is elaborated on for all the stages in a splendid language and style. Ruusbroec's mysticism is a beautiful synthesis of the so-called Christ mysticism and the Trinity mysticism. The soul is primarily unified with its Saviour, Jesus Christ, but finally with the whole Trinity. Also with respect to the *unio mystica* Ruusbroec has an interesting, original conception. In Christian dogmatics a distinction is made between the three persons of the Trinity and the one divine essence. In Ruusbroec's contemplating vision there is an eternal rhythm in God: the three persons enter the one essence and emanate from it in a permanent fluctuation. When united with God, man as creature 'hangs' in his uncreated image in God and follows the divine rhythm in a fluctuating movement of resting and working, consciousness and unconsciousness, emanating and submerging in the *wiselose* (undistinguished) unity. However, Ruusbroec does not remove the distinction between God and man. What is supra-essential for us, is essential for God, i.e. life in eternal bliss is given to us in an act of grace on God's part, it is never our work or merit. Ruusbroec vehemently opposes those mystics, who identify themselves with God and say, that they are Christ themselves or God and that their hand has created heaven and earth.[10] Ruusbroec takes this standpoint especially in his book *Dat Boecsken der Verclaringhe* (The booklet of Explanation), which he wrote as an answer to questions put by the Carthusians in Herne. In this book Ruusbroec describes, how in the pre-ultimate stage the soul, the created image, is unified with its uncreated original image in God in a threefold way. Threefold, because Ruusbroec, in accordance with the Augustinian tradition, sees the soul as God's image in a threefold way, because the Trinity (God) is threefold. The soul consists of memory (*memoria*), intellect (*intellectus*) and will (*voluntas*). The unity of the soul is experienced in *ledicheit* (emptiness), i.e. undistinguished one-ness. But a creature never becomes God, because this unity only exists thanks to an act of grace and the condescending love of God. The soul experiences its distinction from God. There remains in the soul a continuing inclination (*een weselijc voerweert-neygen*) (i.e., according to the context, a permanent inclination to break the union with God).[11] All this, however, is only the pre-ultimate stage. In the final and

highest stage the union of the soul and God takes place in such a way, that the soul no longer experiences a distinction during its participation in God's essential bliss (*ghebruken, fruitio*). This bliss is enjoyed in a unity with God. The soul submerges in a delightful abyss, in a 'darkness' (*demsterheit*), where the three persons of the Trinity are one.[12] But in the same way as God is three and one, personal and impersonal, in a constant rhythm, so is the soul, participating in the divine, experiencing and not experiencing its distinction from God. But, even when the soul does not *experience* its distinction from God, this distinction still exists!

Ruusbroec, in his attempts to describe the mystical raptures, repeats things constantly and very often says the same things twice although in different words. This is a typical feature of the mystic style. At the end of his work, Ruusbroec indicates that rest and unity are the highest, but not the only required stage. There remains a rhythm of entering and emanating, resting and working. Human nature does not perish. Ruusbroec's mysticism is consequently not without social features and he also takes a critical point of view towards the empirical church.[13] Although, according to Ruusbroec, the union with God is beyond reason, the latter remains and so does our sensory life. The soul always get an impulse towards the world, but it works now in a divine spirit in unity with God, returning, if God wills it, to God unifying itself with Him.[14]

So it may be clear that Ruusbroec's mysticism is a magnificent synthesis of working and resting, rational and supra-rational thinking, submerging in and emerging from God.

If we, after this excursion, return to Spinoza, it may be clear that Spinoza's philosophy is totally different. Even his style is completely different: no repetitions, no attemps to say the inexpressible, etc., but the clear language of definitions, axioms, propositions, postulates, etc.

Moreover, in contradistinction to Ruusbroec and many other mystics, Spinoza does not give moral instructions. In the third and fourth part of his *Ethica* he aims at a description of the human emotions (*affectus*) in a pure neutral, 'geometrical' way, as if they were lines, planes and bodies (IIIPraef). In this he does not only differ from Ruusbroec, but also from a moral philosopher like Seneca, whose *epistolae morales* are much more like a church sermon than Spinoza's letters or *Ethica*. And, nowhere does Spinoza describe the *unio mystica* or the *contemplatio Dei*. From this we cannot of course conclude beyond any doubt that Spinoza does not have any mystic experience, but according to me, this conclusion may be drawn with all the probability, necessary in science. For it is a characteristic feature of those, who have indeed had mystical experiences, to testify to their truth. Moreover, even if Spinoza had mystical experiences, then at

least they do not play any role in his philosophical argumentations. Nevertheless, Spinoza's philosophy has a mystical structure. His conception of contemplating the world and the human self *sub specie aeternitatis* has many parallels in mysticism. And when we read in Spinoza's *Ethica* (VP22) that God necessarily has an idea that expresses the essence of the human body *sub specie aeternitatis*, we are reminded of the uncreated original image of man, that occurs as God's idea in Ruusbroec's mysticism. Of course, there remains a difference, in that Spinoza speaks of the idea of the human *body*, which need not astonish us, in view of Spinoza's parallelism between body and soul. And if we love God with an *amor intellectualis*, an offspring from the third way of knowledge (VP33), then this love is a part of the love, with which God loves Himself (VP36). This is a clear example of the mystical doctrine of participation.

It was, however, not necessary for Spinoza to have mystical experiences in order to acquire this mystical structure of his philosophy. For this it is sufficient to reason according to certain logical rules and to accept certain axioms with respect to the structure of reality. In the beginning of our exposé I indicated that many philosophers introduce the dialectics of infinity, which permits them to jump from the finite to the infinite, from the relative to the absolute. This might easily lead to a mystical conception, because the finite might then be seen as a part of the infinite. I shall now shortly investigate some of the logical rules that are presupposed in Spinoza in order to see, how the mystical structure of his philosophy emerges from his axioms.

Spinoza's *Ethica* is written in a 'geometrical' way. We would nowadays say: in an axiomatic way. Spinoza speaks of his method as geometrical, because he thought of the treatment of the subject in the way of Euclid's *Elements*, which consists of geometry. However, it is not the geometrical figures, but the way the subject is treated with the help of definitions, axioms, etc., that is relevant. Therefore it is better to speak of an axiomatic method.

According to modern methods Spinoza makes an omission in not indicating his deduction rules, although he does indicate his definitions and axioms. With the help of a deduction rule one indicates how to draw certain conclusions from some given premisses. But although Spinoza does not indicate his rules of deduction explicitly, we can infer them from the way in which he argues. And it is clear that Spinoza works in his *Ethica* with some generally accepted deduction rules that are well known in classical logic. I shall give some examples from the beginning of his *Ethica*. The rule that is mostly used is the so called *modus ponendo ponens*. In symbolic logic:

$$\frac{p \rightarrow q \qquad p}{q}$$

The premisses stand above the line, the conclusion stands below it. The expression 'p→q' means: ""p" implies "q"". Spinoza proves the first four propositions in his *Ethica* with the help of this deduction rule. In the demonstration of the fifth proposition another rule of deduction is used, viz. the *reductio ad absurdum*. By hypothesis we presuppose something and prove that this hypothesis leads to contradictions. From this we conclude to the opposite of the presupposed hypothesis. If we supposed the negation of some state of affairs, '–p' (the negation of 'p'), and this leads to contradiction, then we may according to classical logic conclude to 'p'. This conclusion is not permitted in all logical systems. In intuitionistic logic e.g. we are only permitted to conclude to '–(–p)'. According to classical logic this is equivalent to 'p', which is not the case in intuitionistic logic. Spinoza uses classical logic. Another rule that is used by Spinoza is the so called *modus tollendo ponens*. Its form is:

p v q
–p
———
q

First we state that there are two possibilities ('p v q'). Then we demonstrate that one of the possibilities is not possible, i.e. that its negation is true ('–p'). From this we conclude to the truth of the other possibility ('q'). By removing one possibility (tollendo) we state (ponens) the other possibility. An example of this rule is to be found in the demonstration of IP8. Spinoza wants to prove that every substance is infinite. He states that every substance is by nature either finite or infinite. Then he demonstrates that the substance (in the sense Spinoza uses this word) cannot be finite, ergo: the substance exists as infinite (IP8Dem).

In his use of the rules mentioned above Spinoza remains within the limits of classical logic. The rule of dialectics of infinity is introduced with the help of two axioms. The difference between a rule of inference and an axiom is that the latter is a statement in the system and the former is an operation rule. It indicates how to get certain conclusions from given premisses. All axioms can be transformed into operation rules. The opposite is not true, although most deduction rules *can* be transformed into axioms. As a matter of fact the three deduction rules mentioned above can indeed be transformed into axioms.

To introduce a rule of deduction in the form of an axiom therefore is, also according to a modern point of view, unimpeachable. Spinoza only made an omission by not indicating any rule of deduction; he only used some.

This omission was, however, not a personal mistake on the part of Spinoza, but a fault of his time. Generally speaking one can restrict the number of deduction rules by extending the number of axioms and

vice versa. Non trivial systems without rules of deduction are impossible, but systems without axioms are possible. We then get the systems of the so-called natural deduction (Gentzen).[15]

The axiom with the help of which Spinoza introduces the dialectics of infinity and the mystical structure of participation into his philosophy, is the first axiom in the first book of the *Ethica*: 'Omnia quae sunt, vel in se, vel in alio sunt' (Everything which exists exists either in itself or in something else). With the help of this axiom Spinoza can prove that there is only one substance that necessarily exists in itself (IP6Cor,IP7) and that everything, including all finite things, are founded in the infinite (IP15). The finite things cannot be understood by themselves and they can therefore not exist in themselves. Thus, according to axiom 1 mentioned above, they must be in God. They are nothing else than *modi* or *affectiones* of God's attributes (IP25Cor).

The dialectical jump from the finite to the infinite is *prima facie* hidden in Spinoza's philosophy, because he starts with the infinite substance (God). In the midst of his system, however, he goes the other way round in that he proves that we can only know two of God's attributes, viz. *cogitatio* and *extensio*, because we only know the modi of these attributes in the finite things, especially in ourselves (IIP1,2; Ep64).

Thus Spinoza can develop his doctrine that we can only understand man as a *res cogitans et extensa* (a thinking and extended thing) if we see him founded in the infinite, as a *pars Dei*, as a part of God. Now Spinoza reasons very carefully. Many philosophers make the jump from the finite to the infinite in that they say: we cannot continue the series of causes *ad infinitum*, ergo there must be a first cause, a *causa prima*.

According to Spinoza this infinite series is certainly possible. We can continue this series of causes into the infinite, but the series taken as a whole has to be founded in God (IP28Dem and Sch; IILm3 after P13; IP15). In a short excursion below I shall indicate that by this improvement Spinoza's proof of an *ens necessarium* (a necessary being) can be reformulated so that it becomes acceptable by modern standards, although of course only within the limits of certain presuppositions.

A second rule that leads to a mystical structure in Spinoza's philosophy, is his conception that there is a parallelism between thinking and being. Spinoza formulates the foundation of this parallelism in the fourth axiom of *Ethica* I: 'Effectus cognitio cognitione causae dependet, et eandem involvit' (The knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of a cause, and involves the same). Perhaps we might not immediately have been aware that the parallelism mentioned above is involved here, if Spinoza himself had not drawn this conclusion. For from this axiom he immediately concludes to the proposition that expresses this parallelism (IIP7): 'Ordo et connexio idearum

idem est, ac ordo et connexio rerum' (The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things). Apparently Spinoza says in IAx4: In the same way as the effect depends on its cause in *reality*, the *knowledge* of the effect depends on the knowledge of the cause and vice versa. From this the parallelism should be evident.

With the help of this doctrine of the parallelism and the doctrine that everything is founded in God, Spinoza can establish the mystical structure of his philosophy. Without this doctrine of the parallelism between thinking and reality we should still have said nothing definitively about the relation between God and his creatures: This relation could still be that of a Creator and creature in the Christian (or Jewish, Mohammedan) sense. But because of this parallism it is necessary to state that in the same way as one proposition is included in another proposition, so what is referred to by these propositions in reality must be included in each other. And therefore, if things are to be inferred from God in a framework of *thought*, because the ideas that are related to them are involved in the idea of God, they must also be included in God in reality, because they are a part of God.

Short excursion: Recent logical investigations in modal logic have demonstrated that in certain logical systems the cosmological argument can be reformulated and its validity can be proved. This argument is not valid in the strictest systems of modal logic, but it is valid indeed in the classical system of modal logic (S_5), a system that is more or less a formalization of Theophrast's system of modal logic. It is interesting to note that these new investigations have made clear that the cosmological argument has mostly been formulated incorrectly. The cosmological argument tries to prove that there is an *ens necessarium*. This entails that we have to prove the necessity of a certain state of affairs. In symbolic logic: we have to prove 'Lq', where 'L' is the necessity functor, out of certain premises. Now usually these premises are formulated incorrectly. Very often it is said that we may presuppose the existence of the world, or of something in the world and that this has only a contingent existence, i.e. that its negation is also possible. Further it is said that we have to ask for its necessary ground. And here the mistake creeps in. If we formulate the premises mentioned above in modern symbolic logic, we get: 'p & Kp & L(p→q)' (where 'K' is the contingency functor). Now from these premises 'Lq' cannot be inferred. But if we ask for the necessary ground of the possibilities of all that which exists, then the cosmological argument is valid. In symbolic logic: if the premises are 'p & Kp & L (Mp→q)' or 'p & Kp & L (Kp→q)' then 'Lq' can be inferred. In ordinary language: If we want to prove God as *prima causa*, i.e. as the first cause in a series of causes (grounds), then this argument is invalid. But if we want to prove in accordance with Spinoza's conception of God's causality, this argument is valid. Because we do not want to prove God as a prima causa, but as the ground of a series of grounds *(causae)*. In passing: Spinoza did not make any distinction between causes that function in time and grounds that need not function in time.
In order to avoid Kant's criticism it is better to make this distinction and to speak of grounds instead of causes, if we deal with the cosmological argument. It is interesting that in this cosmological argument there is no longer any use of doubtful dialectical rules, because the proof is valid in the classical modal

logical system S_5. Therefore in Spinoza's philosophy the important propositions 11, 15 and 28 in *Ethica* I can be proved by means of a certain reformulation with the help of classical modal logic only. However, we acquire the total mystical structure of participation by adding the doctrine of parallelism as we have seen. Furthermore I do not pretend that the cosmological argument is valid in an absolute sense. It is only valid with certain premises.[16]

My conclusion is that the mystical structure of Spinoza's philosophy is completely determined by logical rules. These rules are to be inferred from his system, because he does not indicate them clearly. But whatever criticism of my exposé might be possible in detail, I do not think it is necessary to refer to some mystical experiences on the part of Spinoza in order to explain this mystical structure. Especially if we compare Spinoza with a 'real' mystic the differences in form and foundations are too obvious. These differences in form also lead to differences in content. I shall point towards some aspects.

Ruusbroec's mysticism has a clear Christian character. Scripture is his starting-point. The role of Jesus Christ is fundamental in the soul's itinerary towards its mystical bliss. Although Spinoza speaks of Jesus Christ in lofty terms, it is clear that he does not accept the fundamental dogmas of the Christian faith, i.e. the doctrine of incarnation and resurrection (Ep73,78). Further: Ruusbroec's God is the threefold God of Christian dogma, whereas Spinoza's conception of God is purely philosophical, although Spinoza gives some subordinate place to a more religious conception of God in his philosophy. A point of similarity between the two God-conceptions is that they both have personal and impersonal features. But even here there are differences. In Ruusbroec the three persons of the Trinity submerge, in an eternal rhythm, in the one divine essence, and it is the latter that has impersonal traits. In Spinoza the essence of God is formed by *potentia* (to be translated by power, energy). This *potentia* is determined essentially by the divine attributes. We know only two of these attributes, *extensio* and *cogitatio*. This *cogitatio* is not to be interpreted personally in the complete sense of being personal, but as Spinoza does know the thinking of thinking, the *idea ideae* as a part of a *cogitatio cogitationis*, there is a kind of self-reflection in the attribute *cogitatio*. And this leads to the concept of a certain self-consciousness in God.[17] These personal traits in God are, however, weakened by Spinoza's identification of will and intellect (IIP49Cor). However, H. de Dijn's interpretation in his (in other respects) brilliant dissertation that God's attribute *cogitatio*, and thus God himself as *res cogitans* does not think, seems to me absurd.[18]

Also with respect to the doctrine of immortality there are similarities and differences between Ruusbroec and Spinoza. In Ruusbroec the soul as created being 'hangs' in its original image in God and is unified in this way with God. We saw that Spinoza too teaches such an idea

in God. But we do not find in Spinoza any trace of the divine rhythm, in which the soul participates according to Ruusbroec. Still Spinoza does know an immortality of the soul, in contradistinction to the body, thus violating his doctrine of parallelism between thinking and extension.[19] Sometimes Spinoza's doctrine of immortality is interpreted as follows: only an abstract general idea of man remains in God. This is not true. What remains after death is the *essentia particularis* of each soul, which remains to exist in God as an eternal idea. Of course, there is in Spinoza no belief in a heaven in the Christian sense of the word.

Eternity is not the same for everyone. Spinoza thinks in quantitative categories. The more a soul has knowledge of the second and third way, the more the soul loves God with an *amor intellectualis* and the greater will be the part of the soul that survives death (VP38 Dem and Schol).[20] In Ruusbroec it is important for the soul to submit itself to the will of God. This is alien to Spinoza. According to him it is impossible for a free autonomous human being to submit itself to the will of anyone else, even if this is a divine being. For him it is relevant that man learns to see the necessary connection of all things and knows that they all necessarily emanate from God. Then man acquires the rest of the mind (*acquiescentia mentis*), in which his happiness exists (VP27). If we also gain the insight that our fellow-men do not have a free will, we shall hate them less and thus we shall no longer be a prisoner of our passions: 'Love and hatred towards a thing, which we conceive to be free, must, other conditions being similar, be greater than if it were felt towards a thing acting by necessity' (IIIP49).

So I hope to have made it plausible that Spinoza's philosophy has a mystical structure, but that this is based on logical principles and not on mystical experiences. Whether one therefore wants to call Spinoza a mystic is a matter of definition and taste.

Is such a mystical interpretation necessarily connected with an idealistic interpretation of Spinoza? I do not think so. As is well known, dialectical materialism (Marxism) in particular gives a materialistic interpretation of Spinoza.[21] If this is tantamount to identifying God with extension or matter, then such an interpretation is clearly false, because Spinoza clearly teaches a parallelism between thinking and extension and he sometimes emphasizes the attribute *cogitatio* even more, as we have seen in the doctrine of immortality.[22] But on the other hand we have seen above that God's essence is constituted by *potentia*: 'Dei potentia est ipsa ipsius essentia' (God's power is the same as his essence) (IP34).

Now *cogitatio* and *extensio* express the same *potentia* (IDf4). If one defines materialism as the doctrine of the real existence of the external world, a common conception in dialectical materialism, then a material-

istic interpretation of Spinoza is certainly possible.[23] But according to me Spinoza's philosophy can hardly be completely covered by either the index idealism or that of materialism. He is in this respect (with his doctrine of parallelism) a great original thinker.

We have seen above that a distinction may be made between classical logic and the dialectics of infinity. Are we allowed to identify this distinction with that between the second and third way of knowledge in Spinoza's philosophy? And is this equivalent to identifying the third way of knowledge with a mystical way? Of course, we are tempted to do so. De Deugd in his interesting dissertation has pointed out, that we have to be careful not to overrate the importance of the third way of knowledge, because Spinoza says in his *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* (§ 22), that he, until then, has acquired little knowledge in this third way.[24] In the fifth part of the *Ethica*, however, this kind of knowledge plays a great role, but Spinoza does not indicate clearly, what is understood by it.

Occasionally he gives some characteristics of this kind of knowledge. It is the knowledge of the particular essences in and through God.[25] It is a knowledge that is direct and intuitionistic; that goes from the adequate idea of the formal (= real) essence of some of God's attributes to the knowledge of the essences of the things. It is knowledge that is characterised by a clear and distinct concept, that is gained, when we know things by their proximate cause (KVIICap1v; TIE19; IIP40Sch; IIP47Sch; VP25Dem; VP36Sch). But in spite of all these characteristics it is not clear, which propositions in the *Ethica* are acquired by this kind of knowledge. We have seen above that the mystical structure of Spinoza's philosophy is acquired by using certain logical deduction rules that were present in some axioms. I agree with De Dijn that the axiomatic method belongs to the second way of knowledge. Therefore I am inclined to say that Spinoza's mysticism is, generally speaking, founded on the second way of knowledge and not on the third way. But on the other hand Spinoza occasionally gives instead of or in addition to the laborious way of a proof with the help of preceding propositions, definitions and axioms, a direct demonstration, in which he infers the proposition that is to be proved directly from the definitions (of God). An example is the demonstration of proposition 1 in *Ethica* II (scholium). And this proposition points towards some mystical element in Spinoza's philosophy in that here it is proved that God is an *ens cogitans* and that the *singulares cogitationes* are *modi* of the attribute *cogitatio*. This is first proved in the *demonstratio* in the usual way, but in the *scholium* a direct proof is given by means of definitions 4 and 6 of *Ethica* I. We find other examples of such a direct proof in IP9Dem and VP30Dem.

And such direct proofs by means of definitions of God are, I think,

clear examples of the third way of knowledge: 'by all these characterizations of the third kind of knowledge Spinoza means to say that it is knowledge attained from what he would call a true definition'.[26]- But even so, direct knowledge by means of definitions is not knowledge by means of mystical experience. And therefore the answer to the interesting question, what precisely belongs to the third way of knowledge is not relevant to the main thesis of this article. And the main thesis was, to repeat, that Spinoza's mysticism is not founded on mystical experience but on logic and rational thinking. And at the same time we may see corroborated that mysticism and rational thinking do not exclude each other. We have many other examples in the history of human thought, especially in Indian philosophy that are outstanding in logic and mysticism.

I hope that this article may clarify some concepts and methods and clarification certainly is *e mente Spinozae* (in Spinoza's spirit).

NOTES

[1] F. Sassen, *Wijsgerig leven in Nederland in de twintigste eeuw,* Amsterdam[3] 1960, p.94.

[2] Cp. R. C. Zaehner, *Mysticism. Sacred and Profane. An Inquiry into some Varieties of Praeternatural Experience,* Oxford, 1957. 170ff; 204ff.

[3] Cp. G. E. Moore, *Some Main Problems of Philosophy,* London[3] 1962 p.183, 241f.

[4] H. G. Hubbeling, *Language, Logic and Criterion. A Defence of Non-Positivistic Logical Empiricism,* Amsterdam/Assen 1971, p.25ff.

[5] Cp. H. G. Hubbeling, *o.c.* § 3.3ff.

[6] E. W. Beth, 'Historical studies in traditional philosophy' (*Synthese,* 1946/7, p.248-260);
E. W. Beth, 'The prehistory of research into foundation' (*British Journal of Philosophy of Science,* 1952/3, p.58-81).

[7] J. V. Theunissen, *Paradijselijke visioenen,* Den Haag 1971.

[8] R. C. Zaehner, *o.c.*, p.109ff,199,208ff.

[9] Cp. F. Heiler, *Das Gebet,* München[5] 1923, p.312ff. I shall give a short elucidation of the mystic terms used in the text: The word 'samâdhi' is built up from the roots 'sam-' and 'dhi-'; 'sam-' is related to the Greek 'σύν' and means together (Dutch *samen*); 'dhi-' is related to the Greek root 'ϑε-' or 'ϑη-' (τίϑημι) and means 'to put, to place' (cp. T. Burrow, *The Sanskrit Language,* London 1965, p.68). 'samâdhi' therefore meant originally 'to put together', then 'to put thoughts together', 'to concentrate', 'abstract meditation'. It is the eighth and final stage in yoga. In Buddhism 'samâdhi' is the final (fourth) stage of Dhyâna or intensive, abstract meditation. (M. Monier-Williams (et al.), *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary,* London[5] 1970, p.1159 s.v. 'samâdhi'). 'Samprajñâta' is built up from the root 'sam-' that we already know; 'pra-', which is related to the Latin 'pro' (for) (T. Burrow, *o.c.*, p.285) and the root 'jñâ' that is related to the Greek root 'γνω-' (to know) (T. Burrow, *o.c.*, p.342). 'Prajñâ' means 'to know', 'prajñâta' means 'known' and 'samprajñâta' means 'known exactly'. The 'a-' in 'a-samprajñâta' is the 'α-privans' also known in Greek and Latin. It is the 'a-' that negates the word that follows. 'asamprajñâta' means thus: 'no longer known in the way of

making distinctions' (cp. M.Monier-Williams, *o.c.*, p.425;659,1174 s.v. 'jñâ', 'prajñâ' and 'samprajñâta').
Many Indian philosophers point toward the danger of the stage of the 'samprajñâta samâdhi', because this is the pre-ultimate stage before the proper absorption in God.
The raptures of this stage seduce many mystics so that they do not feel any need to go further on their mystic way (cp. H. Zimmer, *Philosophies of India*, New York, 1957, p.435ff.).
'Vitarka' is built up from the roots 'vi-' and 'tarka-'. 'Vi-' means 'apart', 'toward all directions'; 'tarka' (at a distance related to the Latin *torquere*, to turn) meant originally 'to guess', then 'to think'. 'Vitarka' means 'to think toward all directions' (cp. T. Burrows, *o.c.*, p.286 s.v. 'vi-'; M. Monier-Williams, *o.c.*, p.439, 962, s.v. 'tarka', 'vitarka'). 'vicara' is a combination of 'vi-', which we already know, and the root 'car-' which means 'to move'; 'vicara' originally meant 'to move in all directions', then 'to move the mind in all directions', to contemplate'. In this stage the mind, however intense its thinking may be, easily goes astray (M. Monier-Williams, *o.c.*, p.389, 958, s.v. 'car', and 'vicara'). In the next stage the soul already reaches bliss (sukham). 'Sukham' is built up from 'su-' and 'kha-'; 'su-' corresponds with the Greek 'ευ' and means 'good, well'; 'kha' meant orginally holow (cp. the Greek χάος), then the vault of heaven, firmament; 'sukham' means 'the benignant firmament', "lucky stars", which indicates influence of astrology. 'Sukham' also means 'joy, bliss, satisfaction'.
The second Buddhist stage already gives the soul bliss and happiness, which is to be intensified, if the soul learns 'upeksha', *the sancta indifferentia*, the holy indifference towards all wordly joy. (cp. M. Monier-Williams, *o.c.*, p.215,1221, s.v. 'upeksha', 'sukham'; H. Zimmer, *o.c.*, p.122). In the final stage before the Nirvana 'parisuddhi' is needed, a total moral purification (cp. also Ruusbroec). 'Parisuddhi' consists of 'pari' which means 'around' (cp. the Greek (περί); 'suddha' means 'purified', the substantive 'parisuddhi' means a 'purification that takes place from all sides, i.e. a complete purification'. 'Sati' is from the root 'sat-'. This means 'actual, real, good' (cp. T. Burrow, *o.c.*, p.285, s.v. 'pari'; M. Monier-Williams, *o.c.*, p.591, 1082,1134, s.v. 'pari', 'parisuddha', 'sat'; H. Zimmer, *o.c.*, p.24,166, s.v. 'sat', 'sati').
Just as in Ruusbroec we see in Hindu and Buddhist mysticism a renouncing of the world, a moral purification and a submerging in God. There remain of course differences.
Ruusbroec's rhythm is not found in Hindu mysticism, although other kinds of rhythms may be found in this mysticism. There are also differences between Hindu and Buddhist mysticism. In Buddhist mysticism the 'I' disappears, which as a matter of fact does not have a substantial being in Buddhist philosophy. In Hindu mysticism the 'I' is extended until it takes in the whole world. We cannot go into the various interesting details and the many differences between Hindu mystics, such as the more realistic, personal conception of Ramanuja and the more idealistic, impersonal conception of Sankara, etc.

[10] Jan van Ruusbroec, *Een spieghel der eeuwigher salicheit*, III-B-5-g-2 (*Werken*, Mechelen/Amsterdam, 1932, III, p.191) (edited by the Ruusbroec Society in Antwerpen).

[11] Jan van Ruusbroec, *Dat Boecsken der Verclaringhe, Werken*, III, p.292f.

[12] Jan van Ruusbroec, *o.c.*, p.293f.

[13] Cp. Jan van Ruusbroec, *Van den gheesteliken tabernakel, Werken II*, § 129 (p.285ff.).
Therefore the positive evaluation of the Marxists for certain aspects of mysticism is understandable: G. Klaus and M. Buhr, *Philosophisches Wörter-*

buch, Leipzig 1964, p.367ff; E. Agricola (ed.), *Die deutsche Sprache*, Leipzig 1969, p.481f.

[14] Jan van Ruusbroec, *Dat Boecsken der Verclaringhe*, Werken III, p.296f.

[15] G. Gentzen, 'Untersuchungen über das logische Schliessen' (*Mathematische Zeitschrift* 1935, p.176-210; 405-431); now also available in English translation in: *The Collected Papers of Gerhard Gentzen* (ed. M. E. Szabo), Amsterdam 1969, p.68-132. The present day most usual way to use the rules of natural deduction is to be found in F. B. Fitch, *Symbolic Logic. An Introduction*, New York 1952.

[16] H. G. Hubbeling, *o.c.*, § 8. 19ff. It is interesting to note that the same results can be obtained with the help of symbolic logic as by means of modern set theory. This does not mean that the 'absolute' validity of the cosmological argument is proved. We can only draw the borderlines of its validity sharper than before. The rest of the note might be too technical for those who do not have a preceding training in symbolic (modal) logic and set theory.
As far as logic is concerned, the cosmological argument cannot be given in any system that is stricter than S_5.
We will now give the proof hinted at in the text. In my book mentioned above I gave a proof with the help of the axiomatic system expounded in G. E. Hughes and M. J. Cresswell, *An Introduction to Modal Logic*, London 1968. Now I should like to give it in another variant using Fitch's system of natural deduction (cp. note 20). The technical details in order to understand the proof are given in Hughes and Cresswell, *o.c.*, p.331ff. The fundamental idea is to use necessity deduction with strict reiterations so as to prove necessity. The various systems have different restrictions on the use of strict reiteration.
We shall give only one proof. The other resembles it very closely. We shall deduce 'Lq' from 'p & Kp & L(Kp→q)'
Proof:

1. p & Kp & L(Kp→q)			premise
2. Kp			1, elimination of the conjunction
3. L(Kp→q)			1, elimination of the conjunction
4.	□	Kp→q	3, strict reiteration
5.		Kp	2, strict reiteration
6.		q	4,5, elimination of the implication *(modus ponens)*
7. Lq			6, introduction of the necessity.

Step 5 is only permitted in S_5. Therefore in the other systems the proof is not valid. It may also be clear that from the premises 'p & Kp & L(p→q)' we cannot deduce 'Lq', because we are not permitted to reiterate 'p' in the strict reiteration and therefore cannot deduce in the necessity deduction 'q' from 'p→q' and 'p', because 'p' is not available.
Also in set theory one has to refer to classical, i.e. non-constructivistic principles, in order to establish the cosmological argument. That means that one has to appeal to one of the following principles, which are inferable among each other: (i) the axiom of choice, (ii) the axiom of well ordering (Zermelo's axiom), (iii) Zorn's lemma. If we want to prove the cosmological argument, we want to prove that there is an *ens necessarium*. The presuppositions are, that there is a world (or that there is at least something) and that everything has a necessary ground or more negatively: 'ex nihilo nihil fit' (nothing comes into being from nothing). With the help of set theory we want to order the various grounds. Now, we are not permitted, I think, to suppose that the series of grounds automatically form a totally or even partially ordered set. Should this be the case then the proof is much easier. But we may first execute a partition of all the grounds. With this we get

equivalence classes A_1, A_2, A_3, A_4, etc. whose members are found according to the specification 'grounds that are connected to each other'. They are put in the same class. We take e.g. an arbitrary ground 'a_1' and we put all the grounds that have some connection to 'a_1' in the same class. Out of the remaining grounds we take again an arbitrary ground 'a_n' and put all the grounds that are connected to it in the following class, etc. And grounds are connected if there is in some way some relation of the grounds to each other, in that either the one is the ground of the other or that they have both a common ground. Now, the number of grounds may be infinite, but as the *kinds* (species) of grounds are not infinite the number of equivalence classes found according to the specification mentioned above is finite. But I admit that the specification itself is non-constructivistic, so that the whole proof already presupposes non-constructivistic principles. When we have the various equivalence classes, then we can establish a total or a partial ordening relation *within* these equivalence classes. For the relation 'being the ground of' itself is for things that are connected with each other in the sense given above a transitive, anti-symmetrical (and reflexive) relation. But now we have to ask further for the relation 'being the ground of' between the equivalence classes themselves. We can in this way establish an at least partially ordered set B (of equivalence classes A_1, A_2, A_3, etc). This is also a directed set, because of two classes of grounds we may always ask, whether one class is the ground of the other or whether they have a common ground. We have seen that this set B is finite. Because of its finiteness and its directedness this set B has a last element (cp. H. Gericke, *Theorie der Verbände*, Mannheim 1967, p.38). This last element, the set A_n, may be called the set of 'divine' grounds. It may be compared with Spinoza's natura naturans and infinite natura naturata, or in other words with God's attributes and His infinite *modi*. We might even continue asking for the ground of the series of grounds in A_n and thus come to the divine substance as the ground of the infinite modi, etc. It has been Spinoza's genius that he has seen, that indeed the series of grounds *(causae)* might be infinite, but that we have to continue asking for the ground of this whole series. And only in this way can we give a valid argument for God's existence. It remains of course an open question whether this is permitted – it has anyhow some plausibility – and whether we should appeal to such systems as S_5 in logic or non-constructivistic principles in set theory.

[17] Cp. IIP43 and Sch: Thinking is not mute, Spinoza says, but it is the *intelligere* itself (understanding itself), it is understanding and understanding of understanding, etc.; cp. H. G. Hubbeling, *Spinoza's Methodology*, Assen[2] 1967, p.36.

[18] H. de Dijn, *De Epistemologie van Spinoza*, Diss. Leuven, p.3.

[19] Cp. H. G. Hubbeling, *o.c.*, p.70ff.

[20] Cp. H. G. Hubbeling, *o.c.*, p.69ff.

[21] Cp. e.g. T. de Vries, *Baruch de Spinoza*, Hamburg 1970 (now also available in Dutch): Geschichte der Philosophie (edited by the Academy of Sciences in the USSR), Volume I, Chapter V, 5 (p.371ff); I. A. Konikow, Материализм Спинозы, ('Spinoza's materialism), Moscow 1971.

[22] H. G. Hubbeling, *o.c.*, p.36ff, 84; J. G. van der Bend, *Het Spinozisme van Dr. J. D. Bierens de Haan*, Diss. Groningen, p.85ff., 160ff.

[23] Cp. W. I. Lenin, Материализм и Эмпериокритицизм (Materialism and Empiriocriticism) (*Works*, vol. 14).

[24] Cp. C. de Deugd, *The Significance of Spinoza's First Kind of Knowledge*, Diss. Utrecht 1966, p.158ff.

[25] Cp. also H. de Dijn *o.c.*, p.239ff.

[26] H. A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, New York[2] 1960, II p.142.

LEE C. RICE

METHODOLOGY AND MODALITY IN THE FIRST PART OF SPINOZA'S *ETHICS*

1. INTRODUCTION: GEOMETRICAL METHOD

It is difficult to find a real starting point for a study of Spinoza's methodology; for, while he states that we know all things in God, on the other hand his concept of God is deeply rooted in his methodology. It should also be emphasized, in sharp contrast with the conclusions drawn by one of Spinoza's recent commentators,[1] that there is no such thing as *the* methodology of Spinoza, except perhaps in some rather vague sense of 'orientation' or 'attitude'. Even a cursory reading will indicate that his method in the *Ethics* is far different from his method in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus,* which also differs from that of the unfinished *Tractatus Politicus*; and that all of these methodologies differ from that taken by Spinoza in dealing with the integration of experimental results into a physical system.[2] I have argued elsewhere[3] that, in his attitude toward sensory data generally and experimental method more specifically, Spinoza is far more of an empiricist than might be supposed at first glance; and, though a great deal more work remains to be done in gaining a full understanding of the place of the experimental method in Spinoza's vision of methodology generally, I have here chosen to neglect this problem in favour of a somewhat narrower and perhaps more comfortable one.

In the following pages I shall be dealing almost exclusively with the first eleven propositions of Book 1 of the *Ethics*,[4] with a view towards just what conclusions Spinoza is attempting to support, as well as the means of support offered, therein. The eleventh proposition contains the celebrated three proofs for the existence of God, and one of the problems which the commentators have had revolves about the explanation of why these proofs occur where they do – following ten propositions which deal with the nature and existence of substance. This is an important problem; and I shall argue that many commentators, having resolved it incorrectly, have ended up misunderstanding the general methodology of the *Ethics* itself.

It might be thought that Spinoza provides at least one clue to the general nature of the methodology of the *Ethics* in describing it as written *more geometrico*; but I suggest that the English translation of this phrase, 'in the geometrical method',[5] is at best misleading.

Hubbeling concedes that, while the *Ethics* has a geometrical formulation or character, this is irrelevant to understanding the methodological structure of the work.[6] Indeed, the term 'formulation' or 'character' would appear to be a better translation of the Latin *mos* than the term 'method'; yet the geometrical formulation does have one characteristic which will emerge as very important in grasping Spinoza's arguments at the beginning of the *Ethics*. It was a characteristic elucidated by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics*, illustrated by Euclid in the *Elements* (which remained in Spinoza's day *the* example of the *mos geometricus*), and sufficiently commonplace as to deserve no explicit mention by Spinoza: a presystematic existential commitment to some entity or class of entities with which the system is to deal. In the more formalistic jargon of our own century, we should refer to the *primitives* of the system. The philosopher of a Kantian turn may declare that these primitives are pure or empty postulations, while the contemporary mathematician of a formalist turn might talk of 'implicit definitions' through the axioms: yet neither of these explanations is available before the twentieth century (and I think that Spinoza would argue that they are both bad explanations in any case). For Spinoza and his contemporaries it is simply a matter of saying that, in a geometrical exposition, certain entities are taken as given; while still other entities (nonprimitives) may be constructed out of these by means of the definitions, postulates, axioms, and theorems. For Euclid lines and points are of this type. This is not to claim that these are taken as clearly understood at the outset; for the function of the definitions, axioms, postulates, and theorems of the beginning of the first book of the *Elements* is precisely that of explaining the true nature (Spinoza would say 'essence') of these given entities. One of the goals of my own exposition will be that of describing in what sense Spinoza's methodology in the *Ethics* requires some presystematic commitment to existent things of some sort, and also of course exactly what sort is required.

Methodology has another important direction in our own philosophical world: one which centers upon an explication of modal concepts generally, and that of necessity specifically. The notion of nomological connexion (or connectibility) at the level of describing a scientific or philosophical system will, it is hoped, become explicable by being subsumed under one of the various concepts of necessity available to the contemporary thinker. Modal logic generally has turned out to possess a surprising wealth of fruitful applications to traditional fields of philosophical inquiry. One need only think of its applications to the study of norms (deontic logic), knowledge and belief (epistemic logic), time (tense logic), or even to problems of perception as Hintikka has recently suggested.[7] Still another use has been recently proposed by G. H. von Wright: that of investigating

which modal logics the systems of various philosophers may be said to embody.[8] Some philosophers, e.g., Aristotle and Leibniz, have held rather specific views on the modal concepts themselves; while others, while they have not speculated directly concerning the concepts themselves, have still made important uses of these concepts in constructing their own systems. One thinks of Kant and Hegel, but perhaps most of all of Spinoza, 'the philosopher of necessity'. I agree with Von Wright that this sort of investigation is worthwhile, and even necessary if we hope to fully grasp the philosophical system in question; and I hope someday to be able to produce the sort of results envisioned by Von Wright for Spinoza. Some good work has been done only recently;[9] and I may also offer the conjecture, from my own ongoing research, that the underlying modal system in Spinoza is one which is not equivalent to any of our presently studied systems, and that it may therefore be of some special interest to logicians in its own right.

The natural place to look for hints regarding Spinoza's concept of necessity would appear to be in his own version of the ontological proof, since it is common to regard any version of this proof almost by definition as moving from essence to existence via some concept of necessity. Here my conclusions will be more negative than positive, since I shall argue that the concept of necessity does not figure as an important component of Spinoza's notion of God. One positive aspect of this insight, however, will be some suggestions as to where one should look in attempting to explicate Spinoza's doctrine of necessity.

2. GOD, SUBSTANCE, NATURE

Spinoza opens the first book of the Ethics with the concept of that which is self-caused: an entity which is self-caused is one whose essence involves existence (IDf1). At the root of this definition lies the primordial emphasis which Spinoza places upon the omnipresence of agency: that essence alone is wholly real which realizes itself wholly in act, subject to no other determining agency. Indeed the very meaning of essence is worked out by Spinoza in terms of agency, and the definition of self-causation does little more than elucidate his activism. Martineau objected against this definition that the very notion of a *causa sui* would only be legitimate if causation were a universal category;[10] but the objection itself indicates that he fails to see that for Spinoza it is just that. Following this first definition, Spinoza goes on to define substance as that which is in itself and is conceived through itself (IDf3). This second definition embraces both the affirmation of a real independence (substance is in itself) and of a logical independence (it is conceived through itself). The *Ethics* is a product of *ratio*, or deductive synthesis; and, as I have argued else-

where,[11] central to this second degree of knowledge is that the logical order (the order of deductive connexion – Spinoza's concept of *involvere*) reflect exactly the ontological order (the order of causation). This is perhaps why it is difficult to see at the outset whether Spinoza is beginning with a substance which is affirmed as real, or simply with the definition of substance. Simon de Vries writes to him (Ep8) that it is not clear how those definitions are to be taken, whether they are nominal or real, and what relation they hold to the axioms. Spinoza responds by distinguishing two species of definitions, constructive and descriptive (the terminology is mine). The constructive definition merely proposes a plan to be realized or a hypothetical case, while the descriptive purports to have a referent. The example given is that of the temple of Solomon, which, if it is to be defined, is itself the criterion for the truth or falsity of the proposed definition. It is worth noting here that Spinoza is implicity attesting his nominalism by insisting in the example upon the possibility of defining a concrete individual. If a definition is to be true, it must re-present the individual which it defines (Ep9).

With the definition of God as a being absolutely infinite, consisting of infinite attributes (IDf6) Spinoza's intentions become somewhat more clear; for, once the definitions of *causa sui*, substance, and God are posed, they are seen immediately to converge, and this I shall argue to be part of the goal of the first ten propositions of the first book of the *Ethics*. There can be but one self-cause, one substance, one God, and these terms indicate one and the same agent. Stated otherwise, the first ten propositions of book 1 do not present, properly speaking, any proofs for the existence of God – these are formulated following the eleventh proposition; and, though important, they are of secondary importance. The goal of the earlier propositions is that of showing that everything in which thought has been capable of finding reality – whether it is sought in physics (*causa sui*), metaphysics (substance), or religion (God) – is one and the same reality. Spinoza is not involved in passing, as did Descartes, from doubt to the affirmation of being. It is rather his claim that one must begin with an affirmation of being if he is to understand nature; and, for Spinoza, it is only through this understanding that moral knowledge (the final goal of the *Ethics*) is achieved.

Are we then compelled to conclude with respect to the structure of these initial definitions that '...the verdict is sealed in the very definitions before the case is tried'?[12] – not in the sense that Spinoza is simply defining substance into existence at the outset. The central characteristic of a descriptive definition as Spinoza explains it in Letter 9 is that it have objective reference to something (i.e., an existent entity), though the essence of this existent may be clearly in doubt ('*de qua sola essentia dubitatur*'). The movement of Spinoza's

methodology is not, as so many have interpreted it, from essence to existence (this inverted movement is made by Spinoza following the eleventh proposition), but rather from existence to essence; and, since the essence of the being in question is not existentially determinate in the beginning, it follows that it need not be God, substance, or self-causative. In short, all that Spinoza requires, is that there exist *something*; and thus the movement of these opening propositions is *a posteriori* in nature. Spinoza is not, however, repeating the Cartesian argument (viz., of *Meditation* III), since he is not proceeding from effect to cause, nor even from idea to object (or ideate, as Spinoza would say); but rather his argument depends upon an analysis of existents which terminates in the conclusion that their being must be grounded in substantiality. Further, the existents with which he begins need not be ideas, as they had to be for Descartes; since Spinoza has rejected the Cartesian doubt as a methodological requirement.[13] Like Descartes Spinoza is a realist, but unlike Descartes his realism is dogmatic (as opposed to reasoned): thus the Cartesian cogito is not required at the outset as a warrant of the method or its deliverances. The movement of the argument, consequently, is as follows: if there is any affirmation of agency, then something is self-affirming (*causa sui*). The first ten propositions merely undertake to investigate the nature of self-causation, since Spinoza's realism already posits the antecedent of the conditional. It is the question of infinity (i.e., the essence of existence) which is here primary, and not that of the existence of essence (the proofs for the existence of God).

We need not consider the first six propositions individually; as they merely show that, from the very nature of substance as it is understood, it must be self-causing. If being is identified with agency, if to be is to cause, then it follows at once that a being in itself must be self-causing. Finitude implies a partial negation of agency (Spinoza would say 'of essence'); and, since negation and determination are identified by Spinoza, the negation of essence is the result of reciprocal determination, as is the case for all finite individuals or modes.[14] It follows that a being which is self-affirming, since its determination is through its own essence, involves no negation of essence; and, since substance is by definition self-causing, it is by nature infinite (IP8Sch1). Nothing, consequently, is finite (limited, negated) by itself: the source of finitude for any individual is always *ab extra*.

The proof for the eighth proposition, summarized above, also dictates the meaning which Spinoza gives to infinity here (though one should note that the term has other meanings elsewhere). Being is agency and the being of substance is self-contained: infinity thus refers to unlimited *power* (*puissance, dynamis, potentia*). What I may call the modal question of existence (whether it follows of necessity from the definition of substance) cannot arise here, for power implies existence.

Spinoza even concedes that the seventh proposition (that existence belongs to the nature of a substance) could be accounted as axiomatic, *if* one had a clear insight into the nature of substantiality as infinite power (IP8Sch2). I think, however, that this sort of insight would amount to an example of what Spinoza calls *scientia intuitiva*; and, since the *Ethics* is written at the second rather than the third level of cognition, the proposition is not *per se notum* here. It should be noted that for Spinoza self-evidence is *not* a property possessed by some propositions and wanting in others: rather it is a relation which a given proposition may or may not bear to a certain level or system of knowledge. The contextualism of Spinoza's concepts of self-evidence, truth, and I believe also necessity give them a contemporary ring which makes them well worth further study in their own right.

An infinite power, then, must be infinitely expressive through its own agency: the greater power an entity has, the more active it is, or the greater number of its attributes (Cf.VP36Sch). I have argued elsewhere that Spinoza's doctrine of attributes is the key that opens the door to his quantitative concept of perfection.[15] Here again a great deal of work remains to be done, and I shall rest content with exemplifying the general structure of Spinoza's analysis.[16]

In an Aristotelian cosmology perfection is expressed as a 'formal' aspect of a being; but, unlike the Spinozistic concept of *essentia actuosa* or *forma*, this formal perfection purports to find a contrary in matter. This entails that the conception of a perfect being is merely one of formal perfection stripped of any material potency: in brief, formal perfection is qualitative in nature (like all real determinations for Aristotle), and *pure* only insofar as it is qualitatively 'unmixed' with matter. Spinozism, however, admits no qualitative distinction between form and matter, and thus it must seek the notion of perfection in another way; and it is precisely here that the doctrine of attributes enters. It is unfortunate that Spinoza's initial definition of an attribute has lent itself to both objective and subjective interpretations, though the ninth proposition does provide a good working definition: an attribute is an order of agency proper to a substance. By an order here is meant a self-enclosed system, which follows from Spinoza's claim that every attribute must be conceived in and through itself. Since agency and being are equivalent, the greater being possesses the greater number of attributes; and substance, being absolutely infinite, possesses an absolute infinity of them. If each attribute expresses the agency of nature, then infinite agency can be expressed by nothing but an infinitude of attributes (IP10Sch). The significance of 'absolutely infinite' here is a quantitative or quasi-numerical one. Here indeed is found the greatest parallel between Spinozism and Neo-Platonism: the conception of substance or God as power, a power which continually overflows itself in creative agency.[17]

For the mediaeval Aristotelians, creative agency, while a logical consequence of the divine infinity, was really distinct from it; while for a quantitative concept of power such as that proposed by Spinoza, infinity and creativity are synonymous.

In the Galilean tradition espoused by both Descartes and Spinoza, methodology is divided into analytic and synthetic moments; with analyses conceived in a purely quantitative way as the separating of an idea into its parts (or presuppositions). It would not be amiss to suggest, as Guéroult has also intimated,[18] that it is precisely the first ten propositions of Book 1 of the *Ethics* which constitute the analytic moment in Spinoza's methodology. What is at issue is the uncovering by analysis of the nature of that existential reality which is given presystematically in our experience: its self-causation, substantiality, and even divinity.

3. THE PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

The proofs which follow the eleventh proposition have been the subject of numerous studies and commentaries, and it would be invidious to attempt even to summarize these studies here. It is worthwhile, however, to see how they fit Spinoza's methodology and how they also exemplify his quantitative analysis of perfection in the attributes. The first proof which he provides is merely a very brief restatement of the traditional ontological argument. Siwek takes this to be merely a repetition of Descartes' own version of the ontological argument,[19] but I have already argued that the notion of perfection implicit in it is peculiarly Spinoza's; which is not, however, to deny that it may have its roots in Descartes. Lachièze-Rey cautions us, however, that if Spinoza is merely repeating Descartes' proof, then his exclusion of the Cartesian *a posteriori* proof from the *Ethics* is somewhat unexpected.[20] I think, however, that Spinoza's attitude and procedure is clearly indicated by him in the first lemma following the scholium of proposition VII of Part I of the *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*. Here he is dealing explicity with the Cartesian a posteriori proof, which is based upon the 'axiom' that anything which can accomplish a more difficult thing can also accomplish a less difficult. Spinoza admits here that he does not grasp Descartes' meaning, and in the course of the following scholium he attempts to restructure the argument in terms of grades of perfection.

What is taking place in Spinoza's restructuring of Descartes' proofs is an assimilation of the argument to one based upon his own quantitative conceptions. Dunin-Borkowski claims that this restructuring is good Cartesianism.[21] If this means no more than that it is in the spirit of Descartes, the question is arguable on either side; but nowhere in Descartes do I find the type of analysis which Spinoza here

presents. The lemma which he provides states that, in proportion as a thing is more perfect, in that proportion does it more necessarily entail existence (PPCIP7Lm1). This is simply a restatement of the ninth proposition from part 1 of the *Ethics*; but, since Spinoza cannot here take for granted his doctrine of the attributes, he attempts to demonstrate the lemma through an example, which is decisive in at least its direction. He asks the reader to consider the notion of a being as more perfect in terms of a being with ten degrees of perfection contrasted to one with only nine (PPCIP7Lm1Dem). The proof is Cartesian, but the quantitative analysis of perfection is not that of Descartes. In the second scholium to the proof, Spinoza reminds us that by perfection he does not mean beauty, or other things which superstition has led men to call perfection, but simply reality or being (PPCIP7Nota2).

The second proof in the *Ethics* moves on a level which is more obviously Spinozistic: that of the existential plenitude of being. It assumes as axiomatic that of anything whatsoever a cause must be assigned either for its existence or for its nonexistence. The example given is typically misleading, that of a triangle (IP11Dem1) – since the mathematicals for Spinoza are *entia rationis* and have no real extramental existence. What is assumed is the infinite plenum of existents, such that if something is nonexistent, its nonexistence must be drawn either from its nature (which is contradictory), or from a real cause which prohibits its existence (in the case of contingent beings or modes). Neither case would be possible for God or substance.

The final proof, together with the appended scholium, merely further explicates the theory of perfection, but this time even more explicitly. To be able not to exist (*posse non esse*)[22] is a negation of power. Negation or determination, however, proceeds from external causes (viz., the second account of nonexistence in the preceding proof): an infinite being, therefore, exists (IP11Dem2). Note that this proof does not fall to Kant's criticism that if a being does not exist in the first place, then existent beings cannot be said to be more powerful (Kant would say 'more perfect') than it, there being no second term for the comparison according to Kant, since nonexistence implies simply the absence of all perfections. What Spinoza is claiming here is that, if only finite individuals exist (and we know that *at least* they exist), their finitude is still due to something *ab extra*; but such a determination in a plurality presupposes an order of individuation. Every order of individuals, however, presupposes a higher order, except for a self-contained order which is *causa sui*.[23] Again Spinoza's proof depends upon the presupposition that something exists; and that, if only finite objects existed, nothing could exist. Power is as much the key to this proof as to the others (IP11Sch). What all of the proofs come to is that perfection is causal and assertative of existence;

and that, given finite existents, the certainty of an infinite power is immediate upon analysis of what finitude involves.[24] This position crosses over from Descartes to Kant, as Lachièze-Rey notes: infinite being becomes the transcendental condition of being, but a realistic theory of knowledge opens this transcendental condition to the real order of agency and the epistemic order of experience, sensory and rational.[25]

The Spinozistic notion of substance or nature, based upon a theory of causality and quantitative perfection which is neither mediaeval nor Cartesian and a thoroughgoing Galilean concept of analysis, is neither mediaeval (as Freudenthal contended)[26] nor Cartesian (as Brunschvicq argued).[27] McKeon arguesc onvincingly that Brunschvicq's analysis in particular, as valuable as it may be in many other respects, misses the core of the Spinozistic proofs by neglecting the methodology which Spinoza utilizes.[28] Strangely, it seems that Joachim, who is by no means a sympathetic commentator of Spinoza, has alone noted the peculiar originality of Spinoza's proofs compared to those of his predecessors: '...once grant that anything is actual, and you must admit that God necessarily is actual.[29] The dependence of the proofs upon the continuity of experience,[30] also noted by Joachim, is due to the concept of individuation and agency which underlies them throughout. The methodological movement from finite individual to infinite individual depends upon these same concepts; and it is these same concepts which necessitate the doctrine of attributes, in order to insure against the movement's stopping short of an absolutely (quantitatively) infinite being, a stop which would in effect short-circuit the entire proof.

Finally, in Letter 36 (to John Hudde), Spinoza presents us with another variation of these proofs. This is to the effect that, if we assume the existence of something perfect (i.e., infinite) in its own kind, we must admit the existence of something absolutely infinite (Ep36). The proofs in the *Ethics* depend simply upon the existence of something as their point of departure. If this something is finite, its very nature requires inclusion in an individuating whole, the methodological movement finally being made from infinity to absolute infinity. Spinoza now shows that the same movement is possible from attribute to substance.

4. CONCLUDING NOTES

It would be useful to summarize at this stage the main outline of what I believe that my analysis has uncovered. First the basic methodological structure of the first ten propositions of the first part of the *Ethics* is that of the analysis of an underlying experiential datum: existent being. The purpose of the analysis is to uncover the structure

or nature of this being, and thus the model being used for analysis is essentially that proposed earlier by Galileo and Descartes. Out of this analysis two cardinal concepts emerge: those of causation and perfection. Causation is seen to be a universal category, which legitimizes the concept of self-cause; and perfection is handled in a purely quantitative way (as is required by Galileo's own concept of analysis), which legitimizes the introduction of attributes as orders of causality corresponding to the quantitative levels of reality or perfection. The actual proofs for the existence of God or nature come almost as a footnote to this analysis, whereas the analysis itself has made explicit what is implicitly given in our experience of the world. This fact explains a point emphasized by Spinoza quite frequently, but which appears almost contradictory for a Cartesian viewpoint: that God, though the necessary starting point for knowledge, is not known through himself as such – or rather, that the proposition that God exists is not strictly speaking a *per se notum*. God is not a *per se notum* precisely because the explicitation of what is implicit in our experience is, at least in the *Ethics*, a deductive task, that of *ratio* rather than *scientia intuitiva*; though Spinoza concedes that for some persons it may well be given through the latter type of knowledge (VP36Sch). In opposition to Descartes, God is the necessary starting point for our system of knowledge precisely because the implicit presence of substantiality and causation in our experience of things is an absolute requirement for any objective system at all.

Conspicuous perhaps by its very absence is the notion of necessity as one of the explicanda of Spinoza's concept of God or nature. The analyses which Spinoza presents in the first ten propositions and the proofs following the eleventh have been explicated without recourse to any special concept of necessity underlying them, and this is because I believe that there is no special concept like this. Thus one of the possible paths leading to an understanding of Spinoza's concept of the modalities has been closed if my analysis above is correct. Another path, however, has been opened; for, while the concept of a necessary being has no special place in Spinoza's system, that of necessary connexions between beings does. Here it is that Spinoza's concept of causal efficacy enters the picture. This is as it should be, since where Spinoza discusses necessity he is usually working with a model whereby one idea *involves* a second; and the correlate of this ideational concept *involvere* is that of causality, which is a relational concept. This insight may go a long way toward explaining Curley's paradoxical, but I believe quite accurate, remark that, while Spinoza is committed to the view that every truth is a necessary truth, he is also quite consistently committed to the view that some are not – or rather, that some causal statements are necessary only in qualified senses, whereas others are unqualifiedly necessary.[31]

The above comments are made at least in part for the purpose of stirring interest in the several problems which this paper has left unresolved, and even untouched – problems which go to the heart of Spinoza's methodology, and thereby touch also his general notion of necessity and causal connexion. As thorough and precise a thinker as Spinoza was, I have no doubt that the answers to these problems and questions will reveal themselves under a closer scrutiny of the texts of Spinoza's writings. That we have not yet uncovered them indicates only that we have yet much more to learn from him.

NOTES

[1] Cf. H. G. Hubbeling, *Spinoza's Methodology*, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1964.

[2] Confer especially Spinoza's correspondence with Henry Oldenburg from 1661 to 1663 concerning the various experimental works of Robert Boyle.

[3] Lee C. Rice, 'The Continuity of Mens in Spinoza,' *New Scholasticism* XLIII, 1969, 75-103.

[4] All translations from the Latin text are my own. Page and volume references where given, are to the Van Vloten and Land edition of the *Opera Omnia* (4 vols., The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1914); this edition varies in only minor points from the critical but less convenient Heidelberg Academy Edition, though all quotations have been checked against this edition also.

[5] The phrase 'geometrical method' is that of Ewing's translation; which, though more popular than that of William Hale White (1883), is inferior to it. White uses the phrase 'geometrical order'. By far the finest translation of Spinoza is that of the *Oeuvres Complètes* by R. Caillois, M. Francès, and R. Misrahi, Paris, Pléiade, 1954. Unfortunately, their translation is 'la méthode géométrique'.

[6] Hubbeling, *op.cit.*, 33.

[7] Cf. Jaakko Hintikka, 'On the Logic of Perception,' in *Perception and Personal Identity*, edited by N. S. Care and R. Grimm, Cleveland, Case Western Reserve University Press, 1969, 140-175.

[8] G. H. von Wright, 'Some Observations on Modal Logic and Philosophical Systems,' in *Contemporary Philosophy in Scandinavia*, edited by R. E. Olson and A. M. Paul, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press, 1972, 17-26. Cf. also my forthcoming review of this volume in *The Modern Schoolman* XLX, 1973-74.

[9] Cf. E. M. Curley, *Spinoza's Metaphysics: An Essay in Interpretation*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1969, 82-117.

[10] J. Martineau, *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, London, Macmillan, 1883, 117.

[11] Cf. Leo C. Rice, 'The Continuity of Mens in Spinoza,' *loc. cit.*, 100-102.

[12] James Collins, *A History of Modern European Philosophy*, Milwaukee, Bruce, 1961, 214. Wolfson takes a similar view to that of Collins in holding that Spinoza's proofs are explicative and not demonstrative, a view also taken by Siwek, though with some reservations: cf. *Au coeur du spinozisme*, Paris, Brouwer, 1952, 122-124.

[13] Cf. Spinoza's remarks on the Cartesian doubt in the Prolegomenon to his *Principia Philosophiae Cartesianae*, Part I.

[14] Cf. my article 'Spinoza on Individuation,' *The Monist* LV, 1971, 640-659.

[15] 'The Continuity of Mens in Spinoza,' *loc.cit.*, 94-96.

[16] Cf. also Warren Kessler, 'A Note on Spinoza's Concept of Attribute' *The Monist* LV, 1971, 636-639.

[17] Cf. E. Lasbax, *La hiérarchie dans l'univers chez Spinoza*, 2e édition, Paris, Vrin, 1926, 110-112.
[18] Martial Guéroult, *Spinoza I, Dieu*, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1968, 19-20.
[19] P. Siwek, 'La preuve ontologique dans la philosophie de Spinoza,' *Gregorianum* XXXIII, 1952, 621-627.
[20] P. Lachièze-Rey, *Les origines cartésiennes du Dieu de Spinoza*, Paris, Vrin, 1950, 172.
[21] S. von Dunin-Borkowski, *Das Lebenswerk Spinozas*, Münster i.w., Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1936. Vol. IV, 421.
[22] Elwes has 'the potentiality for nonexistence' and White translates this as 'inability to exist'. Both translations are flatly incorrect.
[23] Cf. my 'Spinoza on Individuation,' *loc.cit.*, 651-653.
[24] Cf. P. Lachièze-Rey, *op.cit.*, 196-197, for a good exposition of this crucial point.
[25] *Ibid.*, 197.
[26] J. Freudenthal, *Spinoza und die Scholastik*, Leipzig, Verlag von Veit und Comp., 1899.
[27] L. Brunschvicq, 'La révolution cartésienne et la notion spinoziste de la substance,' *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* XII, 1904, 755-798.
[28] R. McKeon, *The Philosophy of Spinoza*, New York, Longmans, 1928, 99.
[29] H. H. Joachim, *A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1901, 45.
[30] *Ibid.*, 52.
[31] Cf. E. M. Curley, *op.cit.*, 83.

A. G. WERNHAM

SPINOZA'S ACCOUNT OF COGNITION IN ETHICS PART II, PROP. 9-13

Spinoza interrupts his account of cognition in *Ethics* II to remark in Prop. 11 Schol., 'At this point readers will no doubt stick, and imagine many difficulties to hinder progress: this is why I ask them to proceed with me at a gentle pace, and not to pass judgment on the above until they have read the whole'. Clearly he thought that this proposition and its neighbours were liable to cause difficulty, and in fact they have left the majority of his readers in almost total darkness. This paper is an attempt to cast a few rays of light.

Let us start with IIP9: 'The idea of a particular actually existing thing has God as its cause, not in so far as he is infinite, but in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of a particular actually existing thing; and God is in turn the cause of this second idea in so far as he is affected by a third, and so on *ad infinitum*'. If we ask what is meant by the expression 'God in so far as he is (considered as) affected by another idea' the Demonstration tells us that it simply means 'another idea', i.e. 'God in so far as he *is*, or *takes the form of*, another idea'.[1] Spinoza, then, is saying that the idea of an actually existing particular thing is caused by another idea of an actually existing particular thing; but so far he has given us no examples of actually existing particular things which he regards as having their ideas in causal relation. This deficiency he proceeds to remedy in the Corollary: 'If anything happens in the particular object of an idea, knowledge of it is in God only in so far as he has the idea of that object'. Actually existing particular things which have their ideas in causal relation are objects and things that happen in objects, i.e. modifications of objects. If x is an object, and y a modification of x, then the idea of x is the cause of the idea of y. This is what Spinoza proves in the Demonstration of the Corollary; and his proof is as follows. An idea of y is in God in so far as he is (considered as) affected by another idea of a particular thing. But since God in so far as he is (considered as) affected by x is the cause of y (this is assumed and not stated by Spinoza), and since the order and connexion of ideas is the same as the order and connexion of things (IIP7), therefore God in so far as he is (considered as) affected by the idea of x is the cause of the

idea of y. In order to transform this conclusion into the Corollary Spinoza has to substitute 1. 'knowledge of y is in God' for 'God is the cause of the idea of y', and 2. 'God in so far as he has the idea of x' for 'God in so far as he is (considered as) affected by the idea of x'. Let us consider these substitutions in turn.

1. In making this substitution Spinoza is simply identifying 'God in so far as he is (considered as) affected by the idea of x is the cause of the idea of y' with 'God in so far as he is (considered as) affected by the idea of x has knowledge of y'. If we take x to be a human body, and y to be a modification of that human body, then God has knowledge (is the cause of the idea) of y in so far as he is (considered as) affected by the idea of x. But since 'God in so far as he is (considered as) affected by the idea of x' = 'the idea of x' (by the Demonstration of Prop.9), and since 'the idea of x' = 'the mind of x' (Prop.11), it follows that 'God in so far as he is (considered as) affected by the idea of x has knowledge of y' = 'the mind of x has knowledge of y'. This is the gist of the Demonstration of Prop.12.

2. Note that in the Demonstration of Prop.12 Spinoza cites the Corollary of Prop.9 as 'God in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of ....' This, as we have seen, enables him to pass easily to the conclusion of that Demonstration. But if, instead of 'God in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of x', we say 'God in so far as he has the idea of x' (as the official formulation of the Corollary to Prop.9 requires), we immediately land in difficulties; for we assume (and not without reason) that 'God in so far as he has the idea of x' means 'God in so far as he has knowledge of x'. But if 'God in so far as he has the idea of x' means 'God in so far as he has knowledge of x', we cannot identify 'God in so far as he has the idea of x' with 'the idea or mind of x'. For to have the idea of x in the sense of having knowledge of x is to be the cause of the idea of x, and the cause of the idea of x is not the idea of x (if that were so the idea of x would be *causa sui*), but the idea of some more comprehensive body of which x is a modification. I conclude that in the Corollary to Prop.9 'God in so far as he has the idea of x' does not mean 'God in so far as he has knowledge of x', but 'God in so far as he is considered as affected by the idea of x', which in turn means 'the idea – or mind – of x'. (The original Dutch text of IIP9Cor tends to support this interpretation by suggesting that 'has the idea of' does not here mean 'has knowledge of': where the Latin reads 'ideam habet' (Cor) or 'habet ideam' (Dem) the Dutch has 'het denkbeelt ... in zich heeft', literally 'has the idea ... in himself', i.e. 'contains the idea...').

The fact remains that this non-epistemic use of 'God has the idea of' is highly confusing, especially when it occurs in the same context as the ordinary epistemic use. The end of the Corollary to Prop.11 is a case in point: 'and to say that God has this or that idea, not only in

so far as he constitutes the nature of a human mind, but in so far as together with a human mind he has also the idea of another thing, is to say that the human mind perceives the thing partially or inadequately'. Here 'God has this or that idea' clearly means 'God apprehends this or that', but 'he has also the idea of another thing' means 'he also constitutes the idea of another thing', and not 'he also apprehends another thing'. Of course, since God has the idea of another thing in the same sense as he 'has' a human mind, and 'to "have" a human mind' means in this passage 'to constitute the nature of a human mind', some indication is given of the change of sense: nevertheless Spinoza was right to warn that this part of the *Ethics* needs particularly careful reading.

The main purpose of the Corollary to Prop.11 is to introduce the notion of inadequate cognition, which is explained as follows. Suppose a human body x is affected by an external body k in such a way that a modification y is produced in x. Then while x is the cause of y, it is not the whole or adequate cause of y, since y is partly caused by k. In the same way (IIP7), while the idea of x is the cause of the idea of y (= the mind of x perceives y), the idea of x is not the whole or adequate cause of the idea of y (= the mind of x does not perceive y adequately) since the idea of y is partly caused by the idea of k. So far the Corollary takes us. The question which now arises is this. If the idea of k is part cause of the idea of y, why does Spinoza say in the Corollary to Prop.9 that God has knowledge of y only in so far as he takes the form of the mind of x? Why does he deny that the mind of k perceives y?

To answer this question we have to return to Prop.9 and to stress a point which I have so far neglected. In stating that Proposition in terms of the causation of God Spinoza makes it plain that he is here dealing with immanent and not with transient causation, for God is the immanent and not the transient cause of all things (IP18). Cognition, then, is the immanent and not the transient causation of one idea by another, and the order of immanent causation is from the idea of an object to the idea of a modification of that object, in this case from the idea of x to the idea of y. Spinoza, then, denies that the mind of k perceives y because the idea of k is not the immanent but only the transient cause of the idea of y, and so far his statement that God has knowledge of y (is the immanent cause of the idea of y) *only* in so far as he 'has' the idea of x (constitutes the mind of x) is justified. But in the last resort it cannot be justified, for if God has knowledge of y *only* in so far as he constitutes the mind of x, then God has only inadequate knowledge of y: and Spinoza says that God has adequate knowledge of y in so far as he 'has' the idea of k together with the idea of x, or, as IIIP1Dem puts it, in so far as he contains within himself[2] the mind of k and the mind of x together. Now since x and k combine

to produce a single effect y, we can regard them as together constituting a single body (IIDef7) which is the entire cause of y; and we can regard the mind of x and the mind of k as together constituting a single mind. This mind not only perceives y, but, unlike the mind of x perceives y adequately. I conclude that when Spinoza says 'only' in the Corollary to Prop.9 he intends to exclude the ideas of external transient causes but not the ideas of more comprehensive immanent causes.

I have spoken above of a body formed by the combination of x and k. We can conceive this more comprehensive body as in turn part of a still more comprehensive body, 'and if we go on thus *ad infinitum* we shall easily conceive the whole of (physical) nature as a single individual' (IILm7Sch). This last quotation shows how we must interpret '*ad infinitum*' in Prop.9: Spinoza is not there referring to an endless series of transient causes but to a hierarchy of immanent causes which culminates in an infinite immanent cause, the idea or mind of the whole physical universe. We may add that just as the whole physical universe is the adequate cause of all its modifications (cp.Ep.32), so its mind has adequate ideas of all these modifications.

In illustrating the point of Prop.9 and its Corollary I have assumed that a human mind is the idea of a human body. This Spinoza states in Prop.13: 'The object of the idea which constitutes a human mind is a body, or a certain actually existing mode of extension, and nothing else'. The proof of the first part of this proposition depends on Prop.9Cor. If the ideas of the modifications of an object are caused only by the idea of that object, in other words, if the modifications of an object are perceived only by the mind of that object, and a human mind perceives the modifications or affections of a body, then that human mind is the mind or idea of that body. Spinoza, however, is less concerned to show that the object of the idea which constitutes my mind is my body than to show that it is a mode of extension, and he therefore formulates the proof as follows. If the object of the idea which constitutes my mind were not a body, but a mode of some attribute other than extension (a mode which I shall call X), then the ideas of the affections or modifications of a body would not be in my mind (the mind of X), but in the mind of something other than X, viz. the mind of a body. But the ideas of the modifications of a body are in my mind: therefore the object of the idea which constitutes my mind is a body. The second part of the proof is designed to show that a body or mode of extension is the only object of the idea which constitutes my mind. If the object of the idea which constitutes my mind were not only a body but also a mode of some attribute other than extension, then that mode would inevitably produce some effect (be the cause of some modification in itself), and the idea of that effect or modification would necessarily be in my mind. But I have no idea of

any such effect or modification. Therefore the object of the idea which constitutes my mind is a mode of extension and nothing else. It follows, as Spinoza points out in the Corollary, that a man consists (only) of a mind and a body.

Spinoza's assertion that the object of the idea which constitutes a human mind is a (human) body has led to widespread misunderstanding of his account of the nature of cognition. This misunderstanding is largely due to carelessness on the part of Spinoza himself. In the first sentence of the Demonstration of Prop.13 he departs from the wording of the proposition by writing 'If a body were not the object of a human mind...', which suggests that a human body is the object of a human mind. The object of a human mind is then quite reasonably taken to mean something which a human mind perceives, or of which it has an idea, and the reader is thus led to suppose that a human mind *has* the idea which it *is*; to suppose that the relation of correlativity is also an epistemic relation. This misunderstanding is reinforced by a passage in Ep32: 'I declare that the human mind is this same power, not in so far as it is infinite, and perceives the whole of nature, but in so far as it is finite and perceives only the human body (*tantum humanum corpus percipit*), and in this way I declare that the human mind is part of a certain infinite intellect'.

Against this loose statement, however, we must set Spinoza's precise statement in IIP19: 'The human mind does not know the human body itself, nor does it know that the body exists, except through the ideas of the affections by which the body is affected'. This of course is not to deny that a human mind can form or cause *an* idea of its own body;[3] what Spinoza is maintaining is that any idea of its own body which it does form or cause must be based on its ideas of that body's modifications. But it *is* to deny that a human mind forms or causes *the* idea of a human body which it *is*, i.e. that the human mind is *causa sui*. The relevant part of IIP19Dem can be interpreted along the lines I have already indicated. The human body and 'the many bodies by which it is, so to speak, continually regenerated' together constitute a single comprehensive body of which the human body is a modification; and just as this comprehensive body is the cause of the human body, so its idea or mind, and *not* the human mind, is the cause of the idea of the human body, or knows the human body itself. In the *Ethics* Spinoza distinguishes between the physical correlate of the human mind (the human body itself) and its immediate epistemological objects (the affections of the human body).

This view of cognition as an activity of immanent causation is found in Spinoza's earliest philosophical work. At the end of the First Dialogue in *Short Treatise* Part I he actually uses the immanent causation of ideas by the understanding to illustrate God's immanent causation: 'Your assertion, then, is *that the cause (since it is the Originator*

of the Effects) *must therefore be outside these*. But you say this because you only know of the *transient* and not of the *immanent cause*, which by no means produces anything outside itself, as is exemplified by the Understanding, which is the cause of its ideas. And that is why I called the understanding (in so far as, or because, its ideas depend on it) a *cause*; and on the other hand, since it consists of its ideas, a *whole*: so also *God is both an Immanent Cause with reference to his works or creatures, and also a whole, considered from the second point of view.*' The same causal account of cognition is implicit in a letter written to Schuller in 1675 (Ep64): 'I say that the human mind can only get to know those things which the idea of an actually existing body involves, or what can be inferred from this idea. For the power of each thing is defined only by its essence (by IIIP7). But the essence of the mind (IIP8) consists only in this, that it is the idea of a body actually existing. Therefore the mind's power of understanding only extends to those things which this idea of the body contains in itself, or which follow from the same.' The things which the idea of an actually existing body 'involves' or 'contains in itself' are the attributes of extension and thought. The things which 'can be inferred from' or 'follow from' the idea of an actually existing body are the ideas of that body's affections, and also the ideas of these ideas, through which alone the mind can acquire knowledge of itself (IIP23).

NOTES

[1] For this sense of 'to be affected by' see H. F. Hallett, *Benedict de Spinoza* – The Elements of his Philosophy, p.12.

[2] *quatenus aliarum rerum mentes in se simul continet.* This formulation is an attempt to eliminate the ambiguity noted above in the expression '*ideam habet*'.

[3] This idea may be adequate. If I conceive the affections of my body in terms of the common properties my ideas of these affections are adequate (IIP39Dem), and from them I can form an adequate idea of my own body (IIP40).

JON WETLESEN

NORMATIVE REASONING IN SPINOZA; TWO INTERPRETATIONS

The question which I would like to discuss is this: Which is the bearing of Spinoza's epistemology on the field of normative reasoning? Does Spinoza assume a uniformity of method in theoretical, axiological and practical fields of discourse or does he assume a difference between the former and the latter two? In other words, is it possible to argue about what is good or right along the same lines as one could argue about what is real or true?

I shall consider two possible answers to this question. The former, which I will call a 'platonic' interpretation of Spinoza's theory of reason, states that rational argumentation proceeds by the same methods in all fields of discourse. The latter, which I will call an 'aristotelian' interpretation, states that there is a fundamental difference between theoretical and practical reason and that the methods of reasoning will differ accordingly.

By way of introduction I would like to give an outline of Spinoza's theory of cognition within the perspective of his general ethics.[1] According to Spinoza's view of the human condition, each person is more or less in a state of bondage or freedom or in a transition from one to the other. This condition is essentially governed by two laws: A person is in a state of bondage in so far as his affects and actions are guided by inadequate cognition, and he is in a state of freedom in so far as they are guided by adequate cognition. His affects and actions are accordingly said to be more or less passive or active.[2]

The ethical problem for each person is how to develop from bondage to freedom. The answer, in terms of Spinoza's philosophy, is to improve the understanding; that is to say, to develop a more adequate cognition of the human condition. From an ethical point of view it is therefore clear that the theory of cognition, or epistemology, is highly relevant, and that it would be desirable to have it reconstructed in such a way that it indicated how the understanding could be improved.

Spinoza distinguishes several kinds of inadequate and adequate cognition. According to the classification in the *Ethics*, we may distinguish three main kinds of cognition: 1) imagination, 2) reason,

and 3) intuition.[3] The first is subsumed under inadequate, the next two under adequate cognition. We may tabulate this standard terminology as follows:

1st kind of cognition	imagination	inadequate cognition	passive affects and actions	bondage
2nd kind of cognition	reason	adequate cognition	active affects and actions	freedom
3rd kind of cognition	intuition			

The distinction between inadequate and adequate cognition is related to a family of closely overlapping distinctions, such as the distinction between cognitions which are clear and distinct versus those which are mutilated and confused, between those which are true and certain and those which are false, those which are positive, absolute, perfect, real, necessary, eternal, etc. and their counterparts.[4]

It would be desireable to have the criteria for these distinctions explicated.[5] This might give us an answer to the question about what kind of 'theory of truth' Spinoza adopted. It seems to me that he employed several such theories. Personally I am most interested in what appears to be his 'evidence theory of truth', which is connected with the 'internal signs of a true idea'.[6] Besides Spinoza developed a 'coherence theory'[7] as well as a 'correspondence theory of truth'.[8] This latter occurs both in a stronger and a weaker form. The weaker form is connected with the hypothetico-deductive methodology as applied in the natural sciences.[9]

My reason for being primarily interested in the evidence theory is that it brings out the internal relation between Spinoza's theory of cognition and his theory of conation. This is most clearly seen in his distinction between the objective and formal aspects of both cognition and conation (or essence).[10] The relation between the objective and formal aspects is reminiscent of E. Husserl's distinction between *noesis* and *noema*. The former refers to the intentional act of cognition (or affect), the latter to the intentional object toward which the act is directed.

Most likely Spinoza's evidence theory of truth is connected with the objective aspect of cognition and conation. In so far as anything is adequately cognized, it is necessarily affirmed as true. This act of affirmation involves the objective aspect of the cognizer's conation and cognition. It is at the same time an act of volition. For this reason the will and the intellect are said to be one and the same.[11] Adequate

and active acts like this imply something positive, real, absolute, eternal, necessary, etc. One the other hand, inadequate acts of cognition imply the privation of all these characteristics.[12] They determine passive affects in the conative dimension. This theory is designed to underpin Spinoza's ethics of perfection. Liberation from bondage under the passions is determined by the improvement of the understanding.

The main strategy for the improvement of the understanding, according to Spinoza, is to reflect on the distinction between inadequate and adequate cognition, and to weaken the former and strengthen the latter.[13] Three phases may be distinguished in the process: one of intuitive contemplation, one of rational systematization and one of critical reformation.

The first thing to do in order to become mindful about adequate cognition would be to become aware of those cognitions which Spinoza termed the third kind of cognition or intuition. They consist of singular and concrete acts of awareness wherein a person intuitively understands the essence of himself, of objects and of God.[14] I am inclined to interprete these cognitions as a kind of mystical vision. Through them a person comprehends himself as internally related to the whole field of nature; that is, as a *modus* in *natura naturata*. Moreover, this whole field is cognized as being an indivisible unity – *natura naturans, substantia, Deus* – which is in itself and is understood through itself in a timeless (or eternal) and spaceless (or infinite) manner.[15] This is not only an act of cognition, but necessarily also one of love.[16] It is the *amor intellectualis Dei*, and it takes place *sub specie aeternitatis*. Spinoza believed that all men have such intuitions, periodically at least, although most of the time they may be more or less suffocated by inadequate cognitions and passive affects.[17]

The next thing to do would be to reflect on these acts of intuition in order to obtain a rational clear comprehension of them. Whereas the intuition goes into the unique and concrete essence of things, reason is concerned with their general properties.[18] These properties may also, in their way, be adequately cognized. If they are adequately cognized, they may be regarded as entities of reason (*entia rationis*). If they are inadequately cognized, their status degenerates to that of entities of imagination (*entia imaginationis*).[19] I am inclined to think that all explicit concepts, statements and arguments in Spinoza's theoretical, axiological and practical philosophy belong to either of these two classes of entities. This pertains to both premises and conclusions. It implies that whatever Spinoza has to say about the ontological properties of God, nature or man, about criteria of truth, values or norms, must be regarded as entities of reason. Such an interpretation would be in favour of attributing to Spinoza a conceptualistic position, if not a nominalistic one.

The second step of the procedure cannot be isolated from the third one. Reason establishes some of its premises through a reflection on primary intuitions. Other premises are drawn from experience. That is to say, both the third and the first kinds of cognition serve as sources of premises for the second kind of cognition. In the process of reasoning, the premises drawn from intuition are given priority over the premises drawn from experience. The former are adequate, the latter inadequate. When reason establishes its premises from experience, it selects those premises which may be reasonably integrated into the system of adequate premises. This selection involves a rectification of the first kind of cognition and a criticism of all those features which are incompatible with the adequate premises.[20]

If Spinoza's method for the improvement of the understanding is interpreted in the manner just indicated, there will be a certain homogenity of procedure in all fields of discourse, both with regard to theoretical, axiological, and practical questions. Intuition and reason will cooperate in establishing fundamental premises for answering questions as to what is real or true, as well as questions as to what is good or right.

This homogenity of procedure could be considered more platonic than aristotelian. Plato also distinguished between adequate and inadequate cognition (ἐπιστήμη and δόξα), and subdivided the former into intuitive and rational cognition (νοησις and διανοια).[21] Moreover, he applied his procedures to all fields of discourse, both theoretical, axiological and practical.

Aristotle, on the other hand, introduced a distinction between two types of reason (λόγος), one theoretical (σοφία) and one practical (φρόνησις). Theoretical reason he subdivided into intuitive and discursive reason (νους and ἐπισρήμη). Only the theoretical reason is able to contemplate eternal and necessary premises and their derivations. Practical reason (as well as technical cognition) is confined to contingent premises and their derivations.[22] Methodologically this implies different procedures of argumentation in different fields of discourse. Apodictic argumentation is confined to theoretical reasoning alone, whereas practical (and axiological) reasoning has to adopt dialectical, rhetorical or sophistic methods of argumentation.[23]

When we interprete Spinoza's epistemology and his *more geometrico* in a platonic direction, we should expect a homogenity of rational procedures in all fields of discourse. Actually, this expectation seems to be met by Spinoza's use of the term 'reason'. In Parts III-V of the *Ethics*, as well as in the political treatises, Spinoza argues in terms of reason in a series of axiological and practical contexts. He uses such expressions as the 'guidance of reason' (*ductu rationis*), the 'dictates of reason' (*rationis dictamine*), the 'precepts of reason' (*rationis praecepta*), the 'prescriptions of reason' (*rationis praescripto*), the 'decision of

reason' (*rationis judicio*), the 'authority of reason' (*rationis imperio*) and several other related expressions.[24]

However, if we assume that the term 'reason' in all these occurrence is subsumable under the second kind of cognition, that is, as one of the types of adequate cognition, then we shall have to give an account of certain anomalous passages in Part IV of the *Ethics*. They read as follows.

IVP64:
The cognition of evil is an inadequate cognition.

IVP64Cor:
Hence it follows that if the human mind had only adequate ideas it would form no notion of evil.

IVP68Dem:
I said that he was free who is led by reason alone. He, therefore, who is born free and remains free has only adequate ideas, and therefore has no conception of evil (IVP64Cor), and consequently (as good and evil are correlative) none of good.

Apparantly, these passages deny exactly what we have just affirmed. They seem to state that whoever cognizes adequately, including whoever cognizes rationally, will have no cognition of good or evil. In other words, rational cognition, or more generally, adequate cognition, seems to be excluded from axiological – and by extension, from practical – fields of discourse. This, however, appears to contradict the class of axiological and practical statements referred to earlier, where certain statements of value and certain norms are said to be 'according to reason'.

Whether the text implies a real contradiction or not depends, of course, on how these statements are interpreted. If the terms 'reason', 'adequate', 'good' and 'evil' are used without changes of meaning in these various contexts, then there is no escape from the accusation that Spinoza is contradicting himself. Some commentators delight in trying to establish this kind of conclusion. However, the burden of proof rests with the commentator. He has to justify his assumption about uniformity of usage. The contrary assumption may be equally justifiable. We need only assume that one or more of these terms are used in two or more senses, and there will be a way out of the apparant inconsistencies.

It would be easy to generate a number of interpretations of each of these terms and to connect them into an even larger number of combinations. From this class of interpretations I shall pick out only two possibilities, one favouring the aristotelian line of interpretation mentioned earlier, and another favouring the platonic line of interpretation.

According to the first of these possibilities, we may assume that the terms 'good' and 'evil' are used without change of meaning in all contexts, and that the terms 'adequate cognition' and 'reason' are used in two senses which correspond to Aristotle's distinction between theoretical reason (σοφία, ἐπιστήμη) and practical reason (φρόνησισ). On this assumption we may subsume the occurrences in IVP64&Cor and IVP68Dem under theoretical reason and the aforementioned normative occurrences under practical reason. Although this takes care of the problem of consistency, it implies a devaluation of the role of reason in normative contexts. The type of reason which makes decisions about questions of value or questions of action will have to be subsumed under the first kind of cognition and be considered inadequate. It will be anchored in passive affects only. On the other hand, adequate reason and the active affects and activities will be confined to theoretical cognition alone, that is, to contemplative activities.

According to the other line of interpretation, we may make the contrary assumption. Here we presuppose that the terms 'adequate cognition' and 'reason' are used uniformly throughout, and that the terms 'good' and 'evil' are used in several senses. When it is said in IVP64&Cor and IVP68Dem that whoever cognizes adequately or rationally does not cognize good or evil, this may be interpreted as referring to one sense (or kind) of 'good' and 'evil' but not to the other senses (or kinds). As a consequence it may be consistently said that a person can have an adequate or rational cognition of good or evil in other senses of these terms.

In fact, it seems possible to attribute to Spinoza one generic interpretation of 'good' and 'evil' and to distinguish three species of goods and two species of evils which may be subsumed under this concept. According to Spinoza's general theory of value, value judgments are determined by the same essential laws which determine the affects. Anything which a person cognizes as helping or hindering his striving (*conatus*), will determine a positive of negative affect, and dispose him to evaluate it positively or negatively as a good or an evil.[25]

Within this general class of goods and evils we may distinguish three subclasses of goods corresponding to the three kinds of cognition, and two subclasses of evils. $Good_1$ and $evil_1$ are determined by imagination, which is an inadequate cognition, and by its correlated passive affects.[26] $Good_2$ and $evil_2$ are determined by reason,[27] and $good_3$ by intuition[28] – reason and intuition being adequate forms of cognition and correlated with active affects. The reason why $good_3$ has no corresponding evil is that it involves the affirmation of something which has no contrary which may negate it. That which is affirmed by this kind of cognition and affect also helps the striving of the person.

This is the reason why it is a good, or even the highest good. Since it is something infinite, it has no contrary. It is incommensurable with all finite things. Hence it cannot be frustrated, and consequently no evil contrasts with it.[29]

Using these distinctions now, we could save the platonic interpretation of Spinoza's theory of reason from the anomalous passages in IVP64&Cor and IVP68Dem in this way: Whoever has an adequate or rational cognition, will not cognize anything as $good_1$ or $evil_1$. This, however, is quite compatible with the statement that whoever has an adequate or rational cognition, may cognize things as $good_2$ or $evil_2$.

I would like to mention in passing still another possibility for the interpretation of these passages, although I do not consider it a very plausible interpretation. They could be paraphrased like this: Whoever has an adequate cogniton of the third kind, that is, an intuitive cognition, will not cognize anything as $good_1$ or $evil_1$, nor as $good_2$ or $evil_2$. Although he affirms his object of cognition as a $good_3$, this kind of good is beyond all dualistic judgements. This highest good by itself gives no definite premises for axiological or practical decisions – not until the cognizer steps back from it and tries to explicate some of its properties in the form of a rational model. Even though this might not be a good interpretation of the texts we have quoted, it seems to me to be a plausible explication of a position Spinoza might have expressed. In fact, he seems to have expressed something like this in the *Theological political Treatise* at the end of Chapter 13:

'... an intellectual cognition of God, which takes cognizance of His nature in so far as it actually is, and which cannot by any manner of living be imitated by mankind or followed as an example, has no bearing whatever on true rules of conduct, ...'

Bracketing this last interpretation for the moment, I now return to the platonic line of interpretation, which I consider to be preferable to the aristotelian one for several reasons. For one thing, the terms 'adequate cognition' and 'reason' are more central in the system of Spinoza than the terms 'good' and 'evil', and should therefore be saved from ambiguity before them. Moreover, Spinoza does not himself explicity state that he differentiates between two fundamentally different types of reason. On the contrary, he seems to imply that reason is true, certain, and necessary when it operates in axiological and practical fields of discourse as much as in theoretical fields.

NOTES

[1] There are many possible approaches to the *Ethics*. If the title itself is taken seriously, it might be fruitful to interprete it from a practical point of view. It could be assumed that freedom is the main practical aim, and that the different parts of the treatise serve to diagnose the human condition and to indicate a therapy or a way from bondage to freedom. Supporting passages for this view may be found in IIPraef, IIIP59Sch, IVP66Sch, IVP73Sch, VPraef, VP10Sch, VP20Sch, VP36Sch, VP42&Sch, and also from the title of part V: 'Of the Power of the Intellect or of Human Freedom'. Through IVP73 the political treatises could also be interpreted in this perspective.

[2] Cp. IIIDf1-3, IIIP1 and IIIP3. Some of these relations are reconstructed in J. Wetlesen & A. Naess, *Conation and Cognition in Spinoza's Theory of Affects*. Oslo, 1967. (Mimeo. This book is now included in the 'out-of-print book programme' of University Microfilms Ltd., St. John's Road, Tylens Green, Penn, High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire, England). The reconstructions have been further developed in J. Wetlesen, 'Basic Concepts in Spinoza's Social Psychology', *Inquiry*, 12, 1969, 105-32.

[3] Cp. IIP40Sch2, which should be read together with IIIP59Sch, VP36Sch and VP41Dem.

[4] Central occurrences in *Ethica* are: 'clear and distinct', IIP29Sch, IIP36; 'certain', see note 6; 'positive', IIP33&Dem, IIP49Sch; 'absolute', IIP34; 'perfect', IIP34, IIP43Sch, VP33Sch, VP40; 'real', IIP43Sch; 'necessary', IIP46; 'eternal', IIP44Cor2&Dem, IIP45&Sch, IIP46&Sch, VP23Sch, VP34Sch.

[5] A preliminary investigation in this direction has been made in Wetlesen & Naess, *ibid.*, pp.11-14 and 212-73.

[6] Cp. IIDf4Expl Adequate cognition, in the sense of the internal signs of a true idea, seems to be connected first of all with certainty. This I interprete as an 'evidence theory of truth'. A true cognition, in this sense, is itself the standard of what is true and of what is false. Cp. IIP43&Sch and TIE § 36. This cognition is clear and distinct, and it has a positive intensity or power which also gives it a character of being absolute, eternal, necessary, perfect, real, etc. In IIP43Sch there is a reference to IIP21Sch, which connects the dimension of certitude with that of 'an idea of an idea'. See note 10.

[7] Cp. IIP11Cor, which should be read together with IIIP1Dem and IIIP3Sch. The emphasis is here on the field-relatedness of adequate cognition.

[8] Cp. IAx7, which should be read together with IIP7. See note 10.

[9] Cp. TIE § 57 note 23 and IIP17Sch at the beginning.

[10] It is tempting to interprete the relation between Spinoza's 'evidence theory of truth' and his 'correspondence theory of truth' in this way: Truth as evidence (adequacy, certainty) is connected with the objective aspect of cognition and conation, whereas truth as correspondence refers to the necessary relation between the objective and formal aspects of cognition and conation.
This could be used to give an interpretation of Spinoza's ontology and metaphysics in a way which resembles certain features of the phenomenology of E. Husserl. Such an interpretation is not too far fetched. Both of these philosophers stand in the mainstream of the rationalist tradition, and both are deeply impressed by Descartes' theory of evidence. Husserl maintains that Descartes himself failed to work out the consequences of his premises with full consistency, and that he relapsed from apodictic evidence into the natural prejudices of everyday life *(die natürliche Einstellung)* when he proceeded to develop his ontology and metaphysics. It might well be argued that Spinoza's particular advance in relation to Descartes was that he avoided this relapse.

Spinoza's theory of mind and body or of the attributes of thought and extension could be interpreted in relation to the distinction between the objective and formal essence of things. The body corresponds to what we might call the formal essence of first order – this being equivalent to a certain class of what Husserl would call intentional objects on the level of the *noema*. The mind corresponds to the objective essense which is necessarily presupposed by the formal essence. It equivalates a certain class of what Husserl would call intentional acts on the level of *noesis*. Through acts of reflection one may form an idea of an idea. In this process a first order objective essence is transformed into a second order formal essence, and a second order objective essence is then by necessity presupposed. Such acts of reflection can be reiterated *ad indefinitum*. Each time the objective aspect escapes from the field of objects of cognition into the transcendental realm of acts of cognition. All levels of formal essence above the first level, as well as all levels of objective essence, are subsumable under the attribute of thought. The first level of formal essence alone is subsumable under the attribute of extension.

The parallelism between the attributes of thought and extension in this way approximately equivalates Husserl's parallelism between the *noesis* and *noema*. It is curious that an interpretation along these lines seems to have presented itself to Husserl's mind, but he rejected it. Cp. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie*. Vol. 1, The Hague, 1950, pp.118 and 249. However, a good friend of Husserl's, C. Stumpf (to whom Husserl dedicated his huge work, *Logische Untersuchungen*), has attempted to work out just this interpretation. See C. Stumpf, *Spinoza-studien*, Abh.d.preuss.Ak.d.Wiss., Ph.H.Kl., Berl., 1919.

Main passages for such an interpretation are to be found in IIP5&Dem, IIP6Cor, IIP7&Cor&Sch, IIP8Cor&Sch, IIP11&Dem, IIP12, IIP13&Cor, IIP21&Dem&Sch. These passages should be read together with the theory of reflection in TIE §§ 30-50, especially § 35, where 'certainty' is connected with the objective essence of things, and together with KV, App2, where the objective essence is connected with the infinite intellect.

[11] Cp. IIP48Sch, IIP49&Dem&Cor&CorDem&Sch.

[12] Cp. IIP33, IIP35&Dem, IIP43Sch, IIP49Sch.

[13] Cp. TIE §§ 30-50, especially §§ 33, 37, 38, 39, 49. Of great interest is also § 11. It should be noted that there exists some very interesting similarities between Spinoza's 'way' of liberation (cp. VP42Sch and VP10Sch) and the specifically Buddhist methods of meditation. See Nyanaponika Thera, *The Heart of Buddhist Meditation. A handbook of mental training based on the Buddha's way of mindfulness*. Lond., 1962. The Buddhist 'way of mindfulness' is divided into 'bare attention' and 'clear comprehension' in a manner which reminds very much of Spinoza's division of 'adequate cognition' into 'intuition' and 'reason'.

[14] Cp. VP39Sch. See also VP24 and IIP29Cor&Sch together with VP29Dem&Sch.

[15] Cp. IP29Sch. and also IDf3, IDf5,6, IAx1,2, 1A1, 1A2 on the double distinction between that which is and is conceived by itself and by something else; IP12, IP13 on indivisibility; IP14&Cor on unity and absolute infinity; and IDf8, IP19, IP20Cor1, IIP44Cor2&Dem, IIP45-7, VP23ff., and VP29ff. on eternity.

[16] Cp. IVP28, VP20Dem, VP32Cor, VP33, VP35, VP36&Sch, which should be read together with TTP, note 28.

One very fruitful approach to Spinoza's third kind of cognition and its affects would be to regard it as a primary awareness of one's body. Cp. VP3&Dem, VP4Sch, VP22, VP23&Dem&Sch, VP29Dem, VP41Dem, together with KV, Part 2, Chapter 22. In so far as it involves an awareness of all

parts of the body in an act of affirmation, the corresponding affects will be active. Cp. IVP42Dem and IVP60. If only some parts of the body are cognized and affirmed at the expense of other parts, the affect will be passive. Cp. IIIP10Dem, IIIAffGenD, IVP43Dem.

[17] Cp. IIP47, together with VP10&Sch.

[18] Cp. IIP40Sch2.

[19] Cp. CM, 1,1; KV, Part 1, Chapter 10; Part 2, Chapter 4; together with TIE § 12 and IApp, IIP40Sch1 and IVPr.

[20] Cp. Spinoza's remarks on methods of reasoning in 1P8Sch2, IIP10Sch, IIP18Sch, and VP10&Dem&Sch.

[21] Cp. Plato, *Politeia*, Book 6, 509D-511E.

[22] Cp. Aristotle, *Eth.Nic.*, Book 1, Chapter 13; and Book 6, especially Chapter 7 on σοφία, 6 on νους, 3 on ἐπιστήμη, 5 on φρόνησις and 4 on τεχνή.

[23] Cp. Aristotle, *Topica*, Book 1, Chapter 1; and *Rhetoric*, Book 1, Chapter 1.

[24] Some main occurrences in Ethica are the following. See also E. G. Boscherini, *Lexicon Spinozanum*, The Hague, 1970, under *ratio*, pp. 897-914, which covers the whole *corpus* of Spinoza's writings. *Ductu rationis*, IVP18Sch. IVP24, IVP35&Dem&Cor1&Cor2&Sch, IVP36Dem&Sch, IVP37Dem&Sch1&Sch2, IVP40Dem, IVP46&Dem, IVP62Dem, IVP63CorDem, IV65&Dem&Cor, IVP66&Cor, IVAppCap4; *rationis dictamine*, IIIP59Sch, IVP18Sch, IVP35Dem, IVP37Dem, IVP50Dem, IVP62&Dem, IVP67Dem, IVP72Dem, IVP73Dem, VP20Dem, VP41Dem; *rationis praecepta*, IVP18Sch; *rationis praescripto*, IVAppCap13, VP41Dem; *rationis judicio*, IVP70Dem; *ex ratione*, IVP26, IVP59Dem; *ex ratione oritur*, IVP52, IVP53, IVP61&Dem, IVP63Cor; *ex proprio rationis imperio*, IVAppCap9; *id quod ratio suadit*, IVP72Sch; *ratione ducitur*, IVP37Sch1, IVP63, IVP66Sch, IVP68Dem, IVP73&Dem&Sch; *a ratione determinari*, IVP59&Dem, IVAppCap25; *cum ratione convenit*, IVP51Dem, IVAppCap20; *rationi repugnat*, IVP51; *vita rationalis*, IVAppCap5, IVAppCap6.

[25] Main texts for Spinoza's general theory of value are: IIIP9Sch, IVP8&Dem, and IVAppCap30.

[26] For valuations based on imagination and passieve affects, cp. IIIP39Sch, IIIP56&Dem&Sch, IIIP57&Dem&Sch, IIIAffDf1&Expl, IIIAffDf44-48&Expl, IVP17Sch, IVP34&Sch, IVP37Sch1&Sch2, IVP43&Dem, IVP44Sch, and IVAipCap14.

[27] For valuations based on reason and its active affects, cp. IIIP59Sch, IVPraef, IVDf1,2, IVP14&Dem, IVP15&Dem, IVP16, IVP17&Sch, IVP18Sch, IVP19&Dem, IVP27&Dem, IVP28&Dem, IVP36&Dem&Sch, IVP37&Dem, 1&Dem2&Sch1&Sch2, IVP40&Dem, IVP41, IVP42&Dem, IVP45Sch, IVP59, IVP60&Sch, IVP63Cor&CorDem, IVP65&Dem&Cor, IVP66&Dem&Cor, IVAppCap3,4,5,6,8,9,12, VP20Dem, VP36Sch, VP41Dem.

[28] For valuations based on intuition and its acitve affects, cp. IVP28, VP20Sch, VP25ff., VP33&Sch, VP37&Dem.

[29] On affirmation of something which involves no negation, cp.VP7Dem, VP18Sch, VP20Sch and VP37&Dem, which should be read together with IIP33, IIP34, IIP45, IIP46, VP3&Dem, and VP4&Sch.

THEO ZWEERMAN

THE METHOD IN SPINOZA'S TRACTATUS DE INTELLECTUS EMENDATIONE

SOME REMARKS ON THIS PROBLEM INSPIRED BY THE *TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS* AND BY *EPISTOLA 37*

1. For the most part, what follows is an account of an analysis. It raises questions about some possible connections between what Spinoza says on the method of enquiry to be used in the study of Scripture, and the method followed by Spinoza in elaborating his methodology in *Epistola* 37. I shall explain the context in which I have made this enquiry. In doing so, I also hope to throw some light on proposals for any further study of the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*. Finally, I shall formulate these proposals in the form of conclusions.[1]

2. Briefly, the context of this detailed enquiry is an effort to unravel the structure and the content of the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione* (TIE) – *si énigmatique par sa densité et son interruption brusque.*[2] The motives for this special enquiry could be summarized under two headings.

a) Why did I choose the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (TTP)?
b) Certain elements of the TIE which in their analysis raise many questions.

2.1. Three main reasons have made me seek in the TTP a certain clarification for interpreting the TIE.

2.1.1. There are methodological questions brought up in the TIE as well as in Chapter VII of the TTP. Moreover it is important to observe that the TTP was meant for uninitiated readers of Spinoza and his philosophy. In this respect the TTP resembles the TIE. For in the TIE Spinoza repeatedly makes a distinction between the methodology itself and the *Philosophia* that he would later on (*postea*) deal with.[3]

2.1.2. The verb *petere* has a crucial function in important passages of chapter VII of the TTP; and also in a key passage of the TIE (cf. 2.2).

2.1.3. There is ground for believing that what is said in *Ep* 37 (in particular, on Bacon's *modus*, which according to Spinoza is the way to the true method,[4] could perhaps be clarified through a study of the TTP ch. VII. Similar terms in both texts seem to make this hypothesis legitimate.

2.2. Why, as I said above, must we pay attention to the word *petere* in the TTP, ch. VII (and furthermore in Spinoza's works)? We stress the importance of this word *petere* because it occurs in the last paragraph of the TIE (GII p.40; § 110 in the numbering of Koyré). There it occupies the central position along with other words like *statuere*, *aliquid commune* and *essentia cogitationis*. Now this in itself would hardly be significant, if § 110 had not occupied a special position in this Treatise. Paragraph 110 has a central position in this Treatise for the following three reasons. In this limited study I cannot possibly elaborate these reasons. I therefore only mention them in passing.

2.2.1. First of all, when analysed, the *structure* of TIE Pars II reveals § 110's major importance in order to understand the pages GII pp. 38-40; and further, to understand the whole of *Pars II*. And more so, because this Part II is fundamentally important to understand the movement of thought developped in the TIE.[5]

2.2.2. Secondly, the *content* of § 110 is an application of the principal of sufficient reason. (Cf. in particular the following: *jam aliquid commune statuendum est, ex quo hae proprietates necessario sequantur, sive quo dato hae necessario dentur, et quo sublato haec omnia tollantur*). This second reason prompts two questions.

2.2.2.1. It may be asked whether sufficient attention has been paid to the principle of sufficient reason in Spinoza's work. One may say that especially Boehm and Deleuze have done so. Yet the following question remains: what role does the principle of sufficient reason play in the *Korte Verhandeling* and in the TIE?[6]

2.2.2.2. Secondly, if it is true, that the structure of TIE Part II reveals § 110's major importance in order to understand the whole of Part II, then, we must recognize that Spinoza's search for sufficient reason has played a major role in the whole of the argument of the TIE. And thus, the question arises if, and to what extent, this principle does manifest itself in other parts of the TIE.

2.2.3. The TIE, as it stands, culminates with two parallel expressions: *essentia cogitationis* (...) *petenda* and *jam aliquid commune statuendum*. These two expressions are evidently interesting for the *gerundivum-form*. But I also think them interesting from another point of view – the *vagueness* of the words *aliquid commune*. Any research would show that the occurrence of this vagueness is not haphazard in this Treatise. It therefore presents a challenge for an interpretation of the TIE. In this article we cannot fully develop this point. But it is my conviction that this vagueness may never be reduced to the historical level of thinking and expression of Spinoza in the year 1662. In other words, it would not be wholly satisfactory to say that Spinoza's language was not yet fully developed in the year 1662.[7]

To my mind this vagueness has a role within the limits offered by the TIE. This Treatise must be taken seriously not *in spite* of, but

because of this vagueness. This is especially true, when one could demonstrate that this vagueness is connected with some other points in the text of the TIE.

2.2.3.1. In the first place, there is *the special position* of the supposed reader, who is unaquainted with the eternal order of Nature. This special position can be clarified by analysing the structure of the passage TIE, GII p.*8*,10-*8*,31. It is clear, that when doing so, this passage should be placed within the context of the Introduction of the TIE.

2.2.3.2. Secondly, the perspective of *time* not only plays a large role in the Introduction, in which the horizon for the whole Treatise is given; but it also affects some of its key passages, such as GII pp. *7*,31-*8*,9-*8*,10-*8*,31 (cf. expressions as *in initio, temporis spatium, postquam, interim*).

2.2.3.3. Thirdly, the occurrence of the various terms in the Treatise which express by way of examples *time, relativity, gradation, condition.*[8] It would appear to me that a serious study of the TIE, would place these various elements within an explanatory whole. Perhaps this hope is clarified even further through the proposals given in Part 4 of this article. Yet, whatever the value of these proposals, it seems to me of special importance to figure out the meaning of such words as *petere, statuere* and *aliquid commune*. In doing so, we must consult the TIE and the other works of Spinoza. What follows may be a small contribution in this direction.

3.1. *Preliminary remarks on the similar usage of words in the TTP and in the Ep2 and 37.*

There is an important remark at the beginning of TTPchVII. Spinoza says that the method for the interpretation of Scripture does in no way differ from the method te be used for the interpretation of nature (*sed cum ea prorsus convenire*)[9] He then goes on to develop this method for the interpretation of nature. He distinguishes two stages: the description of the phenomena of nature (*in concinnanda scilicet historia naturae*), and the deriving of definitions from this description of the natural phenomena.[10]

The way he expresses himself in the TTP is very striking. It closely resembles his Letter 37, where he refers to Bacon's *modus*, which guides us to 'the true method' (... *historiolam concinnare modo illo, quo Verulamius docet*).[11] Further this expression *historiolam concinnare* can be found in other parts of the TTP. In these passages they are also brought forward in connection with questions of method.[12]

Coming to the word *narrare*, we find it used in *Ep 2*. In this context Spinoza is making a remark on the philosophy of Bacon.[13] Could we see here a connection between the words *narrare* and *concinnare*? It is important to note here, that the term *enarrare*, used in the TTP, is

employed in passages that deal with the *historia*, and are connected with the interpretation of Scripture.[14]

In the light of these similarities in the use of words between the TTP and some *Ep*, it seems to me that there is some reason for a further research into the methods of studying Scripture and nature. Combined with the data gathered from these letters, Spinoza's doctrine about these methods could help in unravelling the method Spinoza follows in constructing his methodology in the TIE.

3.2. It would seem that two elements in the methodology of the TTP ch VII, are specially important for the reading of the TIE.

a) There is a corresponding methodological norm for the enquiry of nature and for the enquiry of Scripture. Spinoza constantly states that both methods are similar.[15]
b) The description of the stages which his method develops.

In what follows I will deal with both these points.

3.2.1. As is well known, Spinoza repeatedly stresses that Scripture is the only ground on which Scripture must be interpreted. *Quare cognitio horum omnium* (...) *ab ipsa Scriptura sola peti debet: sicut cognitio naturae ab ipsa natura.*[16]

Why, one would ask, does he propose this restriction? One answer to this question is, that in some instances the Bible leaves us no other choice. The Bible contains matters that sometimes cannot be deduced from principles known by the *lumen naturale*.[17] In passing one could also note that in *Ep* 37 Spinoza describes a similar situation. Here knowledge *per causam primam* is also absent. And here as well as in the TTP, Spinoza is suggesting a method of description (*historiolam*).

However, in the TTP Spinoza proposes a methodological restriction to the data given in Scripture, even in the instances where the *lumen naturale* could possibly, and without any difficulty, provide an interpretation of Scripture.[18] Therefore in these instances also Spinoza thinks that Scripture is the only ground on which it must be interpreted.[19]

We recall that this emphasis on Scripture being the only ground for its own interpretation follows from the same grounds which underlie Spinoza's whole argument in the TTP. For Spinoza it was not legitimate to say that free philosophical thinking should be restrained by appeals to Scripture. On the contrary, if Scripture itself is interpreted from within its own and not from other backgrounds, free philosophical thinking is legitimate in its own right.

3.2.2. Now, what are the stages in which the one principle for the interpretation of Scripture and nature is applied and developed? As we have already said, this one principle is: *cognitio Scripturae* (naturae)

ab ipsa Scriptura (natura) *sola peti debet.*[20] From several dispersed remarks in the TTP one could discern two stages.

a) Reporting, or describing, what is found (*concinnare historiam*).
b) Deriving definitions from this historia in the field of nature, and deriving the intentions of the authors in the field of Scripture.[21]

The senses of both these stages are borne by the verb *petere*, as it occurs in: *cognitio Scripturae ab ipsa Scriptura peti debet.* The verb *petere* signifies the search for the knowledge of nature as well as Scripture. We recall that in our opinion, *petere* has a key position in the last paragraph of the TIE.

Coming back to TTP ch VII, we find the following as regards these two stages.

3.2.2.1. The sense of *concinnare historiam* is expressed among others by 'gathering' (*colligere*), by 'drawing under some headings' (*ad summa capita redigere*) what is found in a certain field (*reperiuntur*).[22] These activities are necessary because nature itself does not provide definitions (*non tradit definitiones rerum*).[23]

3.2.2.2. How does Spinoza derive definitions from the historia? This passage towards definitions, drawing conclusions (*concludere*), is not elucidated by Spinoza himself – at least not in the TTP.[24] Nevertheless his use of terms in this connection is consistent. The passage towards definitions (*concludere*) is clearly distinguished from any deduction from principles known by the *lumen naturale.*[25] This first upward movement, as acquisition of knowledge, is called 'investigation' (*investigare*).[26] And besides using the word 'concluding' he speaks of 'following' (*sequere*) or 'eliciting' (*elicere*) from an *historia.*[27]

On the other hand 'to deduce' (*deducere*) has the same sense as *determinare, descendere* and *derivare.*[28] Also in place of *definitiones* he employs some other terms. He sometimes speaks about *principia et fundamenta* which we must derive from *historia.* Elsewhere he speaks about the *res maxime communes* from where one has to descend.[29] A summary of the whole process of interpreting can be found in GIII p.102. But even here the question of *how* this passage is made from description to definitions remains unanswered. However, Spinoza elaborates well what he sees as the total process of gathering knowledge of nature and Scripture. It is a *circle* which first proceeds upwards and then, deductively, downwards. In an enquiry on nature the aim is indeed to find the most general things; things that are common to the whole of nature. (*res maxime universales et toti naturae communes*). They are namely Motion and Rest, and their laws, by which Nature always proceeds.[30]

Departing from there, one proceeds gradually to the less common things (*gradatim procedimus*). The same process holds good for Scripture. Even here one searches the most general, the basis and

foundation (*basis et fundamentum*), the eternal doctrine (*aeterna doctrina*). The movement upwards gathers the variety in its highest achievable unity, and this movement is developed in order to achieve a better deductive knowledge of this variety.[31]

From an interesting passage which deals with the *lumen naturale*[32] we can show that Spinoza considers deductive knowledge as genuine knowledge. Consequently, the methods to acquire knowledge, described in the TTP ch VII, are preparatory. In that passage the following question is raised: what is the make up of the nature, and power, of the *lumen naturale*? The answer is: 'The nature and efficacy of the natural reason consists in deducing and proving the unknown from the known, or in carrying premises to their legitimate conclusions'. (*Hujus enim luminis natura et virtus in hoc potissimum consistit, quod res scilicet obscuras ex notis, aut tanquam notis datis, legitimis consequentiis deducat atque concludat*). There can be no doubt that in this passage there is a correspondence between the word *deducere* and *notae*. There is also a correspondence between the word *concludere* (which in this chapter always signifies an upward movement in the acquisition of knowledge) and the words *tanquam notae*. This same distinction, and a confirmation of this same correspondence, can also be found at the beginning of Chapter VII.[33] At this place too, the basis of the deduction are the *principia nota*; and the basis for the upward movement for acquiring knowledge is called *tanquam certae datae*. In other words: real certainty is only acquired in deductive knowledge.[34]

3.3. Now, what can be done with these explanations in the TTP on the methods for the interpretation of nature and Scripture? These data, it seems to me, could help us clarify the short explanation on method, which occurs in *Ep* 37. And the better we understand this letter, the surer key would we possess to enter the structure of the TIE.[35] As is well known, *Ep* 37 deals with the way (*modus*) that will bring us to 'the true method'. This true method is described as 'the knowledge of pure thinking, its nature and laws'. Concerning the way to this true method, Spinoza says that it is sufficient to give a description of the mind and its perceptions (*mentis, sive perceptionum historiolam concinnare*) when we are unable to achieve knowledge by means of the first cause. As we have already said, several points of *Ep* 37 resemble points that occur in the TTP ch VII. We have mentioned already a similarity with regard to *historiam concinnare*. There is also an analogy in the absence of a deductive knowledge, derived from natural principles of knowledge. Therefore there is also an analogy in the effort to attain a knowledge of the laws (*leges*) through another method than deduction.[36]

In my opinion, all these data put together suggest the following

hypothesis. It seems that just as in the TTP so also in *Ep* 37, and in the TIE, Spinoza followed a way that is analogous to the method of interpreting nature (*methodus interpretandi naturam*). He did this in order to find 'the true Method'. If this hypothesis is justified, the following interpretation and paraphrase of what is said in *Ep* 37 confirms it. The *Ep* 37 says that the true method is equal to the knowledge of pure thinking, its nature and its laws. The way proposed by this *Epistola* to achieve that knowledge is analogous to the *adagium* of the TTP: *Cognitio Scripturae ab ipsa Scriptura sola peti debet.* Applied in its turn to the knowledge of pure thinking it will read: *cognitio intellectus puri* (*ejusque naturae et legum*) *ab ipso intellecto puro solo peti debet.*

If our interpretation is correct, it implies that Spinoza considers it possible to derive knowledge of pure thinking from the data of the pure thinking which occur in our perceptional life. This in turn implies that through the process of gathering, namely *historiola mentis sive perceptionum*, we reach the general unifying principle of thinking. It is in this principle of thinking, that genuine knowledge i.e. deductive thinking, has its source. And 'the true method' *is* this knowledge of the foundation of all pure thinking (*fundamenta*), unspoilt by imagination.

On the one hand, if the basis of this *petere* of the knowledge of pure thinking is pure thinking itself; and, on the other hand, if for deductive knowledge the starting point is this pure thinking known reflexively, but still lacking at the outset; we must say that the search for the true method must be characterised as one big *petitio principii*. A first imperfect knowledge of the basis of pure thinking blooms into a full, at least formal, knowledge of this basis. The way to the method is revealed as the 'coming-to-itself' of pure thinking.[37] Further, if our interpretation and paraphrase of *Ep* 37 is justified, the TIE should somehow reveal the sort of *petitio principii* which we have just described. Is this an avoidable *petitio principii*? It seems to us that it is not. We believe that the TIE, as a doctrine on method, would constantly reveal a double sense with regard to the object inquired after. This object is both the apriori supposed and at the same time the aposteriori yet to be achieved.[38] Furthermore the two stages of the enquiry of nature which we discerned in the TTP would also occur in the TIE. In other words, both a description of the phenomena of knowledge, and a conclusion derived from this description would occur in the TIE.[39] This conclusion on the ground of the description would produce the required all-embracing definition of pure thought. In other words, the result is what *Ep* 37 calls 'the true method'. This would be the fulfilment of the *emendatio* of the intellect.[40]

4. In conclusion I propose the following points. I think they have a

role to play in an enquiry into the TIE. They are partially connected with what was dealt with in points 2 and 3.

4.1. First, there is the problem of the circular argument in the TIE. In the light of what this paper says, one could ask if this circle, *petitio principii*, has in fact a special significance as *the petere* of the sufficient reason of the phenomena of knowledge?[41] Does this same context determine the connection between the growth of the self-consciousness (*prise de conscience* as well as *prise de pouvoir*) and the effort of self-preservation (*conatus*)?[41a]

4.2. Secondly, there is the example set by Parkinson, Fløistad and Deleuze. Their research on the *Ethica* of Spinoza posed the following question: What ways of knowing are actually followed in the *Ethica*? An enquiry on these same lines, in my opinion, must also be made for the TIE. In other words, an analysis of the TIE must also ask the following question: given the distinct ways of perception of the TIE, what ways of knowing does it actually follow? Probably such an analysis would go far in the way of a clarification on questions like, *the method* (followed in this methodology), and the expressions of vagueness and negativity, which we mentioned and which occur in the TIE.[42]

4.3. Thirdly, and in close connection with the last problem, it would be worthwhile to examine carefully those expressions of the TIE which suggest any *instrumental* vision on the formation of knowledge. How far can the fourth mode of perception be attained by means of the lower modes of perception? Is it a staircase formation? Is it the fabrication of an apparatus? But if this last metaphor is applied, how do we understand the transition, the process from fabrication to the use of the apparatus?[43]

4.4. The tension between absoluteness and relativity, between the reality *in sua natura spectatum* and the reality present for a beginner, seems a main task in an analysis of the TIE. Departing from the passage on page 8 (GII p.*8*,10-31), and through and analysis of the usage of words, it would be interesting to sense this same tension through the whole Treatise.[44]

4.5. But perhaps the most important task would be this: to see the connection of these four aspects of the *Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*, of these four methods of question and inquiry, just posed.

NOTES

[1] For Spinoza's works we quote C. Gebhardt, *Spinoza, Opera*: Im Auftrag der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Heidelberg, 1925. (Abbrev. = G.) The English quotations are partially taken from the translation made by R. H. M. Elwes. In reformulating this article in english, I received a very valuable help from drs. Sidney Mascarenhas.

[2] Joseph Moreau, quoted by A. Darbon, *Études Spinozistes*, Paris 1946, p.VII.

[3] For the 17 places in the TIE where Spinoza refers to his 'Philosophy', cf. C. Gebhardt, *Spinozas Abhandlung über die Verbesserung des Verstandes*. Heidelberg, 1905, pp.31-33. (Besides these explicit allusions, there are also implied references in Spinoza's choice of vague terms in the TIE. See below 2.2.3.) Cf. Also Di Vona, *Il concetto di filosofia nel Tractatus de intellectus emendatione di Spinoza*, Rivista critica di Storia della Filosofia, 15 (1960), pp.396-397. Although Di Vona mentions that the TTP more often than once has similarities with the TIE, alas, he hardly explained it.

[4] GIV p.189, 7.

[5] In the TIE, as it has seen light, I have made four main divisions, namely: *The Introduction* (GII pp.*5-9*, 34): *The Preliminary Remarks* (GII pp.*9*, 34-*19*,6); *Pars I* (GII pp.*19*,6-*33*,32); *Pars II* (GII pp.*33*, 32-*40*,12). With regard to the problems in TIE (GII p.38ff.); cf. also J. L. Marion, *Le fondement de la Cogitatio selon le De Intellectus Emendatione*, Les Études Philosophiques, 1962, pp. 357-368. Also cf. G. Deleuze, *Spinoza et le Problème de l'Expression*. Paris, 1968, ch.VIII, pp.114-129.

[6] Cf. R. Boehm, *Spinoza und die Metaphysik der Subjektivität*. Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung XXII (1968), pp.165-186; St. Hampshire, *Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom*, in: *Freedom of Mind and Other Essays*. Oxford, 1972, pp.186,188,190; C. Schoonbrood, *Begrijpelijkheid en Voldoende Grond*, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie, 26 (1964), pp.383-403; G. Deleuze, *op.cit.*, pp.63-64, 70,74,76,87,120,125,139,140 ff. etc.; the *Korte Verhandeling* (K.V.), GI p. 110, 33-34, and p.111,1.

[7] H. H. Joachim places the TIE in 1662. (*Spinoza's Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione*. Oxford, 1940, p. 6). Leaving aside an evaluation of the (im)maturity of the K.V., we are faced in the years 1662-1663 with letters of Spinoza, which reveal, in my opinion, a certain maturity.

[8] One could recall the following words (obviously a selection!): hucusque, quamdiu, quantum in initio licet; ante omnia; hic.
si...; modo...; cum...; licet...; quo...eo; tantum...quantum; sufficiens est; quantum fieri potest; quatenus; non absolute; facilius; quam optime; quam minime;
Cf. also the usage of the words: putare, supponere; aestimari; mirari; vocatur; dicitur; fingere; innotescere; versari circa.
Vagueness can be found in the usage of words like: aliquid; quid...; quaenam; quaedam; talis; tanquam.

[9] TTP Ch VII (GIII p.*98*,18). In this paragraph I follow to some extent the exposition given by S. Zac, *Spinoza et l'Interprétation de l'Écriture*. Paris, 1965, *Chapitre Premier*, and H. De Dijn, *Over de Interpretatie (van de Schrift) volgens Spinoza (1632-1677)* Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 29 (1967), pp.667-704. These authors, however, did not analyse the text of the TTP in order to understand the TIE. In this sense my exposition is determined by another perspective.

[10] TTP Ch VII (GIII p.*98*,20-21) Zac, *op.cit.*, correctly refers here to the TIE. In it there occurs a short but important text (GII p.37). He deals with the manner in which we should acquire the experimental knowledge of nature.

[11] Ep 37 (GIV p.189, 7).

[12] TTP Ch VI and VII (GIII p.*95*,7-8; p.*112*, 30). In the TIE there also occurs the verb *concinnare* (GII p.*9*,6). In this passage it signifies the elaboration of the science of medicine. Could we suggest here that Spinoza wanted to apply the method for the interpretation of nature in the field of medicine, which he so highly esteemed?

[13] Ep. 2 (GIV p.*8*,30) 'Narrare' occurs sometimes in the *Ethica* Part III (GII pp.*176*,18; *183*,4; *198*,30; *198*,33); furthermore in TTP Ch II, GIII p.*43*,15).

[14] TTP Ch VII (GIII pp. 99,33;101,26).

[15] Besides the above quoted text (TTP Ch VII, (GIII p.*98*,18ff.); cf. also TTP Ch VII, (GIII pp.*98*,31;*99*,26; *102*,20ff.).

[16] TTP Ch VII, (GIII p.*99*,5ff.); TTP *Praef* (GIII p.*10*,19ff.); TTP Ch VII (GIII p.102,21ff.) and *passim* in Chapter VII.

[17] TTP Ch VII (GIII p.*98*,33).

[18] TTP Ch VII, (GIII p.*103*,4).

[19] This restriction has a consequence. Spinoza is led to make a distinction between the meaning and the truth of the statements in Scripture. In the methodology of the TTP he is only dealing with the significance of statements in Scripture: *de solo enim sensu orationum, non autem de earum veritate laboramus*. TTP Ch VII (GIII p.100,15).

[20] TTP Ch VII (GIII p.*99*,5ff.).

[21] TTP Ch VII (GIII p.*98*,18ff). The words *tanquam ex certis datis* will be dealt with below.

[22] TTP Ch VII (GIII p. *100*, 8ff.; p.*101*,9).

[23] TTP Ch VII (GIII p.*99*,26; cf.p.*98*,31ff.).

[24] Also Zac remarks: 'Spinoza ne développe nulle part explicitement comment s'effectue, selon lui, le passage de l'histoire à l'interprétation de la nature', *op.cit.*, pp.31-32.

[25] TTP Ch VII (GIII p.*98*,34; cf.p.*99*,27-28).

[26] TTP Ch VII (GIII pp.*100*,2; *100*,20; *105*,11).

[27] TTP Ch VII (GIII pp.*102*,16ff.; *99*,29).

[28] TTP Ch VII (GIII pp.*103*,5; *104*,34; *103*,8; *109*,3; *110*,1). Some of these words occur in important passages of the TIE, e.g. GII p.*38*,1ff. Cf. also also remarks made by Gebhardt in the *Textgestaltung* of his edition, GII ip.338-339.

[29] TTP Ch VII (GIII p.*100*,27ff.; p.104,33).

[30] TTP Ch VII (GIII p.*102*,21ff.); cf. EthII, *Lemmata* (GII pp.97ff.).

[31] Cf. here my remark above (3.2.2.1.) about the use of the word *colligere*. The remarks of Deleuze on the third mode of perception (as given in the TIE) seem to me very relevant for understanding this upward movement. Deleuze, *op.cit.*, pp.141ff. On 'the circle of the investigation' in the TTP Ch VII, cf. also De Dijn, *l.c.*, p.682-683.

[32] TTP Ch VII (GIII p.*112*,5ff.). Elwes' translation, quoted below, is far from precise.

[33] TTP Ch VII (GIII pp.*98*,23 and *98*,33; also cf. p.*98*,20).

[34] In the TTP there is a group of texts which are also important for explaining the problem of method in Spinoza's work. But here I can only refer to them. I have in mind the texts that deal with the *notiones communes* or the *notiones simplicissimae* occurring in an aposteriori argument for the existence of God; cf. Adnotatio VI (GIII p.252-253; p.84ff.). The old question whether these *notiones communes* play a role in the TIE is disputed by Deleuze, *op.cit.*, ch XVIII.

[35] And to add to the keys we possess, Gebhardt said: 'In der Abhandlung über die Verbesserung des Verstandes liegt der Schlüssel zum Verständnis der Ethik.'

[36] Cf. e.g. TTP ChVII (GIII p.*100*,17 and *100*,24ff.).

[37] With regard to this 'coming-to-itself' of pure thinking, cf. The Introduction of the TIE. This Introduction must be taken to be a serious account of the personal process Spinoza underwent.

[38] We see here a certain connection in Deleuze's remarks, namely that *a fiction* is necessary to obtain the *fundamentum* in Part II (GII p.38). (Deleuze, *op.cit.* p.120). Darbon as well as Joachim speak in their own manner about a circle made in the TIE (Darbon, *op.cit*, p.32 and 78; Joachim, *op.cit.*, p.25, n.1) And lastly, there is also a certain similarity with what Koyré says when he is speaking of a 'spring', or 'jump', or 'bounce'. (A. Koyré, *Notes du Traducteur* p.III B. de Spinoza, *Traité de la Réforme de l'Entendement*. Paris, 1951; ibidem, *Avant-Propos*, p.XXI: '*Il faut un bond*').

[9] Perhaps this process could be described in a paraphrase of the title of Richardson's book on Heidegger (W. Richardson, *Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought*. Den Haag, 1964) It would then run: *Spinoza. Through Phenomenology of Thought to Thinking*.

[40] In his book, which we have already cited, Zac mentions the connection between Ep37 and TTP ch.VII. This connection, however, is not elaborated.

[41] Some other places, where the words *petere* and *petitio* occur (besides in TTP Ch VII): TTP Ch I (GIII p.*16*,27; p.*18*,33; p.*29*,9); TTP Ch II (GIII p. *42*,31); TTP Ch III (GIII pp.*53*,23; *53*,28; *53*,31; *53*,33; *54*,3); TTP Ch VI, GIII p.*96*,12); TTP Ch XIII, (GIII p.*170*,33).
Also cf. *Tractatus Politicus* ch. I (GIII p.*276*,3).
In the *Nagelate Schriften*, '*petenda*' (GII p.40) has been translated into '*moet gehaalt worden*'. (N.S., p.446).
The word *petere* does not figure in Boscherini's *LEXICON SPINOZANUM* (La Haye, 1970) But it is clear that this book is indispensable for a further investigation of the usage of words like *deducere, determinare, historia* etc.

[41a] In the Introduction of the TIE the *conatus* occurs in GII p.*6*,24; *7*,6; *9*,23-33.
As mentioned in note 39), Joachim and Darbon talk about a circle. Further, they both agree that the TIE has a popular character. Probably, 'popular' is their manner of accounting for the vague expressions found in the TIE. For me the question remains, where in the system of Spinoza this vagueness or popularity finds its place. Is this connected with the problem of a circle or circles in the TIE? Whatever approach we may have, I think, one must also take into account the following facts:
a) The two meanings attached to the word '*ex*', that occurs in the last paragraph of the TIE (GII p.40; § 110).
b) The two meanings attached to the word '*modus*', that occurs in GII p.*9*,10 and p.*10*,1.
c) The two meanings, it seems, attached to the word '*ad*', that occurs in the key phrase of this methodology, GII p.*16*,3: *quomodo mens dirigenda sit ad datae verae ideae normam.*
d) The dissimilar movement revealed in the word '*investigare*', GII p.*15*,26 and p.*15*,32.

[42] G. H. R. Parkinson, *Language and Knowledge in Spinoza*. Inquiry 12 (1969), in particular pp.34ff.; G. Fløistad, *Spinoza's Theory of Knowledge*. Inquiry 12 (1969), pp.41-65.
Deleuze makes some very interesting remarks on the TIE (*op.cit.* Ch. X). He throws much light on Spinoza's position with regard to the third mode of perception of the TIE. Deleuze makes it clear that Spinoza's position is divergent on the one hand of Aristotle's position, and on the other hand from Descartes' position.

[43] a) These, I think, are expressions of an instrumental vision on the formation of knowledge:

instrumentum, operatio, procedere, commercium habere, formare, praestare, automa spirituale, experimentum, opera intellectualia. For the rest cf. GII p.*14*,33.

b) As far as I am aware, the image of the staircase (*'trap'*) appears twice in the *K.V.* (*K.V.*II, cap. VIII (GI p.*69*,35) and Cap.XXVI (GI p.*109*,32).

c) The problem of discontinuity (bounce, spring, jump) once again demands attention.

[44] A.o., Gebhardt and Darbon have already pointed out that the theme 'All-or-Nothing' plays a role in the Introduction of the TIE. We believe that this theme must be contrasted with the themes: relativity, gradation, condition, time etc.

H. G. HUBBELING

THE DISCUSSIONS AT THE SPINOZA-SYMPOSIUM IN AMERSFOORT SEPTEMBER 10-13, 1973

Under the auspices of the 'Internationale School voor Wijsbegeerte' (International School for Philosophy) and under the inspiring and competent leadership of the director of this school, Dr. J. G. van der Bend, nearly twenty Spinoza scholars from all parts of the world came together to discuss some papers that were distributed before. In addition two public lectures were held on the first day by Naess (Oslo) and Parkinson (Reading). Dr. van der Bend had proposed Spinoza's epistemology as a central theme to which professor Naess added Spinoza's doctrine of freedom. With the exception of the first day during which public meetings were held, we gathered in a circle and held our discussions in a Spinozistic, non-emotional way. The secretary of the Dutch Spinoza-association, 'Het Spinoza-Huis', G. van Suchtelen, drew my attention to the fact that the way in which Spinoza is discussed now, differs very much from that in the twenties and thirties. In those days the scholars tried to defend their own philosophy with the help of Spinoza's authority. Now we have a free attitude towards Spinoza, although we admire him. Thus we are able to give a better evaluation of Spinoza's philosophy. At the conference nobody was a 'Spinozist', but everybody tried to come to a better understanding of this great philosopher. Everybody agreed that the study of Spinoza is an inspiring source of philosophical knowledge. Occasionally Naess would speak words like '... as the Master says ...', but everybody could plainly hear the slightly ironical tone in his words, for which he is so well known. Thus the conference was a symptom of a new era in Spinoza scholarship. Recent philosophical trends of our time, e.g. logical empiricism, analytical philosophy, structuralism, etc. showed that their methods are also fruitful for the study of the history of philosophy. Spinoza is esteemed much higher in these circles than e.g. in existentialism, although also there great admirers of Spinoza can be found, such as the German philosopher Karl Jaspers. The atmosphere of the conference reminded me very often of that of an Old- or New Testament discussion group, where everybody has a bible before him from which he constantly quotes. But for this company the bible was replaced by Spinoza's *Ethica*! If

I now try to give an impression of the discussions, then the selection of the themes chosen can only be subjective. This report is by no means to be considered as an official one. Besides a complete statement of all the discussions would take too much place.

In the centre of our discussions was Spinoza's doctrine of knowledge. Of course in this connection the well-known three ways of knowledge came up. The first way is that of *vaga experientia* (vague experience, or better according to Parkinson: inconstant experience) and knowledge by hearing others; the second way is that of rational knowledge and the third way is the *scientia intuitiva*, intuitive knowledge. In the traditional Spinoza interpretation the first way of knowledge is considered to be of no importance. De Deugd, however, has pointed out in his dissertation that for Spinoza the first way, the way of experience, is more important than people are usually inclined to accept. At our conference Zweerman and De Dijn agreed with this standpoint. Of course, the second way is more important, but this yields, as De Dijn pointed out, only a general framework. For the knowledge of the concrete things, the concrete existences, a completion of this framework with the help of experience is necessary. However, this can never lead to clear and distinct knowledge, because we do not know all the factors that constitute a concrete thing. We can only know the concrete essences of the things in God, but not in the same way their concrete existences.

Is the third way a mystical way? In contradistinction to what is said about this subject in the past, most scholars at the conference (Naess, Fløjstad, Hubbeling) were of the opinion that this was not, or at least not necessarily, the case. They agreed that it was a way to acquire a better knowledge of the concrete things than is possible by the first way of knowledge. We see them now 'in God'. Are there qualitatively different degrees in this third way of knowledge? According to Naess and Fløistad this was certainly the case. De Dijn contradicted this position. According to him there is certainly more and less knowledge in the third way, but this has only to do with *quantitative* degrees of perfection and never leads to a *qualitatively* better knowledge. The standpoint of Naess and others can only be maintained, if one accepts that Spinoza was already aware of the Hegelian dialectical jump from quantitative to qualitative differences which is, of course, an open question.

Spinoza's relation to Hegel and German Idealism came up several times. According to De Dijn Hegel had misinterpreted Spinoza, when he thought that Spinoza's well known adagium '[omnis] determinatio est negatio' ([every] determination [in the logical sense of adding determinants or predicates] is negation) (Ep.50) refers to the constituting of the concrete separate things. According to Hubbeling this

was indeed the case, but Spinoza's concept of negation is not to be taken in the Hegelian dialectical sense, but in the ordinary sense of classical logic. In Hegel's philosophy negation is the driving force in history and thought, but negation has here an ambiguous meaning and is at every turn used differently. At the conference there were also some scholars with a more German Idealistic background, such as Hammacher (Aachen), Hansen (Aarhus) and Harris (Evanston, U.S.A.). They asked our attention for the problem of the selfreflection of the mind. According to Hammacher it was Spinoza's mistake that he did not teach the reflexivity of the mind and of thinking. Therefore he did not know the concept of the 'transcendental ego' and he deprived himself of the possibility of a constant selfreflection on man's actions. And this led Spinoza to his determinism, which is properly speaking a denial of freedom. Harris and Hansen on the other hand thought that Spinoza *did* teach, implicitly or explicitly, this reflexivity of *cogitare*. Zweerman too saw in Spinoza a forerunner of Hegel in this respect: 'The way to the method is revealed as the "coming-to-itself" of pure thinking'. De Dijn, who denied every trace of Hegel in Spinoza, contradicted this. Hubbeling took an intermediate position. He was of the opinion that Spinoza taught the reflexivity of *cogitare*, but he thought that in Spinoza the concept of the 'transcendental ego' is lacking, because he identified intellect and will. This does not alter the fact that Spinoza really knows the concept of freedom and is justified in using it. Man is free, insofar as he is determined by his eternal essence in God. The extent to which he is so determined, however, is not in his own power. Naess took a completely different position. He denied that Spinoza taught a complete determination *in time*. Determination was only a limitation to various possibilities; it was not a fixing on one possibility. Most scholars at the conference did not follow him. Rice (Milwaukee, U.S.A.) pointed out that it was an attractive aspect in Spinoza's philosophy that he could give a doctrine of freedom in spite of the complete determination in time. Naess defended his position by indicating that Spinoza spoke several times about more and less freedom depending on the extent of man's knowledge of the third kind. And this way of knowledge does not stand in the chain of natural causes and effects. It is therefore not determined *in time*.

We saw above that most scholars agreed that the third way of knowledge was not a specific mystical way. Mysticism was taken here as a way of contemplating, leading to a mystical union (*unio mystica*) with God. Hubbeling defended the thesis that the undoubtedly mystical structure of Spinoza's philosophy (man's thought is a part of God's thinking, the world is to be seen 'sub specie aeternitatis', etc.) was founded on the use of certain logical rules and was not based on mystical

experience. This was contradicted by Wetlesen (Oslo), who particularly distinguished himself by constantly quoting Spinoza's *Ethica* by heart. He referred to VP23Sch: 'But nevertheless we know and *experience* that we are eternal'. Hammacher, Rice and Hubbeling pointed out, however, that this quotation occurs in a passage in which Spinoza taught that we know that we are eternal by means of the second and third way of knowledge. 'Experience' in the quotation mentioned above is to be interpreted as a – perhaps emotional – additional phenomenon of our (logical) knowledge. Wetlesen was supported by his Norwegian fellow countrymen (Naess, Fløistad), who argued in favour of the possibility of mystical experience in Spinoza. Naess, however, complicated the matter by saying that Spinoza could have built up his system without the concept of God. Abraham (Zürich) pointed out, however, that the well-known definition 6 of the first part of the *Ethics* was many times referred to by Spinoza in the rest of his book. Wetlesen tried, as the other Norwegians did, to actualize the ethical aspects of Spinoza's philosophy. According to him we have to distinguish several senses in the concepts of 'good' and 'evil' in Spinoza, depending on the fact whether they are known by the first, second or third way of knowledge. In the latter case even we do not, properly speaking, have knowledge of 'evil', only of 'good'. Groen, professor of medicine in Leiden, gave an original contribution. He pointed out the great impact Spinoza had on the rise of modern science, especially on the development of the modern objective study of the emotions. Still he did not deny that Spinoza's philosophy had some shortcomings in this respect, because full justice was not done to the empirical sides of modern science. Moreover Groen attached great value to Spinoza's combination of scientific thinking and mysticism. Furthermore he thought that he could observe a connection of thinking and language in Spinoza, but here he was contradicted by Wernham (Aberdeen), Rice (U.S.A.) and Abraham (Zürich). The conference accepted Groen's thesis that the computer model was not appropriate for describing Spinoza's doctrine of the mind. We have to interpret Spinoza's concept of substance dynamically (Parkinson). According to Naess Spinoza's thought had the structure of the *Gestalt* and not that of a machine. Hammacher contradicted this. According to him the Gestalt-structure was characterized by the fact that the whole is more than the sum of its parts and this feature is lacking in Spinoza. Naess considered this too vague a description of the *Gestalt* to be useful. He did not like the quantitative approach to Spinoza's philosophy as it is found in De Dijn, Rice, Hubbeling, and others. He constructed topological models on the black-board, in which one concept is more comprehensive than the other. By this he did not, however, get rid of the difficult notions of 'more' and 'less', but this has, of course, not escaped his attention.

All this is a (subjective) selection from the many topics of our interesting discussion. Naess thanked Dr. van der Bend for his competent directing of the meeting. The last day was used for a visit to the historical places of Spinoza's life: such as the synagogue in Amsterdam, the houses he lived in in Rijnsburg and The Hague, etc. In contradistinction to the museums of Goethe, Beethoven, Mozart, etc. we can not show e.g. the cup from which the famous man drunk his coffee or the comb with which he made his toilet. But in Rijnsburg Spinoza's beautiful library can still be seen and that is more in accordance with Spinoza's philosophy than the relics mentioned above. Or is this a Freudian remark from the chairman of the association 'Het Spinoza-Huis' inspired by an unspinozistic jealousy, because he is not able to show so much as the museums mentioned above? I leave this to the decision of the reader.

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